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S u m m a r y  o f  R e s e a r c h  P a p e r s  
This dissertation contains three independent research papers that are briefly outlined in 
this section. All projects have in common that they cover research based in two of the 
world’s most important financial centers. Thus, the first research study deals with the 
connection of U.S. interbank risk management and U.S. equity market liquidity. The 
following two papers are located in Switzerland and deal with the determinants of money 
flows of Swiss private banks, and executive compensation in Switzerland. Then, two 
research projects concern financial intermediation - one of the central topics of current 
research in finance. The projects on Swiss private banks and executive compensation in 
Switzerland addresses two entirely different fields, however both are located in 
Switzerland. Hence, as Switzerland is one of the major financial and economic centers, it 
is a main concern to understand central mechanism and challenges that Switzerland faces.  
Motivated by the events around the financial crisis in 2007/2008, the first research project 
“Risk Management and Liquidity” examines the interaction of risk management practices 
in the U.S. interbank market and the level of liquidity in the U.S. equity market. The 
examination of the determinants of liquidity is important, as the level of available 
liquidity primarily affects the scope of asset trading activity. Thus, interbank dealers 
provide the majority of available funding for investors and speculators in the equity 
market. These interbank dealers employ active risk management to control their overall 
exposure and respond to perceived levels of market risk. I provide empirical evidence for 
the existence of cross-market effects and bidirectional causalities between interbank risk 
management practices and equity market liquidity. More specifically, I show that the 
level of perceived risk in the interbank sector seems to be associated with changes in the 
level of liquidity in the equity market. The empirical analysis further reveals, that 
primarily interbank tightness and volatility determine the level of perceived risk of 
interbank dealers. Perceived risk in the interbank sector does not seem to directly interact 
with liquidity in the equity market. It is the interbank financing activity that appears to 
serve as the primary transfer mechanism that connects both parts of the market. 
Furthermore, I show that mutually reinforcing feedback effects between liquidity and risk 
management exist. These effects lead to a stronger aggregate effect than both initial 
shocks considered separately. Studying these effects enables me to contribute to the 
research of why liquidity can suddenly dry up. In particular, I contribute to an existing 
liquidity dry-up spiral framework by adding empirical evidence for an additional risk 
management component.  
The second paper “Net New Money Flows of Swiss Private Banks” is joint work with 
Urs Birchler, Daniel Ettlin and Alexander F. Wagner. It is one of the first papers that 
systematically investigates the determinants of net money flows of Swiss wealth 
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management banks. We are able to examine an unique dataset of assets under 
management and net flows of Swiss private banks available to date. In this research 
project we consider assets under management as the primary source of value creation for 
private banks. Figures on net new money capture the net change of assets under 
management during a specific period and comprise the net amount of assets from new 
and existing clients net of the amount of those clients who withdraw funds or terminate 
their relationship. Thus, we are able to study the organic growth of the asset base of 
Swiss private banks. More specifically, net new money figures capture the variation of 
the asset base in isolation of currency fluctuations, market performance, and interest and 
dividend payments. We find that reputation is a central asset for Swiss private banks. 
Thus, private banks that had a negative media appearance in one year, experience lower 
net new money flows in the following year. Perhaps surprising, we further find evidence 
that banks with strong equity capitalization obtain less net new money. However, this 
result could probably be due to unobserved factors that drive both leverage and client 
acquisition styles. Furthermore, we observe that more cost-efficient banks obtain higher 
levels of net new money. Finally, we establish that there are important differences in 
effects across banks, in particular in terms of bank size, and across time, before and after 
the 2007/08 financial crisis. 
The third paper “Executive Compensation and Disclosure of Compensation in 
Switzerland” is joint work with Alexander F. Wagner. It is one of the first papers that 
provides a comprehensive overview of the contemporaneous structure of levels of board 
and executive compensation in Switzerland. We evaluate an unique and comprehensive 
dataset of executive and board compensation, management and board shareholding 
information of 100 Swiss listed companies for the time period of 2007 until 2011. We 
observe that CEO pay in the largest companies decreases substantially over the sample 
period. Concerning the composition of pay, we document large differences. Thus, top 
executives of large companies receive more equity based compensation than their 
counterparts in smaller companies. We further analyze the extent to which Swiss CEOs 
are rewarded for performance. Concerning the connection of pay and performance, we 
observe that executive pay is primarily associated with return on assets, return on equity, 
and lagged total shareholder return. Remarkably, accounting measures are of lower 
importance. Strikingly, we find that corporate governance is not associated with 
performance. An additional factor that determines the level of total pay is firm 
performance that is purely driven by positive sector performance or favorable 
developments in terms of the exchange rate. We also provide insights into the structure 
and changes of wealth levels of Swiss executives. Lastly, we address the regulatory 
perspective and assess the quality of compensation disclosure in compliance with 
regulatory requirements. We observe a remarkable improvement in disclosure quality 
over the last three years.  
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Risk Management and Liquidity
Michael R. Reichenecker ∗
October 30, 2012
Abstract
This paper examines the interaction of risk management practices in the U.S. interbank sector
and the level of liquidity in the U.S. equity market. Interbank dealers provide the majority
of available funding for investors and speculators in the equity market. As these interbank
dealers employ active risk management to control their overall exposure, they respond to per-
ceived market risk. I provide empirical evidence for the existence of cross-market effects and
bidirectional causalities between interbank risk management practices and equity market liq-
uidity. Specifically, I show that the level of perceived risk in the interbank sector seems to lead
to changes in the level of liquidity in the equity market. Primarily interbank tightness and
volatility determine the level of perceived risk of interbank dealers. While risk management
in the interbank sector does not seem to directly interact with liquidity in the equity market,
interbank financing activity appears to serve as the primary transfer mechanism that connects
both markets. Furthermore, I show that mutually reinforcing feedback effects between liquidity
and risk management exist.
JEL-code: C53, E51, E59, G20
Keywords: Risk management, interbank and financial markets, liquidity, primary dealer
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1. Introduction
This paper provides empirical evidence for an interrelationship between risk management in the
interbanking sector and the level of liquidity in the general equity market. The level of available
funding for investors and speculators in the equity market is provided by intermediaries who finance
themselves in the interbank market. Through this financing activity the interbank sector determines
the level of liquidity and thus the scope of trading activity. In order to control their risk exposure,
financial intermediaries employ active risk management and respond to perceived liquidity and
observed risk by adjusting funding positions.
The central hypothesis - the interaction of risk management practices in the interbank sector
and the level of liquidity in the equity market - is derived from an analytical model by Gaˆrleanu and
Pedersen (2007). Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2007) show that changes in interbank risk management
influence market liquidity and alterations in the level of market liquidity further feed back into
perceived risk. The basic mechanism is that holding periods in the interbank sector are adjusted
to account for prevailing market conditions. More specifically, in response to perceived changes in
the risk environment, interbank institutions adjust their exposure and funding positions. Then,
liquidity effects arise in the equity market, and the corresponding changes in security prices in turn
feed back into the level of perceived risk.
Additionally, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) provide a model that links asset market liq-
uidity and traders’ funding liquidity. In their model, market liquidity in illiquid markets is highly
sensitive to changes in funding conditions and spiral effects emerge that mutually reinforce each
other. A funding shock to speculators is considered to lower market liquidity and increases cor-
responding margins. Hence, initial losses lead to more restricted speculator funding positions and
further increasing margins. Consequently, funding constraints tighten and speculators are forced
to reduce existing positions. Thus, existing positions have to become unwinded and, even worse,
market participants are put in situations where they have to unwind positions during downturns.
These downturning movements connect to a loss spiral where prices drop further, leading to ad-
ditional selling pressure. As both effect reinforce each other, spiral effects can arise. These spiral
effects occur especially in situations when speculators hold large initial positions that are nega-
tively correlated with a demand shocks. Finally, a funding shock could occur that increases market
illiquidity and speculators lose even on their existing positions. At the end, speculators are forced
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to sell more that further decreases corresponding price levels. These liquidity spirals reinforce each
other, implying a larger aggregate effect than the sum of the individual effects.
In providing empirical evidence for the interaction of risk management and liquidity, I extend
this liquidity spiral framework of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008). The risk management effects
connect to their analytical work as an additional spiral effect.
Understanding the determinants of liquidity is important, as the level of available liquidity
directly affects the scope of asset trading activity. Especially in over-the-counter transactions
liquidity, that is, the availability of a counterparty to trade with, is of major importance. In fact,
liquidity is considered as one of the main pillars of the stability of the whole financial system. The
recent financial (subprime) crisis in 2008 highlighted the linkages in the financial system. Thus,
large losses in the subprime market affected the funding activity in many, unrelated, parts of the
financial system. Further, studying potential network effect helps to understand mechanisms that
could arise, when parts of the financial system become into trouble. Hence the understanding of
mutually reinforcing effects allows regulatory authorities to foresee hazardous developments that
could lead to sudden liquidity dry-ups. Furthermore, unexpected or unforeseen vanishing liquidity
imperils the stability of the whole financial system.
To see why the interbank market plays such a big role in this analysis, recall that the demand for
interbank financing emerges when a leveraged trader, such as a dealer, hedge fund, or investment
bank, purchases assets and the amount of the position exceeds its own equity capital. Then,
purchased assets can be used as collateral, facilitating speculators to borrow against it. Thus,
trading in the equity market requires capital in the form of collateral that connects speculators
with parties offering either cash or collateral. Through collateralized lending transactions, interbank
dealers provide liquidity to other financial institutions and market participants enabling them to
settle their trades. The prevailing instrument of lending transactions are repurchase agreements
(in what follows “repos”). A repo is a collateralized financial contract used by market participants
to meet short-term liquidity needs. In a repo transaction, a financial intermediary sells a security
on the understanding that it will buy it back at a pre-agreed price on a fixed future date. The
most typical financing transactions are reverse repo agreements, where a primary dealer provides
general collateral that is rehypotecated in further transactions by market participants.
When opening a financing position the financial intermediaries take on a certain level of risk
exposure. This exposure is primarily determined by the risk over the life of the agreement as well as
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by the timing and market conditions when unwinding the position. In order to maintain solvency
and to meet regulatory and rating requirements, intermediary dealers target a fixed probability of
failure irrespective of the risk environment. This probability of default is directly tied to a specific
ratio of leveraged risk capital to economic capital. Hence, a constant ratio of equity to risk capital
is captured by applying a Value-at-Risk(VaR) rule on the intermediaries risk positions.
Situations such as a massive drop in the valuation of collateral or updates on expected future
volatility determine the level of perceived risk. In order to maintain a constant probability of de-
fault, financial intermediaries react according to their risk management principles and adjust their
exposure correspondingly. Thus, holding positions are adjusted by increasing margin requirements
for financing transactions in order to scale corresponding positions. Furthermore collateral require-
ment are altered. Consequently, the overall risk bearing capacity in the market is expected to
decrease and speculators face additional selling pressure to unwind even existing positions. Finally,
the assessment of the prevailing level of risk is expected to determine the level of intermediaries’
financing activity in the interbank market. Then, this financing channel determines the level of
liquidity in the equity market. Hence, risk management and the level of collateral available for
financing transactions seem to be connected. Therefore, as a first hypothesis, I expect to observe
a negative relationship between the level of perceived risk of financial intermediaries and the level
of liquidity in the general equity market.
As a second hypothesis, I expect to observe feedback effects between the level of liquidity in
the equity market and the level of perceived interbank risk. Thus, in benign economic situations,
such as an economic upswing, the forecasted risk declines and more agents are pushed to the equity
market. Coincidently with increasing securities prices, the potential funding demand as well as
the level of liquidity increases. Hence, as prices, the level of liquidity and market conditions are
reflected in the aggregate risk exposure, financing constraints are expected to loosen.
Third, I expect to observe a mutual interaction of both main effects. I expect to find evidence for
a multiplier effect where tighter risk management results in more restricted positions that reduces
liquidity. Reduced liquidity implies less demand as well as reduced level of potential counterpar-
ties that subsequently increases expected selling times. Then, increased selling times and reduced
liquidity come along with an increase in expected losses. As active risk-management anticipates
these effects, the assessment of risk further tightens and restricts new as well as existing funding
positions. More specifically, I expect to observe that these two effects mutually reinforce each other,
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resulting in a multiplier effect where tighter risk management results in more restricted positions.
Hence, reduced liquidity is associated with an increase in expected selling times. Subsequently,
longer selling times come along with an increase in expected losses that further impact the assess-
ment of risk. Furthermore, a reduction of positions that is amplified by restricted funding decreases
available liquidity and otherwise translates into reduced risk-bearing capacity and hence increases
the time to find a counterparty. Thus, reduced liquidity in the equity market subsequently further
implies tighter risk management.
The empirical analysis recognizes that there are further factors that determine the scope of
funding in the interbank market. Hence, I control for tightness in the interbank market and
volatility in the equity market. I expect to observe that increased tightness in the interbank
market is negatively associated with the level of aggregate funding activity. Volatility in the equity
market is expected to interact with the prevalent level of liquidity.
I test these hypotheses of mutually interacting spiral effects using hand-collected quarterly
Value-at-Risk disclosures of Primary Dealers of the New York Federal Reserve Bank. Furthermore,
I include data of Primary Dealer transaction and financing disclosures of the New York Federal
Reserve Bank. The equity market is represented by the CRSP universe of stocks. Further I include
variables capturing general market conditions such as the three month Libor-OIS and Ted spread
as measures of tightness in the interbank market. Additionally, I include volatility captured by the
CBOE VIX index.
In order to test these hypotheses I conduct several cross-correlation and Granger-causation
tests. Vector autoregression model specifications allow to observe potential lead and lag effects that
connect the interbank and equity market. Overall, I provide evidence that the perceived level of
risk in the interbank market and the level of liquidity in the equity market seem to be associated.
Thus, the level of perceived risk in the interbank markets seems to be directly associated with
innovations in the level of liquidity. Primarily interbank tightness and volatility seem to determine
the level of perceived risk in the interbank sector. Risk management in the interbank sector does
not seem to directly interact with liquidity in the equity market, but interbank financing activity
appears to serve as the primary transfer mechanism that connects both markets.
Finally, the impulse-response functions illustrate the mutual interaction of liquidity in the equity
market and risk management in the interbank market. In order to provide a first overview about
the central finding, Figure 1 depicts the central interaction mechanisms between both markets.
13
Primary Dealer Risk 
Management(VaR)
Equity Market 
Liquidity
LIBOIS
TED VIX
Interbank Market Equity Market
Financing 
Activity
Figure 1. Central interaction mechanisms.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 puts my work in the context of the current liter-
ature and describes the institutional background. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 provides
descriptive statistics. Section 5 examines the relationship between the level of risk management
and the level of liquidity in the general stock market. Section 6 concludes.
2. Additional related Literature
Generally there has been very little empirical work on the interaction of interbank risk management
practices and equity market liquidity. The subsequent section covers primarily relevant scholars
from periphery regions. Basically, the demand for financing arises when a leveraged trader conducts
a transaction that exceeds the amount of his own equity. Then, he can use the purchased asset of
the transaction and can borrow against it. However, the dealer cannot borrow the entire amount
and the remaining margin (haircut) must be financed by the trader. Typically a dealer bank lends
funds against collateral in repurchase transactions. Another financing method are security lending
transactions where an investor lends a security while accepting other securities or cash as collateral.
Both of these financing mechanisms involve in a cycle of continuous lending and rehypotecation of
collateral between the interbank sector and other participants in the equity market. Ho¨rdahl and
King (2008) provide some insight to this securitized-banking system and state that the (former)
top U.S. investment banks funded roughly half of their assets using repo markets.
Since margins can be adopted to market conditions on a daily basis, the duration of these lending
agreements is short. As a consequence, traders do not carry much excess capital and changes in
margins and haircuts force traders to adjust their positions. The funding risk can therefore be split
into margin (haircut) funding risk, rollover risk, and redemption risk (Brunnermeier (2009)).
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Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) provide a model that connects the funding of speculators
and market liquidity. They study the interaction between funding and market liquidity and observe
that large market shocks trigger to switch to a high margin equilibrium, where markets become
illiquid. Hence, financiers set margins in accordance to their risk assessment in order to control
their overall risk exposure that is determined by the underlying level of equity. In situations where
tighter risk management lets traders hit their capital constraint or they risk to hit it during the live
of a trade, they reduce their positions and market liquidity falls as a result (“stabilizing margins”).
Furthermore it can happen that they are forced to further de-lever (“destabilizing margins”). These
liquidity spirals bring down asset prices and financial institutions capital erodes, while at the same
time lending standards and margins tighten. Both liquidity effects can mutually reinforce each
other, pushing down prices and tightening funding even further ((Brunnermeier, 2009)). Further,
their model implies that market liquidity can suddenly dry up, is related to volatility, and co-moves
with the market.
Since liquidity is a priced factor, security prices are also affected (Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003)
and Amihud (2002)). Additionally, de-leveraging transactions and selling pressure increase the
demand for liquidity. Hameed and Viswanathan (2010) provide empirical evidence for a decrease in
liquidity and argue that this effect occurs especially during times of tightness in the funding market.
Hameed and Viswanathan (2010) show that spillover effects from capital constraints in the market
making sector. They state that liquidity dry-ups occur because market participants engage in
panic selling (demand effect) and financial intermediaries withdraw from providing liquidity (supply
effect) or a combination of both. Therefore market-makers balance sheet and income statement
variables determine daily stock market liquidity (Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton,
and Seasholes (2010)).
Gorton and Metrick (2011) support this view and show that in the crisis of 2008 raising haircuts
led to massive constraints in the repo lending for various forms of collateral. Finally that led to
massive deleveraging transactions. These effects were observed for many securities for which the
repo market offered only overnight loans or shut down completely as reflection of reduced funding
capacity. Selling pressure increased and securities prices fell even more (Krishnamurthy (2010) and
He and Krishnamurthy (2010)).
Another aspect is the interaction of changes in balance sheet size and leverage. Thus, the
asset side of the balance sheets of interbank dealers mainly consists of traded assets and reverse
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repos. Traded assets and repos are valued marked-to-market and for short term collateralized
loans the book value reflects the current market value. The liability side of interbank balance
sheets is characterized by short positions and repurchase agreements that are valued at market
prices. Typically long-term debt is of minor importance. The market-value based structure of the
balance sheets of financial institutions implies that changes in asset prices show up immediately in
their balance sheets. Thus, in situations where the economic environment is benign and forecasted
risk declines, asset prices are expected to rise. Hence, the asset side of the balance sheet rises and
total leverage, considered as the ratio of total assets to equity, falls correspondingly. The then
strengthened balance sheets put the intermediaries in a situation where they hold spare capital.
This capital is employed by taking on additional debt to purchase securities to bring leverage back
to the initial level.
Adrian and Shin (2010) show that increases in leverage are strongly negatively related with
shocks to other risk measures such as lagged CDS spread changes or innovations in lagged implied
volatility. In contrast to leverage there seems to exist almost no association between the growth
of risk measures and equity. Equity seems to be unaffected by changes in the observed risk envi-
ronment. Adrian and Shin (2010) conclude that models of risk and economic capital dictate active
management of the overall VaR. Thus, financial intermediaries actively adjust their balance sheets
in a pro-cyclical manner, such that leverage is high during booms and low during busts.
Basically the aggregate balance sheet size of financial intermediaries determines the level of
available liquidity in the equity market. The margin of adjustment of balance sheets is through
repos and reverse repos. Apart from that, changes in the dealers’ financing and repo activity can
be considered as forecasting measure of changes in financial market risk. Adrian and Shin (2010)
use the VIX index to capture innovations in financial market risk.
Adrian and Shin (2011) provide a systemic empirical investigation on how banks adjust their
balance sheets to actively manage their risk exposure. They show that feedback effects arise where
financial intermediaries’ balance sheets become stronger as asset prices increase. Thus, a surge
in assets prices lets, without adjustments in the asset holdings, total leverage decrease and the
financial intermediaries hold excess capital. This surplus capital is employed by borrowing more on
the liability side and implies searching for more potential borrowers on the asset side in turn. Thus,
larger balance sheets and higher leverage are associated with greater willingness to take on further
exposures and an increase in the provision of financing collateral. In these financing transactions
16
Primary Dealers adjust their liabilities in a way to ensure that their total VaR is proportional to
total equity (Adrian and Shin (2011)).
Therefore, the available funding capacity is connected with risk assessment that finally deter-
mines the height of leverage. In response to an increase of risk in financial transactions after a
shock, the intermediary sector cuts its asset exposures. This allows to keep the probability of de-
fault constant and to anticipate potential further shocks. Adrian and Shin (2011) provide empirical
evidence that during the recent financial crisis interbank dealers sharply reduced their leverage
whereas the ratio of VaR to equity remained fairly constant. Again, this indicates that leveraged
financial intermediaries actively manage their balance sheets in order to maintain a constant ratio
of VaR to equity. Thus, equity is the pre-determined variable and the size of the balance sheet
(total assets) is the endogenous choice variable that is determined by the willingness of banks to
take on further risk exposure given the realized value of equity. Finally, the active management
of balance sheets leads to pro-cyclical leverage effects where financial intermediaries’ leverage is
potentially high when total asset prices are generally large.
Lastly, my work is related to Nyborg and O¨stberg (2010) who work on a connection between
the interbank market for liquidity and the broader financial markets. They show that tightness in
the interbank market for liquidity leads to “liquidity pull-back”-effects which involve the selling of
financial assets either by banks directly or by leveraged investors. This also establishes a connection
between the interbank market for liquidity and the broader financial market, which is based on the
demand for liquidity by banks.
3. Data
3.1. Interbanking Sector and Risk Management Disclosures
As representatives of the interbank sector I consider the group of Primary Dealers that serve
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (henceforth NY FED) as trading counterparties in its
implementation of monetary policy. Primary Dealers are banks and security broker-dealers that
trade U.S. Government securities with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The NY FED
publishes a current list of the institutions being acknowledged as Primary Dealer as well as an
archive of revisions since January 1998.1
1 http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pridealers listing.html
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The resulting panel of dealer banks is unbalanced, because there are additions to and with-
drawals from the list as well as substantial consolidation and internal reorganizations among the
group of primary dealers. The sample period lasts from the 4th quarter 1998 until the 1st quarter
2010(46 quarters).
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires all large U.S. publicly traded corpo-
rations to report quantitative information about their risk management practices in their financial
reports filed with the SEC. Registrants may choose from three different reporting methods: (1)
a tabular presentation describing fair value under market fluctuations, (2) a sensitivity analysis
describing potential changes in fair values under market fluctuations, and (3) VaR numbers. This
disclosure requirement is based on the SEC (1997) market risk disclosure rule FRR No. 48 (item
305 of SEC Regulation S-K “Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures about Market Risk”) became
effective in 1998 (Jorion (2002)).
The risk management data are publicly available from regulatory filings with the SEC on quar-
terly 10-Q and yearly 10-K forms.
The VaR is a quantile measure of a potential loss distribution due to adverse market movements
over a defined time horizon. Based on regulatory requirements it equals the amount of equity
capital that a firm must hold in order to stay solvent with a given probability. VaR captures a loss
distribution defined as the smallest benchmark amount such that the probability that the realized
loss turns out to be bigger than the benchmark amount is below some fixed probability (p). If a
bank were to manage its idiosyncratic risk, emerging from different exposures, by maintaining VaR
not to be bigger than its equity capital, the bank would ensure its solvency with at least (1-p).
Thus, the VaR summarizes the effect of leverage, diversification, and adverse price movements in a
single dollar amount.2 Usually the VaR estimations are based on historical positions and market
data as well as on the underlying assumptions disclosed in the SEC filing.
In the Primary Dealer sample VaRs are reported at either 95% or 99% confidence levels. There-
fore the figures across different companies are not readily comparable. To address this constraint,
I follow Adrian and Shin (2011) and adjust the VaR figures to an equal confidence level. Hence,
2 In order to consider the validity of these numbers, it is important to note that the institutions actual loss on a
particular day may exceed the amount indicated by the VaR. Thus, the indicated VaR figures do not predict the
magnitude of losses that should they occur, may be significantly greater than the projected amount. Thus, an
institution’s exemplary 95% daily VaR, based on historically observed market risk factor movements, implies that
the unrealized loss in its portfolio value would have been exceeded with a frequency of 5% or on one out of 20
trading days.
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I scale the VaR to a 99% level by multiplying with Φ−1(99)/Φ−1(95) ≈ 1.414, where Φ−1 denotes
the inverse CDF of the normal standard distribution.
3.2. Financing Activity
The NY FED collects transactions, positions, financing and settlement data of the Primary Dealers
in U.S. Treasury securities, agency debt securities, mortgage-backed securities, and corporate debt
securities. Individual positions are reported via form FR 2004 and are publicly available from the
website of the NY FED on a weekly consolidated basis since July 4, 2001.3
I focus on a subset of this data covering the financing activity of the Primary Dealers. On
a gross basis these data are separated into securities that are received by a dealer (“securities
in”) and delivered securities (“securities out”). A transaction where a dealer enters into a repo
in which he borrows funds and provides securities as collateral is considered as “securities out”.
The financing data are further broken down according to the term of the financing agreement. An
overnight financing agreement is an agreement that settles on one business day and matures on the
next business day. For example, overnight financing includes a Tuesday to Wednesday agreement.
Continuing contracts cover agreements that remain in effect for more than one business day, but
have no specific maturity and can be terminated on demand by either the borrower or the lender.
A term agreement is an agreement with an original fixed maturity of more than one business day
that is not a continuing contract.
Basically, the main financing activity of Primary Dealers is measured by the difference between
repos and reverse repos. However this measure does not account for transactions that are tanta-
mount to repo financing activity, but are not reported as such (Adrian and Fleming (2005)). The
difference between “securities in” and “securities out”, designated as “net financing”, and between
repo and reverse repo transaction, designated as “net repo financing”, allows to captures the net
amount of funds that Primary Dealers borrow through all fixed-income securities financing trans-
actions and repo transactions, respectively. This measure encompasses all financing transactions
reported by the dealers. These net financing measures account for the funds borrowed by Primary
Dealers through financing transactions.
3 http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/statrel.html.
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3.3. Volume and Returns
The stock market data come from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). I consider
ordinary common shares that are listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX over the period January
1, 1999 until March 31, 2010. By focussing on CRSP share codes 10 or 11 only, I exclude Certificates,
American depositary receipts, Shares of Beneficial Interest, Units, Companies incorporated outside
the U.S., Americus Trust Components, Close-end funds, and Real Investment Trusts because, their
trading characteristics might differ from ordinary equities. Financials are also excluded by removing
firms with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes between 6000 and 6999. Additionally I
remove stocks whose price exceeds $999 or firms that changes ticker, cusip or exchange; penny
stocks are implicitly included. This results in an average of 3871 stocks per day.
3.4. Measurement of Liquidity
Goyenko and Trzcinka (2009) show that useful liquidity measures can be constructed from low-
frequency (daily) stock returns and volume data. I follow their suggestion and employ the Amihud
(2002) price impact measure of liquidity to capture the scope at which assets are influenced by a
trade. Thus, an equity market is considered to be liquid and exhibits a high depth, even if high
volume trades do not lead to large price movements. Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure captures
“daily price responses associated with one dollar of trading volume” or, stated differently, the price
impact of order flow.
Stock illiquidity is defined as the average ratio of the daily absolute return (absolute change in
price) of a stock to its dollar trading volume on that day, i.e. |Ridt|V OLDidt . Ridt is the return on stock
i on day d of time period t and V OLDidt is the daily volume in dollars.
ILLIQit =
1
Dit
Dit∑
t=1
( |Ritd|
V OLDitd
)
(1)
where, Dit is the number of days for which data are available for stock i in time period T. Due
to the fact that VaR figures are only available quarterly the subsequent analysis is conducted on a
quarterly basis. Thus the average in Equation (1) is taken across observations of stock i for each
quarter t, when the recorded volume is positive and the current and past return on days t and t-1
is non-negative.
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3.5. Tightness in the Interbank Market
The state of the interbank market is captured by the Libor-OIS and TED spread. These two
spread measures reflect the interbank credit and liquidity differential (Schwarz (2010)). The London
Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) is the interest rate paid on unsecured interbank market loans where
the borrower receives an agreed amount of money either at call or for a given period of time.
Overnight index swaps (OIS) are sequences of overnight bank credits where counterparties agree
to exchange the difference between a fixed interest rate and the realized compounded overnight
interbank rate. In contrast to Libor loans, OIS transactions exhibit less counterparty risk because
at maturity only the differential between the two interest rates is exchanged and the underlying
notional is not exchanged. Hence, the difference between the Libor and the OIS rate with the
same maturity effectively captures the spread between unsecured and secured loans. Naturally,
this ratio is considered to capture the counterparty risk in the secured and unsecured interbank
market (Gorton and Metrick (2011)).
The Libor-OIS spread refers to the difference between the 3-month USD Libor and 3-month
USD OIS rate. Data for OIS-Libor are available daily, but cover only the period from December 4,
2001 until March 31, 2010. In order to cover the whole period of VaR observations, I include the
TED spread as an alternative measure for interbank tightness. The TED spread is the difference
between the 3-month USD Libor rate and the 3-month Treasury Bill rate. This implies that the
TED-spread can be considered as substitute for the Libor-OIS spread. This is justified, because
the in-sample correlation between these two measures on a weekly and monthly weighted averaged
basis is 0.928 and 0.925, respectively.
Finally, the aggregate financial market volatility is measured by the VIX index. This index
reflects the realized volatility in the S&P 500 Index. The data are downloaded from the Chicago
Board of Options Exchange for the whole sample period.
4. Basic Properties of the Data
This section provides an overview of the main variables used to determine the interaction between
the level of liquidity in the equity market and the prevailing effects of risk management practices in
the interbanking sector. In order to consider the fact that financial institutions’ risk management
disclosures (VaR) are available only on a quarterly basis, all variables are aggregated over one
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quarter.
4.1. Summary Statistics
Table A.1 in the appendix provides a description of the financial institutions that are covered in
this paper and the reporting quarters where VaR observations were obtained. In total there are
404 individual hand-collected VaR reportings available, providing an average of around nine VaR
observations per quarter.
Table I presents summary statistics for levels and first differences of the variables capturing
liquidity in the equity market, the amount of perceived risk in the interbanking sector, data about
intermediary financing activity, and variables capturing the status of the interbank and equity
markets, respectively.
The panel of VaR-disclosing institutions is averaged by equal weights on a quarterly basis to
get one aggregate observation per quarter. Over the period of 46 quarters, the Primary Dealers
reported an average VaR of USD 78.83 millions with a standard deviation of USD 49.66 millions.4
Over the sample from 1998Q4 until 2010Q1, the average quarterly illiquidity was 0.2593 with
a standard deviation of 1.200. Illiquidity is only moderately skewed whereas the VaR measure is
highly skewed. The measure for equity market volatility (VIX ) is itself quite volatile and highly
skewed. Both of the interbank variables (LIBOIS and TED) show similar patterns, which justifies
the further use of the TED measure instead of LIBOIS to benefit from the longer time-series
availability of this measure.
In order to capture the total amount of financing activity of the interbanking sector, weekly mea-
sures of financing activity are summed up for each quarter. Netfinancing (NETFIN ) and netrepo
(NETREPO) transaction cover the total sum of quarterly financing activity of Primary Dealers.
To get a more differentiated understanding about the financing activity, the financing measures are
further broken up according to the maturity of the agreements. Netfinancing and netrepo financing
activity on a term basis is captured by NETFINT and NETREPOT ; overnight and continuing
financing activity is measured by NETFINO and NETREPOO, respectively. Figure A.2 pro-
vides an overview about the aggregated quarterly amounts of Primary Dealer financing activity. A
graphical inspection reveals that netrepo transactions exceed netfinancing transaction by around
three times. Thus, Primary Dealers lent during the period between 1998Q4 and 2010Q1 an average
4 Note that the standard deviations essentially refer to quarterly deviations because of quarterly aggregation.
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Table I
Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for levels and first differences of the variables capturing liquidity in the equity market, the amount
of perceived risk in the interbanking sector, data about intermediary financing activity, and variables capturing the status of the interbank
and equity market. ILLIQ stands for Amihud’s illiquidity measure, VAR captures the risk management of the Primary Dealers, reported
in million USD, VIX stands for the measure of volatility in the equity market, LIBOIS and TED measure the tightness in the interbank
market and are reported in percentage points. All of these variables are equally averaged over one quarter and cover the time period
between 1998Q4 and 2010Q1. NETFINANCING and NETREPO cover the financing activity of the interbank sector via securities lending
and repo transactions, respectively; the suffixes T and O specify the maturity of the contract, where T stands for term and O determines
overnight and continuing agreements, respectively. These financing data are reported in million USD and available since July 4, 2001 and
are summed up of the corresponding quarters. Panel A reports the statistics for levels and Panel B shows the summary statistics of the
first differences of the variables.
ILLIQ VAR VIX LIBOIS TED NETFIN NETFINT NETFINO NETREPO NETREPOT NETREPOO
Panel A: Levels
Mean 2.593 78.832 22.434 29.835 52.523 3615.179 -4748.560 8363.738 11878.520 -1951.644 13830.160
Median 2.381 59.740 21.836 12.533 38.649 3210.199 -5054.765 8111.299 10352.760 -1666.653 13551.150
Standard Deviation 1.200 49.665 8.911 41.251 45.907 1437.081 1471.875 2610.685 4103.151 1081.238 4140.410
Kurtosis 2.410 3.129 7.647 12.055 8.327 3.959 1.543 2.053 1.955 3.403 1.953
Skewness 0.539 1.163 1.691 2.862 2.140 1.340 0.158 0.475 0.545 -0.917 0.292
Range 1.937 56.444 10.304 13.246 45.557 1636.102 2828.383 4226.731 6637.783 1075.620 7270.723
Minimum 0.956 23.640 11.035 6.569 14.467 1925.679 -7271.270 4996.922 6660.480 -4789.890 8030.804
Maximum 5.521 206.863 58.605 210.533 245.206 7716.227 -2411.432 13880.970 19985.630 -128.044 22184.740
Observations 46 46 46 34 46 35 35 35 35 35 35
Panel B: First Differences
Mean -0.053 2.101 -0.208 -0.300 -1.715 -3.812 -63.165 59.353 41.022 -53.224 94.246
Median -0.169 0.103 -0.769 -0.973 0.227 -43.912 -55.016 208.091 391.981 -79.733 279.581
Standard Deviation 0.643 14.973 6.922 31.774 34.093 657.377 543.409 863.549 1173.918 568.130 1088.992
Kurtosis 5.938 9.575 14.184 11.173 9.192 2.893 2.740 3.744 6.956 3.202 3.437
Skewness 0.284 1.820 2.517 0.363 -0.843 0.225 0.403 0.052 -1.996 -0.443 -0.780
Range 0.611 12.813 3.584 4.714 14.808 811.893 637.395 841.803 1030.906 756.533 969.023
Minimum -2.117 -26.235 -13.605 -109.377 -140.845 -1369.880 -995.466 -2075.599 -4061.974 -1406.117 -2701.593
Maximum 2.035 67.701 33.532 119.310 103.545 1556.684 1148.863 2396.273 1360.718 1007.028 2317.592
Observations 45 45 45 33 45 34 34 34 34 34 34
amount of USD 11.8 billions in repo transactions and USD 3.6 billions in other financing trans-
actions. Interestingly, the amount of securities that Primary Dealers report as incoming exceeds
the amount of securities they lend in term financing transaction. Thus, when conduction term
financing and term repo transactions Primary Dealers are net long in the market. This pattern
reveals that that Primary Dealers purchase securities securities on term agreements and provide
their main financing activity in short-run (overnight and continuing) agreements.
Next, in the subsequent analysis I evaluate the data conducting several time series approaches.
Generally, the first step in time series analysis is to test whether a time series is stationary. I
conduct this analysis using the augmented Dickey Fullers test as well as the Phillips-Perron test.
The augmented Dickey-Fuller (1988) test involves to fit a model like in Equation (2) by ordinary
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least squares (OLS)):
∆yt = α+ βyt−1 +
k∑
j=1
ζj∆yt−1 + t (2)
where k is the number of lags and t is an independently and identically distributed zero-mean
error term. I specify the model by allowing for a constant term (α 6= 0) and by testing for up to
four lags.
Panel A of Table II reports the results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests for the null
hypothesis of a unit root in all interbank and equity market variables. All ADF-test statistics are
above the critical values for reasonable levels of significance and indicate the existence of unit-
root processes. These results are confirmed in a second test for unit-roots in time series data.
The Phillips-Perron (1988) test is justified as it employs Newey-West (1987) standard errors to
account for serial correlation. Thus, Phillips and Perron’s test statistics can be viewed as Dickey-
Fuller statistics that are robust to serial correlation using Newey-West (1987) heteroskedastic- and
autocorrelation-consistent covariance matrix estimators. The Phillips-Perron test involves fitting
the regression:
yt = α+ ρyt−1 + t (3)
by OLS with a constant term. The results provide evidence for the indication derived from the
previous test. Hence, all test statistics are above the critical values and the null hypothesis cannot
be rejected for any of the variables. The implication of this findings is that the further models used
to test for causality should be specified in first differences.
Panel B of Table II provides the results after first-differencing each variable: The test statistics
for the ADF and Phillips-Perron test are below the critical values for common levels of significance.
Hence, taking the first difference of the interbank and equity market variables allows to achieve
stationary variables.
4.2. Correlations
Table III presents the time series correlations for levels and first differences of the variables capturing
risk management, measures of the state of the equity and interbank market and financing variables.
A first inspection of the level-based panel reveals that there does not seem to exist any cor-
relation between risk management in the interbank sector and the level of liquidity in the equity
market. However, both liquidity and risk management variables exhibit significant and positive
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Table II
Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Unit-root Test Statistics
This table presents test statistics for Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests for the existence of unit-roots. DF presents the
Dickey-Fuller test statistics and the corresponding critical value at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The same information
is presented for the Phillips-Perron Test as well as the corresponding critical values at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The
underlying null hypothesis is that the variables contain a unit root, and the alternative is that the variable was generated
by a stationary process. Panel A shows the test results for levels of the variables, and Panel B provides test results for first
differences variables. ILLIQ stands for Amihud’s illiquidity measure, VaR captures the risk management of the primary
dealers, VIX stands for the measure of volatility in the equity market, LIBOIS and TED measure the tightness in the
interbank market. These data were equally averaged over one quarter and cover the time period between 1998Q4 and
2010Q1. NETFINANCING and NETREPO cover the financing activity of the interbank sector via securities lending or
repo transactions; the suffixes T and O specify the maturity of the contract, where T stands for term and O determines
overnight and continuing agreements, respectively.
VARIABLES ADF Critical Values p Perron Critical Values p Obs
1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10%
Panel A: Levels
ILLIQ -1.754 -3.614 -2.944 -2.606 0.404 -2.154 -3.614 -2.944 -2.606 0.223 45
VAR -0.620 -3.614 -2.944 -2.606 0.866 -0.449 -3.614 -2.944 -2.606 0.902 45
NETFIN -1.453 -3.668 -2.966 -2.616 0.557 -1.767 -3.668 -2.966 -2.616 0.397 37
NETFINO -1.459 -3.668 -2.966 -2.616 0.554 -1.548 -3.668 -2.966 -2.616 0.510 37
NETFINT -1.620 -3.668 -2.966 -2.616 0.473 -1.534 -3.668 -2.966 -2.616 0.516 37
NETREPO -0.991 -3.668 -2.966 -2.616 0.756 -1.362 -3.668 -2.966 -2.616 0.601 37
NETREPOO -1.357 -3.668 -2.966 -2.616 0.603 -1.505 -3.668 -2.966 -2.616 0.531 37
NETREPOT -0.975 -3.668 -2.966 -2.616 0.762 -1.033 -3.668 -2.966 -2.616 0.741 37
LIBOIS -2.266 -3.696 -2.978 -2.620 0.183 -2.300 -3.696 -2.978 -2.620 0.172 33
TED -2.626 -3.614 -2.944 -2.606 0.088 -2.612 -3.614 -2.944 -2.606 0.091 45
VIX -2.801 -3.614 -2.944 -2.606 0.058 -2.797 -3.614 -2.944 -2.606 0.059 45
Panel B: First Differences
D.ILLIQ -4.529 -3.621 -2.947 -2.607 0.000 -4.446 -3.621 -2.947 -2.607 0.000 44
D.VAR -7.354 -3.621 -2.947 -2.607 0.000 -7.478 -3.621 -2.947 -2.607 0.000 44
D.NETFIN -4.627 -3.675 -2.969 -2.617 0.000 -4.687 -3.675 -2.969 -2.617 0.000 36
D.NETFINO -4.747 -3.675 -2.969 -2.617 0.000 -4.729 -3.675 -2.969 -2.617 0.000 36
D.NETFINT -7.189 -3.675 -2.969 -2.617 0.000 -7.327 -3.675 -2.969 -2.617 0.000 36
D.NETREPO -3.048 -3.675 -2.969 -2.617 0.031 -3.044 -3.675 -2.969 -2.617 0.031 36
D.NETREPOO -3.379 -3.675 -2.969 -2.617 0.012 -3.358 -3.675 -2.969 -2.617 0.013 36
D.NETREPOT -5.395 -3.675 -2.969 -2.617 0.000 -5.366 -3.675 -2.969 -2.617 0.000 36
D.LIBOIS -6.242 -3.702 -2.980 -2.622 0.000 -6.307 -3.702 -2.980 -2.622 0.000 32
D.TED -7.563 -3.621 -2.947 -2.607 0.000 -7.746 -3.621 -2.947 -2.607 0.000 44
D.VIX -6.938 -3.621 -2.947 -2.607 0.000 -7.104 -3.621 -2.947 -2.607 0.000 44
correlation with the variables capturing the tightness in each of the underlying markets. Thus,
tightness in the equity market, captured by VIX, correlates positively with illiquidity and risk
management variables. Tightness in the interbank market, captured by LIBOIS or TED, is also
positively associated with risk management variables in the interbank market and liquidity in the
equity market. Naturally, the correlations analysis reveals that the scope of correlation is higher
between the variable capturing the level of risk and the corresponding underlying market.
As expected, both financing measures are largely correlated with the level of perceived risk of
the financial institutions and the scope of correlation is higher for netfinancing activity. Thus, an
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increase in financing activity, increases the exposure that is associated with an increase in capital
at risk. Then, as previously seen, Primary Dealers are net long in financing transactions with
term maturity. This pattern is also reflected in the correlations as both netfinancing and netrepo
on a term basis are negatively associated with perceived risk. Contrary to that, liquidity in the
equity market is only significantly correlated with netrepo financing measures in total and split
into different maturities. This seems to reflect the fact that repo financing is more important as it
provides larger amounts of collateral. The association between repo financing and equity market
illiquidity is negative and indicates that increasing repo funding increases the amount of available
collateral for market transactions that further increases trading and finally influences the prevailing
level of liquidity.5
Further, a first indication for a connection between the interbank and equity market arises
from the positive and significant correlation between tightness in the interbank market (LIBOIS
and TED), and volatility in the equity market (VIX ). Additionally, tightness in the interbank
market is positively associated with aggregated financing activity. Thus, netfinancing and netrepo
measures are highly significantly correlated with LIBOIS and TED.
This first analysis of correlations in levels allows to assume the existence of a potential as-
sociation between risk management in the interbank market and liquidity in the equity market.
While, there does not seem to arise a direct association but potential connection mechanisms arise.
Hence, liquidity and risk management are both mutually correlated with tightness measures of both
markets as well as with financing activity. The financing measures are also correlated with risk
management and liquidity. Thus, it seems plausible to consider measures of tightness and financing
variables as potential transfer variables.
Panel B of Table III reports the correlations after first differencing the variables of panel A. It
turns out that changes in liquidity in the equity market are highly significantly correlated (0.52)
with changes in risk management. Next, an increase in the changes in perceived risk that Primary
Dealers face in the interbank market seems to be transferred to the equity market as illiquidity
increases there. Reportings of marked-related tightness measures and risk management reveals,
that differencing of the variables has almost no impact on the correlation of these measures. Like
in the previous analysis of levels, the differences of equity market volatility, interbank tightness,
liquidity and risk management are strongly positively and highly significantly correlated with each
5 Note that increasing levels of liquidity are captured by a decrease in the Amihud Illiquidity measure.
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Table III
Correlations
This table presents the correlation matrix for the time series of interbank market, equity market and interbank financing variables. Panel A
shows the correlations in levels of the variables, and Panel B provides the correlations for the first differences of the variables. ILLIQ stands
for Amihud’s illiquidity measure, VAR is capturing the risk management of Primary Dealers, VIX stands for the measure of volatility in the
equity market, LIBOIS and TED measure tightness in the interbank market. These data were equally averaged over one quarter and cover
the time period between 1998Q4 and 2010Q1. NETFINANCING and NETREPO cover the financing activity of the interbank sector via
securities lending or repo transactions; the suffixes T and O specify the maturity of the contract, where T stands for term and O determines
overnight and continuing agreements, respectively.
ILLIQ VAR VIX LIBOIS TED NETFIN NETFINT NETFINO NETREPO NETREPOT NETREPOO
Panel A: Correlations in Levels
ILLIQ 1.000
VAR 0.026 1.000
VIX 0.858*** 0.389*** 1.000
LIBOIS 0.595*** 0.716*** 0.789*** 1.000
TED 0.300** 0.551*** 0.560*** 0.928*** 1.000
NETFIN 0.012 0.573*** 0.199 0.581*** 0.769*** 1.000
NETFINT 0.210 -0.788*** -0.091 -0.462*** -0.586*** -0.611*** 1.000
NETFINO -0.112 0.760*** 0.161 0.583*** 0.754*** 0.895*** -0.900*** 1.000
NETREPO -0.434*** 0.374** -0.234 0.270 0.570*** 0.820*** -0.710*** 0.852*** 1.000
NETREPOT -0.292* -0.748*** -0.491*** -0.486*** -0.343** -0.089 0.575*** -0.373** 0.097 1.000
NETREPOO -0.353** 0.566*** -0.104 0.399** 0.655*** 0.835*** -0.854*** 0.941*** 0.966*** -0.165 1.000
(b) Correlations in First Differences
ILLIQ 1.000
VAR 0.523*** 1.000
VIX 0.794*** 0.610*** 1.000
LIBOIS 0.604*** 0.618*** 0.811*** 1.000
TED 0.454*** 0.471*** 0.658*** 0.944*** 1.000
NETFIN -0.077 0.15 -0.024 0.117 0.229 1.000
NETFINT -0.261 -0.244 0.044 0.121 0.187 -0.026 1.000
NETFINO 0.106 0.268 -0.046 0.013 0.056 0.777*** -0.649*** 1.000
NETREPO -0.339** -0.221 -0.292* -0.135 0.027 0.747*** -0.044 0.597*** 1.000
NETREPOT -0.518*** -0.467*** -0.293* -0.201 -0.106 0.046 0.669*** -0.386** 0.386** 1.000
NETREPOO -0.096 0.005 -0.162 -0.041 0.084 0.782*** -0.397** 0.845*** 0.877*** -0.106 1.000
*p<0.10,**p<0.05, ***p<0.01
other.
However, considering interbank financing activity as potential mechanism of transfer and con-
nection between the interbank market and liquidity in the equity market, there does not seem
to exist a direct connection in the differences. Especially the significant correlations between the
financing measures and risk management vanish. Solely changes in repo agreements with term
maturity remain significantly associated with changes in risk management and exhibit almost the
same coefficients as before. Then, repo and term repo financing remain significantly correlated with
illiquidity. The significant association between tightness in the interbank market and volatility in
the equity market also survives the first-differencing. Finally, changes in the financing activity at
arbitrary maturity are no longer associated with changes in the state of the interbank market.
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The analysis of correlations of levels and first differences provides a first indication of potential
interaction effects between liquidity in the equity market and risk management in the interbanking
sector. After taking the differencing, liquidity and risk management are positively and significantly
correlated with each other. It seems also plausible to consider financing measures and variables
capturing tightness in both markets as potential indicators that connect both markets.
5. Interaction of Risk Management Practices and Market Liquidity
5.1. Interaction between the Interbank Market and the Equity Market
Following the results of the correlation analyses, there are reasons to expect cross-market effects
and bidirectional causalities between the interbank and equity market. For instance, if there arise
lead and lag effects of tightness in the interbank market in response to a systematic risk effect or
an information shock on the perceived level of risk, then these measures can be used to predict the
scope of financing and thus the level of liquidity. Similarly, lead and lag effects of volatility in the
equity market may affect interbank financing activity and have cross-effects on the risk management
in the interbank as well as on the level of liquidity in the equity market. Thus, if shocks on risk
and liquidity get reflected in one market before the other, then, exemplarily, adjustments in risk
management in the interbank market determine changes of liquidity in the equity market.
Given that there are reasons to expect to observe these cross-market effects as well as bidirec-
tional causalities, I first apply a vector autoregression model that incorporates the first difference
of the variables under inspection. I specify the autoregression system in a way to evaluate the
association for a pair of each of the different variables capturing either interbank risk, tightness in
the interbank sector, liquidity and volatility in the stock market as well as financing variables split
according to different term structures.
I consider the following linear vector autoregressive model (VAR):
 X1 t
X2 t
 =
 A1 0
A2 0
+
 A1 1(L) A1 2(L)
A2 1(L) A2 2(L)
 X1 t−1
X2 t−1
+
 1 t
2 t
 (4)
where Ai0 are parameters representing intercept terms, Aij(L) are polynomials in the lag operator
L, X1 t and X2 t are vectors that represent interbank and equity market observations, and 1,t and
2,t are white noise disturbances. I choose the number of lags in model (4) based on the Akaike
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Table IV
Overview Lags
This table provides an overview about the lags derived on basis of the Akaike information criterion, the Schwarz’s Bayesian
information criterion, and the Lu¨tkepohl version of the information criteria to fit the vector autoregression model in
Equation (4). ILLIQ stands for Amihud’s illiquidity measure, VAR captures the perceived risk of the Primary Dealers,
VIX measures volatility in the equity market, LIBOIS and TED capture the tightness in the interbank market. These
data were equally averaged over one quarter and cover the time period between 1998Q4 and 2010Q1. NETFINANCING
and NETREPO cover the financing activity of the interbank sector via securities lending or repo transactions; the suffixes
T and O specify the maturity of the contract, where T stands for term and O determines overnight and continuing
agreements, respectively.
ILLIQ VAR VIX LIBOIS TED NETFIN NETFINT NETFINO NETREPO NETREPOT NETREPOO
ILLIQ 1 2 1 1 3 1 4 1 1 1
VAR 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 4
VIX 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 3 1 4
LIBOIS 1 1 1 4 4 1 4 3 1 4
TED 1 1 1 4 4 1 4 1 1 3
NETFIN 3 4 1 4 4 1 1 1 4 1
NETFINT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
NETFINO 4 1 4 4 1 1 1 4 4 1
NETREPO 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 4 1 4
NETREPOT 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 4 4 4
NETREPOO 1 4 4 4 3 1 1 1 4 4
information criterion, the Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion, and the Lu¨tkepohl version of
the information criteria. Where the three criteria indicate different lag lengths, I choose the shorter
lag length for the sake of parsimony. In order to consider the fact that I work on quarterly averaged
means, I allow up to four lags. Table IV provides an overview about the chosen lag length of the
different VARs.
In Table V I present the results from pairwise VARs with eleven variables as endogenous factors
and the lags choosen according to Table IV. Each VAR is estimated with a constant and is based
on observations from 46 quarters. It is important to note that the cross-correlation analysis allows
to incorporate time effects. Thus, no present interactions are evaluated - the subsequent cross-
correlation analysis reveals lagged associations over time.
Panel A of Table V reports cross-correlations in innovations obtained from the VAR systems.
The inspection reveals that there does not seem to exist any direct interaction of risk management
and liquidity. However, both liquidity and risk management variables are again positively and
strongly associated with interbank tightness. This supports the indication for a potential linkage
of frictions in both markets as well as the existence of a common transfer mechanism that connects
these markets.
Next, as the aggregated financing measure is associated with both liquidity and risk man-
agement, financing activity seems to connect both markets. Highly significant cross-correlations
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indicate that risk management and the scope of financing activity in the interbank market are
strongly associated. Additionally, aggregated financing variables are also strongly and positively
cross-correlated with the prevailing level of liquidity.
This association also seems to be present in the interaction with liquidity in the equity market;
however only on a lagged basis.
These findings allow to assume that there exist connections through transfer mechanisms. Thus,
time lags arise from the interbank market and effects from this market appear delayed, transferred
through financing mechanisms, in the equity market. This pattern can be observed from the cross-
correlation of overnight financing activity with both, liquidity in the equity market and the level
of risk management in the interbank market. Furthermore, this measure is also associated with
volatility and tightness in the interbank market. Aggregated repo financing activity displays similar
patterns. Financing measures, split according to the maturity of the agreement, are associated with
measures for the tightness of their underlying, interbank, market as well as with measures of the
state of the connected, equity market. This further bolsters support for a potential connection
between both markets.
Interestingly, changes in repo financing activity are stronger and more significant related to
tightness in the interbank market. This fact provides evidence that the interbank market primarily
finances through repos that are stronger determined by tensions of participating banks face through
their risk management.
To sum up the findings of the correlations analysis in levels and differences, and after considering
lagged variables, it can be seen that the level of risk management in the interbank market and
liquidity in the equity market are connected through lead and lag variables of interbank tightness
and measures capturing volatility in the stock market. These variables seem to captured the extent
of prevailing tightness in each underlying market, but are also affected by spill-over effects of the
adjacent market. Financing activity is the a central mechanism that basically seems to connect
liquidity and risk management.
In order to further investigate how these transfer mechanism work, I consider a causality ap-
proach that allows to incorporate leads and lag variables and assess their eligibility to predict
developments of the variables. This approach also allows to incorporate and use that fact that
differencing or lagging variables sometimes influences the sign of causation and therefore give an
unclear picture about the scope of the real influence.
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5.2. Mutual Dependence, Granger-causality
For the null hypothesis that variable i does not Granger-cause variable j, I test whether the lag
coefficients of i are jointly zero when j is the dependent variable in the VAR. Granger (1969)
defines causality between two scalar-valued, stationary, and ergodic time series {X1 t} and {X2 t}
in the following way: Let F (X1 t|It−1) be the conditional probability distribution of X1 t, given the
bivariate information set (It−1) consisting of an Lx1-length lagged vector of X1 t, say
XLx11 t−Lx1 ≡ (X1 t−Lx1 , X1 t−Lx1+1, ..., X1 t−1), and an Lx2-length lagged vector of X2 t, say
XLx22 t−Lx2 ≡ (X2 t−Lx2 , X2 t−Lx2+1, ..., X2 t−1). Given the lags Lx1 and Lx2, the time series {X2 t}
does not strictly Granger-cause {X1 t} if:
F (X1 t|It−1) = F
(
X1 t|(It−1 −XLx22 t−Lx2)
)
, t = 1, 2, ... (5)
If the equality in Equation (5) does not hold, then knowledge of past X2 values helps to predict
current and future X1 values, and X2 is said to strictly Granger-cause x1. Similarly, a lack of
instantaneous Granger-causality from x2 to x1 occurs if:
F (X1 t|It−1) = F (X1 t|(It−1 +X2 t)), (6)
where the bivariate information set is modified to include the current value of X2. If the equality
in Equation (6) does not hold, then X2 is said to instantaneously Granger-cause X1.
As shown in Equations (5) and (6), strict Granger-causality relates the past of one time series
to influence the present and future of another time series. This contrasts this approach from
instantaneous causality, that relates the present of one time-series to influence the present of another
time-series.
Panel B in Table V presents pairwise Granger-causality tests between the endogenous variables
of the VAR. For the null hypothesis that variable i does not Granger-cause variable j, I test whether
the lag coefficients of i are jointly zero, when j is the dependent variable in the VAR. In panel B
of Table V the cells are associated with the i -th row variable and the j -th column variable shows
the chi-square statistic of the test.
First, I observe the causal effects on liquidity in the equity market as endogenous variable. There
arises strong evidence for a causal relation between the levels of liquidity and the perceived levels
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Table V
Contemporaneous Cross-correlations between VAR Innovations and Granger Causality Tests
This table presents results from a VAR with endogenous variables, estimated with two lags and a constant term. It is based on 404 observations.
Panel A shows the cross-correlations between VAR innovations. Panel B presents the Chi-square statistics of pairwise Granger-causality tests
between endogenous variables. ILLIQ stands for Amihud’s illiquidity measure, VAR captures the risk management of the Primary Dealers,
VIX stands for the measure of volatility in the equity market, LIBOIS and TED measure the tightness in the interbank market. These data
were equally averaged over one quarter and cover the time period between 1998Q4 and 2010Q1. NETFINANCING and NETREPO cover the
financing activity of the interbank sector via securities lending or repo transactions; the suffixes T and O specify the maturity of the contract,
where T stands for term and O determines overnight and continuing agreements, respectively. These financing data are available since July 4,
2001 and are summed up of the corresponding quarters.
ILLIQ VAR VIX LIBOIS TED NETFIN NETFINT NETFINO NETREPO NETREPOT NETREPOO
Panel A: Cross-Correlations between VAR innovations
ILLIQ 1.000
VAR 0.013 1.000
VIX -0.336** 0.233 1.000
LIBOIS 0.474*** 0.315* 0.121 1.000
TED 0.391*** 0.423*** 0.179 0.274 1.000
NETFIN 0.611*** 0.523*** 0.046 0.293 0.189 1.000
NETFINT 0.133 -0.142 0.045 0.050 0.062 -0.166 1.000
NETFINO 0.474*** 0.293* 0.513*** 0.395** -0.028 0.265 -0.023 1.000
NETREPO 0.148 0.224 0.451** 0.506*** 0.369** 0.314* -0.076 0.513*** 1.000
NETREPOT 0.114 -0.048 0.232 0.314* 0.429** 0.389** 0.041 0.596*** 0.562*** 1.000
NETREPOO 0.103 0.502*** 0.420 0.314* 0.525*** 0.265 -0.105 0.328* -0.136 -0.440** 1.000
Panel B: Chi-square statistics from Granger causality tests. Null hypothesis: Row variable does not Granger-cause column variable
ILLIQ 8.565*** 16.278*** 0.734 0.039 1.728 5.313** 13.743*** 3.631* 8.275*** 1.767
VAR 2.040 2.189 9.970*** 16.819*** 3.087 1.510 0.127 0.137 0.027 12.838**
VIX 19.797*** 8.210*** 1.150 3.493* 0.786 9.521*** 10.818** 9.596** 13.993*** 8.749*
LIBOIS 3.798* 10.653*** 2.515 48.869*** 0.910 12.526*** 9.533** 4.714 13.994*** 11.347**
TED 3.719* 19.668*** 4.303** 72.889*** 1.769 12.723*** 14.685*** 1.576 20.855*** 6.908*
NETFIN 22.583*** 39.756*** 0.065 65.008*** 38.334*** 1.228 1.013 0.806 11.773** 0.038
NETFINT 2.368 0.942 0.079 0.160 0.201 0.978 1.013 0.889 11.461*** 2.050
NETFINO 20.655*** 3.925** 37.824*** 54.058*** 0.020 0.978 1.228 21.592*** 30.725*** 3.007*
NETREPO 3.962** 1.445 22.510*** 22.535*** 5.277** 2.098 0.225 24.774*** 0.499 31.017***
NETREPOT 6.177** 0.375 1.783 3.216* 7.275*** 6.177 1.768 35.923*** 22.788*** 31.017***
NETREPOO 0.860 25.970*** 28.770*** 36.660*** 27.226*** 3.236* 1.275 2.696 22.788*** 11.166**
*p<0.10,**p<0.05, ***p<0.01
of risk management, whereas levels of risk management does not seem to directly Granger-cause
the levels of liquidity. However, there is evidence for a strong and significant two-way causation
between liquidity and volatility in the equity market. Thus, innovations in liquidity are related
to volatility that itself feeds back on prevailing levels of liquidity. Another strong natural two-
way causation seems to exist between liquidity and overnight financing activity, repos and term
repos. Furthermore, innovations in liquidity are Granger-caused by interbank tightness measures
and aggregated financing activity.
Next, the inspection of the effects that determine the level of perceived interbank risk reveals a
highly significant Granger-causation with the measures for equity market liquidity and volatility.
Furthermore financing variables Granger-cause the level of perceived risk, however only on an
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aggregated and overnight and continuing basis. Additionally, there also exists a two-way Granger-
causation between the level of perceived risk and interbank market tensions. This supports the idea
that the level of perceived interbank risk is determined by interbank tightness measures, whereas
effects of risk management also feed back on the interbank tightness. Further support arises from
the mutual Granger-causation of risk management, and overnight and continuing repo financing.
As a first interim result, I conclude that liquidity seems to be directly associated with the level
of perceived interbank risk, whereas the level of risk seems to drive liquidity through other channels
that have to be evaluated in the subsequent analysis.
Thus, volatility seems to be significantly determined by financing activity and in this way by
the available collateral for transactions. There arises a strong and significant mutual Granger-
causation between volatility and almost all financing measures. This allows to consider volatility
as one potential mechanism that connects both markets by driving the effects of financing to the
equity market. Additionally, VIX and illiquidity innovations mutually Granger-cause each other,
whereas volatility Granger-causes only with perceived risk.
The inspection of both interbank tightness measures reveals, that both tightness variables and
risk management do mutually Granger-cause each other. This results seems to provide further
support for the results of the (cross-)correlation analyses. Next, interbank tightness measures
seem to be associated with volatility in the stock market as well as with corresponding financing
activity. Especially, there seems to exist a strong association with repo financing activity that may
be explained by the collateralized nature of these financing agreements. Finally, tightness in the
interbank market also seems to be transmitted to liquidity in the equity market, whereas mutual
Granger-causation cannot be found. Again, this supports the basic assumption that potential
spill-over and connection mechanisms can be captured by market risk and financing measures.
Thus, tightness in the interbank market seems to decisively determine and interact with the risk
management measure.
Next, the financing measures provide a less clear-cut picture. Aggregated financing measures de-
velop almost independently, that is, almost uncaused from the variables under inspection. However,
contrary to this finding, almost all sample variables seem to Granger-cause aggregated financing.
Thus, there arises highly significant Granger-causations between netfinancing measures and liquid-
ity, the level of perceived risk and interbank tightness measures. This indicates that the financing
measures are important to incorporate in the analysis, as they connect the developments in the
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equity and interbank market and transfer the resulting effects between these markets.
The observation of financing activity segmented into different maturities reveals, that term
financing agreements are Granger-caused by liquidity, volatility and interbank market risk; but do
not Granger-cause other variables. Again, it is important to emphasize to connection to interbank
tightness, market liquidity and financing activity.
In support of these findings, overnight financing seems to play the real role as transfer mechanism
that connects the interbank and equity market. Overnight netfinancing activity mutually Granger-
causes with liquidity and volatility in the equity market and with equity market tightness measures.
Furthermore, overnight financing Granger-causes the level of perceived risk. This provides an
indication that the inherent transfer effects of financing activity are captured the best by overnight
netfinancing activity.
Aggregated repo financing activity actually provides a similar pattern than aggregated financing
activity. Thus, there seem to occur mutual Granger-causations between liquidity and volatility in
the equity market. Furthermore, netrepo financing activity Granger-causes tightness measures in
the interbank market. Contrary to term financing activity, concerning term netrepo arrangements,
there seem to occur enhanced interactions with illiquidity and interbank tightness measures. Thus,
an even stronger Granger-causation seems to exist between overnight and continuing netrepo financ-
ing measures. Additionally, this measure mutually Granger-causes directly and highly significantly
with risk management, interbank tightness, and volatility in the equity market.
This Granger-causation analysis reveals that risk management and liquidity are connected -
however not directly mutually but through transfer mechanisms. Measure of tightness in the
particular markets indicate a first response to corresponding changes. These indicator measures
are partially affected by spill-over effects. However, the main mechanism that transfers shocks
between the equity market and the risk management in the interbank market seems to be the
financing activity of the Primary Dealers.
After having conducted the cross-correlation and Granger-causality analysis it is important to
state that Granger-causality should not be interpreted according to the normal meaning of causality
and exogeneity. Thus is would require for a variable to be considered as exogenous that it is not
affected by contemporaneous values of the endogenous variable. However, Granger-causality refers
only to the effects of past values of an endogenous variable to current values of the variable under
inspection. Hence, Granger causality does not allow to draw real causality statements. For example,
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there is no direct evidence for a mutual interaction of risk management and liquidity. However, the
Granger test shows evidence for a mutual interaction of risk management with interbank tightness
and overnight financing activity. Furthermore risk management interacts with illiquidity, volatility
in the equity market and other financing measures. These influences of risk management on market
liquidity are assumed to be subject to common influences, but changes one variable, do not “lead”
directly to changes in the other market.
5.3. Shocks to the System, Impulse Responses
In order to further understand the dynamic interaction between liquidity and risk management, I
compute impulse response functions (IRFs). An IRF allows to trace out the time path of a one unit
change (henceforth “innovation” or “shock”) on the variables contained in the VAR system. This
method allows to capture the effect how a change in any of the exogenous variables is “transferred”
to the current and future endogenous variables.
Since innovations are correlated (Table V, Panel B) they need to be orthogonalized. I apply the
Cholesky decomposition to the residual covariance matrix in order to orthogonalize the impulses.
In contrast to Granger-causality tests, results from IRFs and variance decompositions are generally
sensitive to the specific ordering of the endogenous variables. In particular, placing a variable
earlier in the ordering tends to increase its impact on the variables that follow. Thus, in choosing
an ordering, one approach is to order the variables according to the sequence in which they influence
the other variables.
Based on the (cross-)correlations and Granger-causality analysis above, I consider the following
order of market determinants: (1) Measures for interbank tightness follow onto perceived levels of
risk. Thus, I assume that in situations of a perceived change in the risk environment, financial in-
stitutions react by becoming more sensitive to market developments and respond by adjusting their
lending activities. This adoption is reflected in adjustments of the interbank lending rate. (3) Since
measures for interbank tightness are derived directly from interbank lending rates, these measures
are affected next. As featured in the cross-correlations analysis, interbank tightness measures are
associated and Granger-caused by interbank financing. Hence, adjustments in the interbank lending
rate influence the level of available collateral for financing transactions. Succeeding these adjust-
ments in the lending activity, interbank tightness is assumed to spill over to the equity market. (4)
Interbank financing activity is related with the state of the equity market, captured by volatility.
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(5) Finally, changes in volatility are associated with liquidity as both measures are determined by
changes in volatility and the level of available funding.
5.3.1. Impulse Response Function Specification
In order to consider the fact that the financing activity of Primary Dealers is available as aggregated
measures (NETFIN and NETREPO) as well as split according to the maturity of the agreement
(Term Maturity, and Overnight and Continuing), four different models are specified.
Basically, all models are based on the same ordering, as describe above, and vary only in the
kind of financing activity and in maturity, respectively. I ensure that all VARs are stationary by
checking that the eigenvalues of the compansion matrix of the VAR are inside the unit circle. Thus,
the maximum lag length is limited to two quarters.
Model 1: Aggregated Netfinancing:
V ARt
TEDt
NETFINt
V IXt
ILLIQt

=

A1 0
·
·
·
A5 0

+

A1 1(L) · · · A1 5(L)
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
A1 5(L) · · · A5 5(L)


V ARt−1
TEDt−1
NETFINt−1
V IXt−1
ILLIQt−1

+

1 t
·
·
·
5 t

(7)
Model 2: Netfinancing, Maturity:
V ARt
TEDt
NETFINT,t
NETFINO,t
V IXt
ILLIQt

=

A1 0
·
·
·
·
A6 0

+

A1 1(L) · · · · A1 6(L)
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
A1 6(L) · · · · A6 6(L)


V ARt−1
TEDt−1
NETFINT, t−1
NETFINO, t−1
V IXt−1
ILLIQt−1

+

1 t
·
·
·
·
6 t

(8)
Model 3: Aggregated Repo Financing:
V ARt
TEDt
NETREPOt
V IXt
ILLIQt

=

A1 0
·
·
·
A5 0

+

A1 1(L) · · · A1 5(L)
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
A1 5(L) · · · A5 5(L)


V ARt−1
TEDt−1
NETREPOt−1
V IXt−1
ILLIQt−1

+

1 t
·
·
·
5 t

(9)
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Model 4: Repo Financing, Maturity:
V ARt
TEDt
NETREPOT,t
NETREPOO,t
V IXt
ILLIQt

=

A1 0
·
·
·
·
A6 0

+

A1 1(L) · · · · A1 6(L)
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
A1 6(L) · · · · A6 6(L)


V ARt−1
TEDt−1
NETREPOT, t−1
NETREPOO, t−1
V IXt−1
ILLIQt−1

+

1 t
·
·
·
·
6 t

(10)
where Ai0 are parameters representing intercept terms, Aij(L) are polynomials in the lag oper-
ator L, and it are white noise disturbances.
5.3.2. Direct Influence of Risk Management on Liquidity
I first assess the direct interaction of risk management in the interbank market and liquidity in the
equity market. This analysis is conducted under the implicit assumption that the above derived
potential transfer mechanisms prevail and interact with each other. Thus, these mechanisms drive
the considered interaction with interbank and equity markets measures through the system of
autoregressions.
Figure 2 illustrates the response of liquidity to a one unit shock on the risk management vari-
able. I evaluate the direct reaction of liquidity for the above mentioned four model specifications.
The implications of the correlation, cross-correlation and Granger-causality analysis are, at least,
partially confirmed.
Thus, in an immediate response to a shock to perceived risk in the interbank market, illiquidity
in the equity market increases. This reaction is independent of the model specifications. However,
subsequently onto the immediate shock, illiquidity in the equity market relaxes again and liquidity
increases. This increase of liquidity indicates a surge in deleveraging transactions due to increased
risk positions and heightened margin requirements. These deleveraging transactions last for two
periods. Then, two quarters after the initial introduction of the shock into the system, illiquidity
increases again, but from a lower level than before. Thus, the initial market reaction is terminated
and existing positions that were considered as too hazardous under the new risk assessment were
unwinded. Further, due to reduced availability of collateral in combination with limited risk-
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bearing capacity in the interbank sector, transactions in the equity market are limited or even
cancelled. After that, illiquidity increases again. However it does not turn back to its initial
level before the system was shocked. Indeed, it “over-shoots” beyond its initial level. Then, three
periods after the original introduction of the shock into the system, illiquidity in the equity market
reaches its second peak. Again, market participants realize an imbalance between their positions
and the targeted levels determined by risk management constraints. Consequently, deleveraging
transaction occur and tighten liquidity once again. Finally, the level of liquidity “meanders” back
to its initial level after seven quarters. The size of this counteraction depends strongly on the VAR
model specifications and exhibits almost the same scope as the initial risk management shock had
(Figure 2, Model M1).
This first results support the main hypothesis that risk management in the interbank sector
has decisive influence on the level of liquidity in the equity market. Actually there seems to occur
potential interaction effects.
5.3.3. Direct Influence of Liquidity on Risk Management
In this section the effects of a one unit innovation of liquidity on the perceived level of risk in the
interbank sector are evaluated. Figure 3 illustrates the effects of a one unit shock in illiquidity on risk
management through the autoregression model specifications. In contrast to the previous transfer
of shocks there arises no direct impact on risk management. Perceived risk in the interbank sector
features a prolonged reaction and reaches its reaction peak after two quarters (Figure 3, Model M1
and Model M2) or after one lagged period (Figure 3, Model M3 and Model M4). However, the
reaction is the same for all model specifications: Liquidity in the equity market interacts with the
perceived level of risk in the interbank market. A one unit increase in liquidity comes along with
an increase in the variable capturing perceived interbank risk.
This effect can be explained by a reduction in trading due to decreased availability of collateral.
Thus, when interbank market participants enter into a financing transaction they incorporate not
only the prevailing conditions, they also consider the environment at the time when unwinding the
position. As previously seen, liquidity massively determines this environment and in this way the
ease of unwinding positions. Then, as illiquidity increases interbank dealers face soared tightness
to unwind existing positions and, subsequently, the perceived level of risk on existing positions
increases.
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Figure 2. Orthogonalized impulse-response functions of illiquidity. This chart plots the
orthogonalized impulse-response function of illiquidity (ILLIQ) on a one unit shock of the perceived
interbank risk (VAR). M1-M4 specify the underlying vector autoregression model specification. The
grey shaded area indicates the 95% confidence interval for a forecasting period of 12 quarters.
As the liquidity driven raise in perceived risk drives interbank dealers to force their counterpar-
ties to unwind positions, the above described deleveraging effects occur. This implies that existing
positions become unwinded and in line with reduced exposure, perceived risk of the interbank deal-
ers declines. However, in dependence of the underlying model specification, this phase of easing
lasts between three and five quarters.
Next, after the deleveraging transactions become settled, perceived levels of risk increase again.
Thus, as liquidity is incorporated in the methods for risk-assessment, reduced trading activity begins
to feed back into risk calculations. Consequently, VaR positions begin to raise again. Additionally,
reduced amounts of collateral and tightened funding conditions lead to auxiliary feedback effects.
Finally a process of assimilation follows until the original stable levels are reached. Hence, it can
39
−5
0
5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
M1: Response of VAR on ILLIQ
−5
0
5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
M2: Response of VAR on ILLIQ
−5
0
5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
M3: Response of VAR on ILLIQ
−5
0
5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
M4: Response of VAR on ILLIQ
Figure 3. Orthogonalized impulse-response functions of interbank market risk. This
chart plots the orthogonalized impulse-response function of perceived Primary Dealer risk (VAR)
on a one unit shock of illiquidity (ILLIQ). M1-M4 specify the underlying vector autoregression
model specification. The grey shaded area indicates the 95% confidence interval for a forecasting
period of 12 quarters.
be concluded that liquidity and risk management mutually interact and influence each other.
5.3.4. Interaction between Risk Management and Market Variables
After analysing the direct interaction of risk management and liquidity variables, it is of further
interest to observe the effects of risk management and liquidity on the other potential interaction
variables. In the subsequent analysis all the results and insights derived from the previous analyses
are incorporated.
Figure 4 illustrates the orthogonalized impulse-response functions of interbank, equity market
and financing variables to a one unit shock on the perceived level of risk of the Primary Dealers.
An inspection of all responses reveals that there occur several interaction effects.
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A one unit increase in perceived interbank risk immediately increases tightness in the interbank
market. Hence, in situations when interbank dealers face tightenings in the perceived risk environ-
ment, they respond directly by adjusting the price for lending. That is, they increase corresponding
interest rates of financing transactions. As interbank tightness is defined by the difference in interest
rates between secured and unsecured lending, this variable is affected in the first place. This imme-
diate reaction is further associated with a reduction in financing activity. Following the correlations
analyses above, these effects are connected and increases in risk management come along with re-
ductions in financing. Thus, financing measures (NETFIN and NETREPO) decrease immediately
in response to an increase in perceived risk. After one period, tightness in the interbank market
mitigates massively. When the first run effects of unwinding of existing positions, that were not
adequate according to the new risk environment, are settled, lending rates begin to ease. However,
as financing capacity is still reduced, the limited scope of transactions evoke a secondary effect
and interbank tightness increases again. Then, after a second period of deleveraging-transactions,
interbank tightness levels off to the original level before the initial shock.
Next, volatility in the equity market displays almost the same pattern. The level of volatility
increases quickly in response to changes in perceived interbank risk. After a massive rebound,
a period of easing follows and volatility moves back to its initial level. This pattern seem to be
mainly driven by liquidity-induced effects of risk management. Hence, the increase in risk leads
to massive deleveraging transactions that increase - in an initial effect - the transactions and the
amount of collateral in the market. As mentioned in the subsection above, liquidity increases in a
first response to a surge in perceived risk. After these risk-induced transactions are terminated, the
scope of available securities as collateral is reduced. Then, the reduced scope of trading activity
in association with a reduced scope of collateral leads to an increase in illiquidity. However, the
arising counter reaction is not that tight and the systems finds back to its initial level after an
adjustment period of six quarters.
Aggregated financing measures support this evaluation: A massive decrease in these measures is
followed by further tightening and a quick recovery after the initial shock. However, the inspection
of financing activity split into different maturities reveals more interesting results. Hence, the
reaction of short-term interbank financing emerges as the most vivid of the measure for overnight
and continuing financing activity: An increase in risk management leads to a massive decline in
financing activity. The impulse-response function and the effects of the analysis above provide
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evidence for a strong connection between overnight financing activity and volatility in the equity
market. Overnight financing activity takes three quarters to recover to its initial level and this
reaction goes along with tightness in the equity market(volatility).
In order to interpret the effects of term financing activity, it is important to incorporate the
pattern found in the summary statistics. Thus, Primary Dealers purchase on average more securities
on a term basis. Hence, deleveraging effects in response to increased interbank tightness occur as
well. However, the direction is vice verse: An increase in the term financing measure indicates that
there are more securities reported as outgoing than there are reported as incoming. This implies
that Primary Dealers buy back borrowed securities and reduce funding in this way. However, due
to the face that financing measures are only reported on an aggregated basis, it is not definitely
clear which effects dominates. Thus, there can be more securities reported as out going because of
unwinding positions, or there can be less securities reported as in going due to reduced demand for
financing in reaction of the effects in the overnight and continuing financing.
Finally, it is remarkable that aggregated financing and repo measures only return to their
initial levels and do not anticipate the counteraction in the same intensity as the market-based
measures do. Overnight and continuing financing measures are hit more by the innovations in risk
management.
5.3.5. Interaction between Liquidity and Market Variables
Figure 5 presents the orthogonalized impulse-response functions of interbank, equity market and
financing variables on a shock to liquidity in the equity market.
Interbank tightness increases in response to heightened illiquidity in the equity market. The re-
action on reduced liquidity is even more distinctive in the equity market. There, volatility increases
with almost the same scope than in response to a shock in perceived risk. Thus, in the further
response to the liquidity-induced shock, both tightness measures exhibit a common pattern: After
a peak, deleveraging transactions occur that alleviate the pressure in both markets. Obviously
the first-response peak is more pronounced in the equity market as this market is affected by the
original shock first.
This pattern seems to arise because interbank dealers realize a reduction in trading volume
that increases illiquidity. As liquidity is one of the factors that determine lending conditions, the
interbank dealers adjust the corresponding margins and their counterparties hit their adjusted
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Figure 4. Orthogonalized impulse-response functions of interbank and equity market
variables shocked by perceived interbank market risk. This chart plots the orthogonalized
impulse-response functions of interbank market, equity market and financing variables on a shock
of the perceived interbank risk of Primary Dealers. TED denotes the TED spread as measure for
the tightness in the interbank market, VIX describes the VIX index that measures volatility in the
equity market, NETFIN and NETREPO cover the financing activity of the interbank sector via
securities lending and repo transactions, respectively; the suffixes T and O specify the maturity
of the contract, where T stands for term and O determines overnight and continuing agreements,
respectively. The grey shaded area indicates the 95% confidence interval for a forecasting period
of 12 quarters.
margins. Subsequently, deleveraging transactions occur and the interbank dealers become, under
the tightened liquidity situation, even more reluctant to finance or extend positions. Then, in
response to increased illiquidity in association with deleveraging transactions, interest rates for
lending increase. These lending rates are directly connected with the interbank tightness measures.
Then, after one period the deleveraging transactions are settled, and tightness in both markets eases
and reaches the original level after one period. Finally, the period of relaxation goes that far that
both tightness measures ease even further - even above the original level before the introduction of
the illiquidity shock. That “over-reaction” connects to netfinancing and net repo financing activity.
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Figure 5. Orthogonalized impulse-response functions of interbank and equity market
variables shocked by illiquidity in the interbank market This chart plots the orthogonalized
impulse-response functions of interbank market, equity market and financing variables on a shock
of the illiquidity in the equity market. TED denotes the TED spread as measure for the tightness in
the interbank market, VIX describes the VIX index that measures volatility in the equity market,
NETFIN and NETREPO cover the financing activity of the interbank sector via securities lending
and repo transactions, respectively; the suffixes T and O specify the maturity of the financing activ-
ity, where T stands for term and O determines overnight and continuing agreements, respectively.
The grey shaded area indicates the 95% confidence interval for a forecasting period of 12 quarters.
After a slump in financing volume because of increased illiquidity and feedback effects due to
tightened risk management, both aggregate measures recover to reach their initial level before the
shock.
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6. Conclusions
This is one of the first papers that empirically combines risk management in the interbank sector
and market variables in the general equity market. Examining a comprehensive dataset of hand-
collected Primary Dealer risk management observations reveals as central finding the existence of
cross-market effects and bidirectional causalities between the interbank and equity market. By
considering the sample of Primary Dealers as representatives of the interbank market, I show that
the perceived level of risk in the interbank market and the level of liquidity in the equity market
seem to be associated through lead and lag effects.
The financing activity of the interbanking sector seems to be the primary transfer mechanism
that connects both markets and drives potential adoptions between both markets. Through this
connection, feedback effects arise that can result in mutually reinforcing effects. Measures for
tightness in the interbank market and volatility in the equity market arise as potential indicators
for transfers between both markets.
The level of perceived risk in the interbank market seems to be directly associated with changes
in the level of liquidity in the equity market that Primary Dealers observe. Contrary to this,
risk management in the interbanking sector does not seem to directly interact with liquidity in
the equity market. The Granger-causality analysis reveals that primarily interbank tightness and
volatility seem to determine the level of perceived risk in the interbank sector. More specifically,
interbank dealers’ financing activity decreases in response to an decrease in the perceived level
of liquidity in the equity market. Hence, interbank dealers anticipate an increase in the inherent
risk of their funding positions due to a decrease in liquidity. They react according to their risk
management constraints and unwind existing positions. The inspection of the impulse-response
functions reveals these deleveraging transactions as well as a concomitant effects in both markets.
Thus, both volatility and interbank market tightness increase and both measures feed back on the
perceived level of risk. These effect result in secondary adjustment mechanisms. Hence, after first-
run deleveraging transaction become settled, heightened volatility and interbank tightness lead to
further decreasing levels in liquidity, that in turn feed back on increasing levels of perceived risk.
Finally, the inspection of the impulse-response functions reveals the potential, that both, the
liquidity and the risk management effect, can mutually influence each other. Thus, shocks in one
market seem to spill-over to the other market leading to reinforcing feedback effect that result in
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an even larger aggregate effect than the actual shock. These self-reinforcing feedback effects can
leads to contagion effects, where shocks to equity market spill-over to the interbank market that
itself feeds back on the equity market.
The inclusion of this additional risk management spiral into the liquidity spiral framework of
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) lets the contribution of this paper become apparent. Thus,
the empirical evidence of an auxiliary spiral effect improves their models and helps to increase the
prediction efficiency.
My analysis still presents some limitations. The VaR-filings of the Primary Dealers with the
SEC, that are considered to capture the levels of perceived risk, are only available on an aggregated
basis at the end of each filing quarter. Consequently, this implies that all liquidity and market
tightness measures have to be aggregated to quarterly measures; although these observations are
available on an even higher frequency. This implies a certain simplification and further research
should attempt to evaluate VaR-filing at higher frequency. Furthermore, VaR-filing with the SEC
are of high importance from a regulatory point of view. Thus, there are reasons to assume that
the group of Primary Dealers aspires to report some kind of smoothed measures at the end of each
quarter. Thereof occur possible distortions on these measures. Therefore, although being strictly
private information, further research should to real daily VaR observation of interbank dealers.
Then, the inspected financing data are only available on an aggregated basis for the group of
Primary Dealers that report to the NY FED. Ideally, it would increase the precision of the analysis
to have the real dealers financing data. Finally, one major improvement in this analysis would be
to evaluate more detailed data about the margins and financing conditions that Primary Dealers
set in their financing transactions. Thus, the effects of risk assessment and associated financing
activity become more capturable.
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Table A.1
Overview Reporting Institutions
This table presents an overview of the filings of the individual institutions included into this study according to the quarter of filing.
Panel B: Reporting Institutions
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Reporting Quarter Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
BANK OF AMERICA CORP x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 43
BANK ONE CORP x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 20
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIE x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 37
CHASE MANHATTAN CORP x x x x x x x 7
CITIGROUP INC x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 27
CREDIT SUISSE (USA) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 21
DONALDSON LUFKIN & JENRETTE x x x x x x x x 8
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 38
HSBC USA INC x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 33
J P MORGAN CHASE x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 36
JEFFERIES GROUP INC x x x x x 5
LEHMAN BROTHERS INC x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 37
MERRILL LYNCH & CO IN x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 31
MORGAN STANLEY x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 44
SALOMON SMITH BARNEY x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 17
Total 6 6 7 8 9 8 8 6 11 9 10 10 10 11 10 11 10 9 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 9 10 10 9 10 10 10 8 9 9 9 7 9 7 8 5 7 7 7 5 6 404
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Figure A.2. Primary Dealer financing activity. This figure plots the amount of Primary Dealer financing activity. Both
plots in the first column report the amount of financing on an aggregated basis, and the following charts depict financing data split
according to the maturity of the agreement into term and overnight and continuing contracts, respectively. The differences between
the securities that are delivered by a dealer in a transaction and the securities that are received by a dealer are considered as the
netfinancing and netrepo activity, respectively. The figures are reported in USD 100 million.
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1 Introduction 
In this paper we use a unique, hand-collected dataset to investigate net new 
money flows into and out of assets under management of Swiss private banks. 
Private banking refers to the part of the business field or banking unit that 
services wealthy individuals (Cocca (2008), Horn and Rudolf (2012)).1  
There are several reasons to be interested in the ability of Swiss private 
banks to attract client money. First, the Swiss private banking sector presents 
one of the most important wealth management centers in the world. At the end 
of the year 2011 banks operating in Switzerland had CHF 5’300 billion assets 
under management, which represents a market share of 27% in cross-border 
private banking (Swiss Bankers Association (2012)). Understanding net new 
money flows for the Swiss case thus is of significant interest to policy makers 
and practitioners worldwide.  
Second, the Swiss financial sector holds an important role for the Swiss 
economy; in 2011 it accounts for more than 10 percent of value added in 
Switzerland (Swiss Bankers Association (2011)). After decades of prosperity, 
this sector is currently facing substantial external pressure and the competition 
with other financial offshore centers intensifies. Erosions in the banking 
secrecy in Switzerland and tax amnesties in Germany, UK and Italy are 
leading to increasing repatriation of offshore assets. These developments are 
further augmented through regulatory pressure and increasing restructuring 
requirement of foreign owned banking subsidiaries. In the face of this new, 
difficult climate it is important to know what factors allow banks to position 
themselves well.  
Third, in financial markets in general trust and discretion, service, and 
performance are very important. These qualities are especially highly valued 
in private banking. Studying this segment is, therefore, of significant interest 
as the role of these features is likely to be particularly pronounced here. At the 
                                                 
1
 In particular, the term “private banks” here refers to financial institutions focusing on wealth management 
and private banking. This is different from the term “private banker,” which refers to the partner in a private bank that 
is organized as an unlimited partnership.  The term “private bank” is also not intended to distinguish between 
privately held institutions and state-owned banks.  
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same time, private banking is a very specific area of the banking business that 
exhibits structurally different patterns than the general banking business.  
For private banks, the source of value creation derives from their assets 
under management. Thus, to boost revenues banks can either increase the asset 
base or raise the margins earned on assets, or both. We focus on the 
developments of the asset base, considering the ability to keep existing funds 
as well as to increase the share of wallet of existing clients and to attract new 
funds as being the main strategic focus of banks (Simonian (2011), Maude 
(2006)). 
Net new money (NNM) measures these factors. More precisely, net new 
money captures the net change of assets under management during a specific 
period and comprises the net amount of assets from new and existing clients 
less the amount of those clients who withdraw funds or terminate their 
relationship with a specific institution. Thus, NNM figures characterize the 
organic growth of the asset base of a bank in isolation of currency fluctuations, 
market performance, and interest and dividend payments.  
Swiss banking is known for its discretion. However, strikingly, 
Switzerland is the only major country in the world that requires its banks to 
disclose, in the annual report, net new money flows. This study capitalizes on 
this information, which has so far been rarely used in academic research.  
Drawing on work conducted by Birchler et al. (2011), we construct the most 
comprehensive database of assets under management and net flows of Swiss 
private banks available to date. The more than 80 wealth management 
institutions in our sample manage an aggregated sum of more than CHF 4’000 
billion of assets under management; this corresponds to around two thirds of 
total managed assets in Switzerland. We also include wealth management 
institutions in Liechtenstein as they are closely related to the Swiss market. In 
sum, we are able to provide a comprehensive picture of the broadly defined 
Swiss financial center.  
We first document substantial cross-sectional and time-series variation in 
NNM flows. While the average NNM flow is around 4 percent of the total 
assets base, the standard deviation is 11 percent. Outflows of assets under 
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management reach up to CHF 2.5 billion, while the maximum inflow in a year 
was CHF 19.8 billion. This corresponds to a decrease of 20 percent and an 
increase of 30 percent in assets, respectively.  
This heterogeneity then prompts us to investigate several hypotheses 
regarding the determinants of these flows, especially in the cross section. 
These hypotheses are motivated by the idea, so far evidenced mostly 
anecdotally, that private banking is a relationship-driven business that is based 
on the central pillars confidentiality, security, trust and the perceived level of 
client advisory service. We document several interesting results, including the 
following four:  
First, Swiss private banks that had a negative media appearance in one 
year experience lower NNM flows in the following year, suggesting that 
clients worry about the reputation of a bank. Second, private banks with higher 
equity ratios achieve slower growth in assets under management in the 
following year. While this may be at first surprising, this result may indicate 
that these banks generally follow a more conservative business model and are 
less aggressive in chasing potential new clients. Third, private banks that offer 
a higher level of service and that are more cost-efficient obtain more NNM. 
Fourth, we also find cross-sectional and time-series heterogeneity in the 
importance of determinants. For example, it is small banks whose net new 
money flows are particularly strongly related to negative media coverage, and 
performance in terms of client value created was important only up to the 
2007/08 crisis.  
A search for literature on investigation of private banking industry in 
general and for studies with a focus on Switzerland in particular reveals that 
exists only very limited empirical research on private banking. This is 
surprising, given the mentioned importance of private banking. Hens and 
Bachmann (2008) and Maude (2006) provide general overviews of private 
banking. Delaloye, Habib, and Ziegler (2012) conduct and event study to 
investigate the importance of banking secrecy for Swiss private banks. Other 
streams of literature focus on specific wealth management and banking topics. 
Foehn (2004) conducts a case study to determine the client value of private 
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banking clients in Switzerland. Burgstaller and Cocca (2011) study the 
efficiency of private banking institutions in Switzerland and Liechtenstein. 
Cocca (2008) considers size effects and integrated business models in private 
banking in Switzerland and Liechtenstein. Horn and Rudolf (2012) investigate 
the determinants of service quality and its effects in private banks. Most 
related to our study, Horn and Rudolf (2011) document that financial security 
affects customer loyalty more than service quality and they provide a first 
indication that banks outside Germany benefit more from their reputation for 
security.  
Broadly speaking, our paper is also related to the mutual funds literature, 
which has investigated determinants of fund flows (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik 
(2003), Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009)). While there are some similarities, 
there are many differences between the sectors, and a transfer of results 
obtained for mutual funds to private banks is impossible.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
foundation and develops the central hypotheses of this paper. Section 3 
introduces the data. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2 Hypotheses 
2.1 Main Hypotheses 
This section derives our central hypotheses. The hypotheses concern the 
central topics of trust (Hypotheses 1 and 2), service quality and efficiency 
(Hypotheses 3 and 4), bank-internal incentives and growth of the number of 
relationship managers (Hypotheses 5 and 6), and performance (Hypothesis 7). 
2.1.1 Trust 
We begin by observing that a private bank promises to safeguard and to 
manage deposited assets in an appropriate manner, especially in accordance 
with the client’s desire. Therefore, trust is a critical component in a private 
bank’s ability to attract and retain client funds (Molyneux and Omarini 
(2005)). We consider two concrete aspects of how clients consider the 
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trustworthiness and security of a private bank: media coverage (Hypothesis 1) 
and financial soundness (Hypothesis 2). 
Hypothesis 1 (media coverage): Negative media coverage is negatively 
associated with net new money flows.  
The idea behind Hypothesis 1 is that the media play a critical role in 
influencing the reputation of companies (Jonsson, Greve, and Takako (2009), 
Meier, Luo, and Oberholzer-Gee (2012), Einwiller, Carroll, and Korn (2010)), 
and reputation in turn is important to attract and to retain clients. The greater a 
company’s involvement in issues that are intensively and emotionally 
discussed, the greater is the effect on reputation (Eisenegger, Schranz, and 
Schneider (2011)).  
In the time period this study covers, topics related to the financial sector 
were in the focus of the media. Some of these topics were in relation to 
general banking such as the recent financial crisis and regulatory issues. In 
order to explain the cross-sectional variation in NNM growth, however, we are 
interested in topics such as banking secrecy, tax related issues or data theft that 
affected some institutions in particular but not the whole wealth management 
banking sector equally. 
Publicity-shy wealth management clients do not appreciate negative 
media coverage of private banks for two reasons. First, the desired privacy and 
discretion are endangered due to increasing media presence of the bank. 
Second, negative media coverage in relation to tax scandals or data theft lets 
them question the security of their wealth and casts doubts on the trust they 
put into the chosen fiduciary relationship with a particular bank. 
Hypothesis 2 (financial soundness): Bank leverage is negatively associated 
with net new money flows.  
This hypothesis is motivated by the notion that the ratio of equity to total 
assets is a source of a bank’s inherent trust resources. Doing so, we address the 
financial security dimension and assume that the amount of trust that private 
banking clients put in a relationship with a private bank is influenced by the 
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way the bank finances itself. Arguably, signaling trust is one of the central 
determinants of a private bank’s ability to attract net funds as it signals 
stability and security as well as a profound understanding of the trustful 
relationship that affluent clients expect. 
An alternative view on the relevance of the capitalization of the private 
bank is that a high level of leverage is tantamount with an increased 
aggressiveness of the business model and managerial attitudes.  
2.1.2 Service Quality and Efficiency 
Private banking is considered as a pure service industry (Chase (1981)). This 
implies that factors other than product characteristics and price advantages are 
of vital importance. In particular, the private banking business is 
predominately determined by service characteristics such as interaction quality 
(competence, investment proposal), service product quality (performance, 
product and service range) and service environment quality (financial security 
and corporate identity).2 Service, however, is costly, and we need to control 
for the fact that banks vary in their effectiveness of obtaining NNM with given 
resources. Therefore, we posit two connected hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3 (service quality): An increase in the service quality offered 
to existing and potential clients is positively associated with NNM flows.  
Hypothesis 4 (efficiency): A higher cost-income-ratio is negatively 
associated with NNM flows.  
Hypothesis 3 reflects the idea that an increase in the scope of offered 
service increases the intensity of an existing relationship as well as the quality 
of service. Additionally, it takes into account that traditional products have 
been expanded to include services such as financial planning and alternative 
investment advice (Foehn (2004)). We assume that an increase in the offered 
service level improves the client to relationship-manager ratio. This should 
                                                 
2
 For example, Horn and Rudolf (2012) found that an improvement of service quality leads to a higher growth 
of assets under management. 
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support a relationship manager to extend the share of wallet at existing clients 
and to increase the attractiveness of the bank for potential new clients.  
Conversely, Hypothesis 4 captures the notion that the effectiveness in 
which a private bank conducts its business is reflected in the cost-income-
ratio. Managers of a private bank with a high ratio of operating costs to 
operating income may generally be less effective in generating business; 
indeed, a high cost-income ratio arguably is related to low managerial ability. 
Therefore, we expect that a high cost-income-ratio is associated with 
inefficiency in increasing the asset base and is, therefore negatively, associated 
with NNM flows. 
2.1.3 Employees and Incentives 
The next two hypotheses are based on the observation that the relationship 
manager represents the private bank and is therefore, considered by many 
practitioners, a very important factor in this special service environment. 
Indeed, hiring additional relationship managers to increase assets under 
management is one of the most favored approaches by private banks.  
Alternatively, or additionally, relationship managers can be rewarded for 
their extra effort to attract new assets. Thus, an increase in past bonuses is 
likely to predict net new money growth this year because relationship 
managers wish to reach last year’s bonus level again. These considerations 
yield the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5 (employment growth): Additional relationship managers are 
positively associated with NNM growth. 
Hypothesis 6 (incentives): Compensation for relationship managers is 
positively associated with NNM growth. 
2.1.4 Performance 
Finally, we note that the goal of private banking clients is to grow or at least 
maintain their wealth. Horn and Rudolf (2012) show that in a private banking 
relationship price characteristics such as the price for the service provided is of 
secondary importance. And a decline in the price-performance ratio may affect 
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customer satisfaction less than a rise in service quality. However, wealth 
management clients generally cannot observe the scope of resources that 
private banks devote to the relationship and during investment process. 
Furthermore, clients can hardly observe the private bank’s ability when 
recommending an investment. However, clients are aware of past client value 
created, and thus can use a private bank’s past performance to assess 
credibility and competence (Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994)). Thus, a 
natural hypothesis is the idea that clients pay attention to the value created for 
them as they attempt to make a prediction regarding the bank’s competence. 
Therefore, we posit: 
Hypothesis 7 (client value): Better past performance in the sense of 
greater client value created is positively associated with NNM growth.  
Note that a full test of this hypothesis should also consider the risks with 
which a given performance was achieved. However, this information is not 
available to us, clearly presenting a limitation of our analysis.  
We will also consider some other explanatory variables for which we do 
not have unambiguous hypotheses.  
2.2 Heterogeneous Effects 
For all the hypotheses, we also investigate whether larger banks react more to 
any given factor than smaller banks do. Then, we further explore whether the 
recent financial crisis has had an effect on the role of some determinants. We 
do not have unambiguous hypotheses regarding this cross-sectional and time 
series heterogeneity.  
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3 Data and Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Institutional Setting 
We use a hand-collected panel data set of major private banks domiciled in 
Switzerland. In order to increase sample size and to ensure better robustness of 
our results, Liechtenstein private banks were also added. We begin with the 
dataset developed by Birchler et al. (2011) and expand it in several 
dimensions. Our sample period is 2003 until 2010. 
Private banking includes a broad range of financial, advisory, and 
additional services for domestic and international clients. The core business is 
the administration of assets and investment advisory, where the customer 
receive tailor-made solutions (Horn and Rudolf (2011), Cocca (2008)). A 
private bank was included in the sample if it has a clear strategic focus on 
private banking and if at least one third of total revenues were generated from 
fee and commission income. The strategic focus was verified through the 
overall mission statement in the annual report or on the bank’s official internet 
presence respectively. Furthermore, the availability of an annual report was a 
necessary condition for inclusion in the sample.  
Due to mergers and acquisitions, firm exits, ownership changes, and 
increased restrictions in data availability some banks dropped out of the 
sample. The resulting panel data set is unbalanced. 
3.2 Dependent Variable 
Net new money (NNM) is the net amount of assets under management (AUM) 
of new and existing clients less the amount of assets withdrawn. The Swiss 
Federal Banking Commission (SFBC)3 defines AUM to encompass all assets 
in self-managed collective investment instruments, assets from investors and 
clients in a wealth management contract. Additionally, AUM include assets in 
self-managed funds and assets with an investment advisory and/or investment 
                                                 
3
 SFBC Circular 24 (2002), Circular 38 (2006) and Circular 2 (2008). 
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service mandate.4 “Custody-Assets” – assets that are held exclusively for 
safekeeping, custody or transaction purposes – are not considered as AUM as 
the bank does not provide any consultancy service.5  
The SFBC requires all Swiss banking institutions to disclose figures on 
levels and flows of AUM if they have a significant part of their activities in 
wealth management. Specifically banks are required to disclose their AUM if 
the net balance of the positions “commission income on securities and 
investment transactions” and “commission expenses on securities and 
investment transactions” is greater than one third of the sum of “results from 
commission and fee business and “trading income” (SFBC, Circular 2/2008. 
Margins nos. 198f). The NNM-figures have to be disclosed based on the 
scheme of “Table Q”, specified in SFBC Circular 2/2008 (198e) and attached 
to this paper in the Supplementary Appendix. The disclosure rules do not 
require separating out inflows and outflows in the presentation of NNM 
figures. 
Importantly, interest and dividend income as well as market and currency 
movements on clients’ assets are excluded from this calculation. Thus, a 
positive NNM-figure implies that the aggregated net asset inflow is higher 
than the aggregated amount that clients withdrew in the same period. 
In order to capture size effects we standardize NNM figures by the 
average AUM holdings in the previous and current period to generate 
NNM_AUM, our main dependent variable. 
3.3 Main explanatory Variables 
MEDIA is a binary indicator variable that equals one if a private bank received 
a negative media mention in a given year. In order to evaluate media coverage 
we conduct a content analysis of six of the most popular opinion-forming 
                                                 
4
 In particular, AUM include liabilities towards customers such as savings and deposits, time deposits, 
fiduciary deposits and all portfolio assets. However the statement is a non-exhaustive list and further details of 
inclusion have to be derived from the investment purpose.  
5
 As reporting institutions are required to disclose the detailed criteria concerning the classification on custody 
assets, there could arise potential data limitations.  
6
 Depreciations are included into operating costs to account for the fact that banks can either buy or lease 
tangible assets and, consequently, leasing expense are considered as operational costs and are incorporated in total 
administrative expenses. 
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general and business newspapers. We focus on Swiss newspapers and include 
additionally one main German business newspaper.  
For the media analysis we assume that relevant news and bulletins 
affecting the Swiss financial center and the individual private bank are 
published and reported in the Swiss home media first and are afterwards 
translated to international media agencies and broadcasted by international 
newswires. We conduct a content analysis using LexisNexis Academic 
International News and Wire database. For each year and institution we search 
for articles that cover the bank in combination with reportings about tax 
scandals, banking secrecy, data theft or double taxation agreements. In a 
second step we classify each article manually to have either positive or 
negative content. Further details concerning the use of specific search terms 
and the inspected newspapers and additional information of the media 
coverage in Switzerland and Germany can be found in the Appendix.  
The private bank’s capital strength is captured by the EQUITY RATIO, 
which is the proportion of equity to total assets. A high equity ratio signals 
low balance sheet risk.  
SERVICE is defined as the total number of employees standardized by the 
total amount of assets under management. The COST-INCOME-RATIO 
captures total operating expenses and depreciations per unit of net operating 
profit.6 EMPLOYEES is the total number of employees. COMPENSATION is 
the total personnel costs a bank shows in its annual report. (Unfortunately, we 
do not have data on relationship managers specifically.) EMPLOYEE 
GROWTH is the one-year growth rate of EMPLOYEES. Our measure of 
incentives is COMP-PER-CAPITA, calculated as COMPENSATION, divided 
by EMPLOYEES. This is clearly a highly noisy measure of incentives. It is 
motivated by (a) the fact that the companies we study are in the same industry 
and should thus be competitive to each other with respect to pay practices and 
                                                 
6
 Depreciations are included into operating costs to account for the fact that banks can either buy or lease 
tangible assets and, consequently, leasing expense are considered as operational costs and are incorporated in total 
administrative expenses. 
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(b) the notion of basic economic theory that risk-averse agents receiving 
higher-powered incentives receive higher pay.  
CLIENT VALUE is a proxy for the bank’s investment performance. It 
captures the growth of AUM over a one-year period, subtracting out the 
growth of the asset base through net clients’ fund flows in the same period.  
3.4 Other Control Variables 
LOG (ASSETS) is included as a control variable for size effects. 
OWN_FUNDS captures the ratio of assets under management that are 
managed in bank’s own funds.  
COMMISSION_INCOME income is defined as the ratio of revenues and 
income from fees and commissions to the net operating profit. It captures the 
degree of specialization and is considered to proxy private banking 
knowledge.  
Finally, the ability of a bank to attract funds may be higher if it offers 
services of special interest to certain client segments.7 For example, one 
argument often made by relationship managers and also addressed by Cocca 
(2008) is that it is important to offer corporate financial advisory services 
because founders and owners of family firms may be interested in transactions 
(especially in the context of succession planning). In order to capture the type 
of the private banks’ clients we evaluate each institution’s individual internet 
presence and screen it for advertised clients segments that are served. If an 
institution is not presented online, we consult the Bloomberg BusinessWeek 
Company Search8 and derive client information based on the company 
description stated.9 This search results in three variables: CORPORATE 
CLIENTS is a binary indicator equal to one if competencies for corporate 
advisory services are stated explicitly. This comprises advisory competences 
and services in areas such as corporate finance, transnational (commodity) 
                                                 
7
 All private banks serve “traditional” private banking customers – individuals that demand strategic asset 
management, financial planning and portfolio management services. 
8
 Available at http://investing.businessweek.com/research/common/symbollookup/symbollookup.asp. 
9
 Almost all private banks in our sample are presented in the internet when the search was conducted in April 
2012. However some of the institutions dropped out because of mergers and acquisitions. A potential imprecision is 
inherent in this proceeding as institutions can change or extend its strategic focus. 
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trade financing, merger and acquisition, share and secondary placements and 
transaction banking. INSTITUTIONAL CLIENTS is a binary indicator equal to 
one if a private bank offers custodian services for pension funds, insurance 
companies, family offices, other banks and related brokers. INDEPENDENT 
ASSET MANAGERS is a binary indicator equal to one if a private bank 
specifically states that it caters to this group of clients.  
3.5 Empirical Strategy 
We run panel regressions with NNM_AUM as our dependent variable and the 
explanatory variables described above. Our hypotheses concern the cross 
section of private banks. Therefore, we include time fixed effects in our panel 
regressions. This also allows us to control for general macroeconomic factors. 
In particular, in the time period under analysis, the financial sector in general 
and the Swiss private banking sector specifically were affected by several 
regional and international challenges. Most importantly, the financial crisis 
affected primarily the trust and perception of financial institutions. 
Furthermore, impacts of the financial crisis influenced the potential monetary 
inflows that could be tied up by Swiss private banks. Changes in the Swiss 
nominal interest rate and fluctuation of major currencies in relation to the 
Swiss franc determined the attractiveness of the Swiss financial center for 
offshore money.  
Additionally, we lag all explanatory variables by one year. Lagging each 
variable is appropriate as we consider annual balance sheet data that usually 
exhibit a backward oriented view. It also to some extent ameliorates reverse 
causality concerns. 
4 Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table I provides descriptive statistics. In order to exclude potential 
misleading results due to outliers (possibly due to the financial crisis or the 
influence of extremely large or unusual market participants), we winsorize all 
variables at the 2.5 and 97.5 percent levels.  
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Table I 
Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables of Swiss private banks from 2003 to 2010. NNM is the net 
Swiss franc amount of assets and assets under management of new and existing clients less the amount of assets withdrawn; AUM is the 
Swiss franc amount of assets and assets under management. NNM_AUM captures the aggregated net amount of assets under management 
acquired from new and existing clients standardized by the level of previous years AUM, NNMt divided by the average of AUMt and 
AUMt-1. MEDIA is a dummy variable that equals to one if an institution exhibits negative media coverage in the corresponding year. 
EQUITY RATIO is the ratio of equity to total capital. SERVICE captures the proportion of the number of total employees to total AUM.
COST-INCOME-RATIO is the cost-income-ratio. WAGES is the total Swiss franc amount of wages paid to the employees. COMP-PER-
CAPITA captures the wage cost per employee and GROWTH-COMP-PER-CAPITA is the growth rate of wages per employee. EMPLOYEE 
is the total number of employees and EMPLOYEE GROWTH is the annual rate of change. CLIENT VALUE captures the growth of AUM 
over a one year's period less the growth of the asset base through net clients funds in the same period. CORPORATE CLIENTS, 
INSTITUTIONAL CLIENTS and INDEPENDENT ASSET MANAGERS are dummy variables that equal to one if the bank serves 
corporate, institutional or independent asset managers, respectively. OWN_FUNDS captures the ratio of AUM allocated in own funds. 
COMMISSION INCOME is the proportion of revenues from commissions and fees to total revenues. ASSETS captures the private banks 
total capital. The data are winsorized at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75 Min. Max. N 
NNM (Mio. CHF) 1’439.68 4’140.18 -71.60 122.00 909.11 -2’580.20 19’816.00 521 
AUM (Mio. CHF) 23’848.23 41’071.88 1’876.07 6’498.00 25’647.00 437.10 193’350.00 610 
NNM_AUM  0.04 0.11 -0.02 0.04 0.09 -0.20 0.32 518 
MEDIA (dummy) 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 792 
EQUITY RATIO 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.21 0.04 0.51 594 
SERVICE  0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.07 591 
COST-INCOME-RATIO  0.71 0.18 0.58 0.69 0.80 0.38 1.21 647 
WAGES (Mio. CHF) 58.12 92.58 5.25 16.70 59.02 1.93 368.20 559 
COMP-PER-CAPITA (Mio. CHF) 0.18 0.06 0.14 0.17 0.19 0.08 0.55 548 
GROWTH COMP-PER-CAPITA 0.03 0.16 -0.05 0.02 0.10 -0.41 1.18 461 
EMPLOYEE (number) 381.63 602.23 38.50 120.00 412.00 12.00 2’573.00 639 
EMPLOYEE GROWTH  0.05 0.14 -0.02 0.03 0.10 -0.21 0.43 540 
CLIENT VALUE  0.00 0.16 -0.07 0.02 0.09 -0.33 0.39 474 
CORPORATE CLIENTS (dummy) 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 890 
INSTITUTIONAL CLIENTS (dummy) 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 890 
INDEPENDENT ASSET MANAGERS (dummy) 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 890 
OWN FUNDS 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.32 585 
COMMISSION INCOME 0.63 0.13 0.54 0.63 0.73 0.38 0.89 606 
ASSETS (Mio. CHF) 4’154.85 7’796.12 298.50 898.15 2’858.70 54.34 33’772.90 538 
LOG ASSETS  6.92 1.72 5.70 6.80 7.96 4.01 10.43 538 
 
As already mentioned in the previous section, the Swiss private banking 
market exhibits a high degree of heterogeneity. Thus, an average private bank 
in our sample exhibits about CHF 23 billion of assets under management and 
attracts on average CHF 1.4 billion of net funds each year. However, the 
median bank exhibits assets under management of around CHF 6.5 billion and 
attracts CHF 122 million. This high skewness is due to the fact that both big 
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banks, UBS Wealth Management and Credit Suisse Private Banking, manage 
more than the half of total AUM in our sample and the combined market share 
of the group of smallest 40 banks represent only 3 percent of our total sample.  
There also occurs substantial variation in assets and assets under 
management. Furthermore, these absolute assets measures are heavily skewed 
and the mean-to-median ratio ranges between 3.6 for assets to around 12 for 
net new money. Therefore, we conduct the subsequent analysis based on 
ratios. New funds correspond to around 4 per cent of the total assets base on 
average. 
As for the other variables, the average amount of total assets per bank is 
CHF 4.1 billion and consists of around 16 percent equity. The average private 
bank in our sample employs 400 employees and exhibits annual wage costs of 
about CHF 58 million CHF. On average, an employee earns about CHF 
180’000 and the annual growth of the number of total employees is by around 
2 percentage points higher than the average increase of compensation per 
capita. Some of these variables, too, are highly skewed.  
There is not only significant cross-sectional variation in net new money, 
but also considerable time series variation. Figure 1 plots average the average 
NNM development over time.  
4.2 Main Hypotheses 
Table II presents our main results. It also shows the expected signs for the 
hypotheses.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we find that negative media coverage in the 
previous year is robustly negatively associated with NNM-flows. Private 
banks experiencing negative media coverage display decelerated net asset 
growth by around 3 percent in the subsequent year.  
private bank that exhibits an average level of equity ratio (0.16) increases 
its equity ratio to the upper quartile of our sample (0.21), then the resulting 
average growth of the asset base decreases by about 0.66 (=0.132*0.05) 
percent. These results reject Hypothesis 2. A possible explanation is that 
besides the effect of the equity ratio as a signal of quality a second effect 
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comes in. Recent research documents that leverage decisions are to a 
significant extent driven by managerial preferences (Lemmon, Roberts, and 
Zender (2008)). Thus, high leverage (a low equity ratio) may be reflecting 
confident, aggressive, perhaps even risk-loving management. These managers 
would at the same time also be very entrepreneurial and innovative in their 
attempts to acquire additional assets under management, which would yield 
the correlation we observe in the data. We cannot definitively ascertain the 
channel through the finding arises; what would be needed to address this issue 
further is an exogenous shock to leverage that is unrelated to managerial 
characteristics.  
Next, we find significant evidence in favor of Hypothesis 3. As seen in 
Column (3) and other regressions, an increase in the client-to-relationship 
manager ratio (SERVICE) predicts an increase in NNM flows. For an average 
private bank of our sample an increase in its service ratio by 10 per cent is 
associated with growth in AUM of around 3.5 percent. However, the potential 
to increase NNM only through an increase in service is dampened by the fact 
that private banks that operate less efficiently in general (have a high cost-
Figure 1. Development of Net New Money. This figure depicts CHF levels of NNM over the sample
period. The levels are reported in Mio. CHF and lb and ub capture the lower and upper bound of the
sample distribution, respectively.  
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income ratio) also are less effective in obtaining NNM, which confirms 
Hypothesis 4.10 
Next, Column (4) suggests that incentive effects do exist: An increase in 
wages, which, as argued earlier, is a reasonable proxy for the power of 
incentives in the private bank, is associated with positive AUM-growth. When 
an average private banking institution increases its average compensation per 
employee by 20 percent, this translates to an increase of AUM by almost 4 
percent. In contrast, external growth (an increase of headcount, for example, 
through the acquisition of a team of relationship managers from a competitor) 
is not a significant determinant of NNM on average. (As we will see below, 
however, this insignificant result is the result of substantial heterogeneity 
between banks in this respect.) 
Column (5) shows that past performance does not explain future NNM-
growth; thus, Hypothesis 7 is not confirmed on average. 
Finally, Column (6) includes all variables considered so far and 
introduces a set of control variables that are likely to pick up significant bank 
fixed effects. Notably, all the previous results by and large hold also in this 
“kitchen-sink” regression. There are few other strong effects. Interestingly, the 
potential to offer own funds products/ to allocate funds in the own institution 
tends to allow the private bank to increase NNM-growth; the effect is not 
significant on conventional levels, however. Moreover, it turns out that NNM-
growth is not determined by the client base/ portfolio of clients that are served. 
In particular, there seem to exist no cross-selling effects between private 
banking and investment/corporate banking for attracting net funds. If 
anything, private banks also offering corporate services are less successful in 
attracting client funds, controlling for the other variables.  
                                                 
10
 An alternative explanation for the negative coefficient on the cost-income-ratio runs as follows. Suppose 
that an increase in the share of wallet of existing customers has a more positive effect in generating income than the 
acquisition of new clients. This may be plausible if new clients imply higher acquisition costs and assigned capacities 
(such as increases in relationship management or performance reporting requirements) than old existing clients.  
Then, if a bank was successful in targeting new clients last year, it may have exhausted its potential to reach new 
clients then, implying lower NNM this year. This would yield the correlation observed in the data. 
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4.3 Heterogeneous Effects across Banks 
Table III investigates whether the effects vary across institutions. In particular, 
we are interested in whether large private banks behave differently than small 
private banks. To study this possibility, we interact variables of interest with 
our proxy for bank size, LOG ASSETS. 
In Column (1) we observe that negative effects of negative media 
coverage are less serious for larger private banks. Indeed, for the largest 
private banks in our sample, starting at the upper quartile, the negative effect 
of negative media coverage becomes negligibly small. This compensating 
effect of size may be based - at least partially - on the sobriety and soundness 
that larger private banks convey. 
Alternatively, larger wealth management institutions are faced with a 
constant media observance, which makes single negative media articles be of 
minor importance, and allows the banks to more effectively and actively 
response to negative news. Furthermore, larger size private banks employ 
well-staffed public relation offices that enables them to deal and respond in a 
more sophisticated manner with negative media coverage. 
The opposite tends to be the case for the equity ratio, as can be seen in 
Column (2). As previously seen, higher leverage enables private banking 
institutions to increase their asset base. This analysis reveals this effect mainly 
arises for larger institutions. Consider again a quantitative example. 
Assume that leverage increases by 5 per cent. This corresponds to a 
decrease in the equity ratio from 0.16 to 0.11. Then, NNM-growth of a 
representative bank of the lower quartile of our sample increases by around 2 
per cent. That effect is even more pronounced, the larger the private bank is. 
Thus, for a private bank of the upper quartile the reduction in leverage, 
increases NNM-growth by around 2.5 percent.  
Column (3) shows that the scope of service offered to clients is more 
important for small-sized private banks than for larger banks, and the incentive 
effect is more pronounced for large private banks. 
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Table II 
Main Results 
This table examines panel regressions of yearly net new money of Swiss private banking institutions on bank
characteristics from 2003 to 2010. The dependent variable is NNM_AUM and captures the aggregated net amount of 
assets under management acquired from new and existing clients standardized by the average of AUMt and AUMt-1. 
MEDIA is a dummy variable that equals to one if an institution exhibits negative media coverage in the corresponding
year. EQUITY RATIO is the ratio of equity to total capital. SERVICE captures the proportion of the number of total 
employees to total AUM. COST-INCOME-RATIO is the Cost-Income-Ratio. COMP-PER-CAPITA captures the wage 
cost per employee and EMPLOYEE GROWTH is the annual rate of change of the number of total employees. CLIENT 
VALUE captures the growth of AUM over a one year's period less the growth of the asset base through net clients
funds in the same period. CORPORATE CLIENTS, INSTITUTIONAL CLIENTS and INDEPENDENT ASSET 
MANAGERS are dummy variables that equal to one if the bank serves corporate, institutional or independent asset 
managers, respectively. OWN FUNDS captures the ratio of AUM allocated in own funds. COMMISSION INCOME is 
the proportion of revenues from commissions and fees to total revenues. ASSETS captures the private banks total 
capital. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors, clustered at
the bank level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Hyp. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MEDIA (-) -0.036*   -0.045*  -0.053** 
  (-1.80)   (-1.80)  (-2.11) 
EQUITY RATIO (+)  -0.132*  -0.166*  -0.166* 
   (-1.71)  (-1.65)  (-1.71) 
SERVICE (+)   1.632** 2.271**  2.531** 
    (2.15) (2.33)  (2.46) 
COST-INCOME-RATIO (-)   -0.083** -0.122***  -0.118*** 
    (-2.32) (-3.75)  (-3.11) 
COMP-PER-CAPITA (+)    0.193*  0.172 
     (1.73)  (1.50) 
EMPLOYEE GROWTH (+)    0.001  -0.027 
     (0.01)  (-0.53) 
CLIENT_VALUE (+)     0.023 0.038 
      (0.63) (0.85) 
CORPORATE CLIENTS       -0.019 
       (-1.21) 
INSTITUTIONAL CLIENTS       0.006 
       (0.36) 
INDEPENDENT ASSET MANAGERS       0.011 
       (0.54) 
OWN FUNDS       0.087 
       (1.36) 
COMMISSION INCOME       -0.006 
       (-0.09) 
LOG ASSETS  -0.001 -0.007 -0.002 -0.005 0.000 -0.003 
  (-0.18) (-1.41) (-0.40) (-0.88) (0.06) (-0.45) 
Constant  0.013 0.076 0.043 0.079 -0.001 0.049 
  (0.38) (1.60) (0.93) (1.30) (-0.03) (0.64) 
        
N  409 408 402 335 333 320 
Number of Banks  79 79 79 78 78 78 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  0.093 0.094 0.094 0.13 0.066 0.13 
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 Interestingly, while employee growth is insignificant in the main 
regressions, the interaction term with size in Column (3) of Table III reveals a 
potential positive size effect. Thus, as bank size increases, this interaction term 
increases its dominance on the association between employees and NNM-
growth. Thus, very large institutions can increase their asset growth by raising 
the number of employees, that is growing inorganically. This interaction can 
be due to increasing financial capacities as well as organizational capabilities 
that larger institutions exhibit, in contrast to institutions of average size or 
smaller private banks, respectively.  
Further results reveal potential size effects of the interaction with the 
clients segment that is served. It seems to be potentially lucrative only for 
larger private banks to serve corporate clients. Specifically, solely private 
banks with a minimal asset size of CHF 2.8 billon are able to compensate the 
initial negative effect that occurs when serving corporate clients.  
Remarkably, clients’ reaction on negative media coverage does not seem 
to be associated with their professional background (see Column 4). Solely 
independent asset managers do exhibit a less negative reaction to negative 
media coverage shocks than other clients segments do.  
4.4 Heterogeneous Effects across Time 
The main focus of this paper is on understanding the cross-sectional variation 
of NNM-growth. As a final step in the analysis, however, we now briefly 
consider variation in the role of determinants of NNM over time. Our interest 
in this analysis lies with the potential repercussions of the global financial 
turmoil of 2007/2008. The financial crisis had a distinctive influence on the 
financial sector in general and on the private banking sector in particular. Due 
to losses from the crisis, the asset base was reduced massively and in addition, 
the perception as well as the reputation of the financial sector suffered 
massively. To evaluate how this additional external pressure affected the role 
of the determinants of NNM flows, we interact variables of interest from the 
previous observations with a time dummy variable for the time after the 
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financial crisis, AFTERCRISIS, namely the years 2008 until 2010. (Naturally, 
we now omit year dummies from the regressions.)  
The results are presented in Table IV. First, as expected, there is a 
significant reduction in NNM-growth in the time after the financial crisis. 
Interestingly, there are few significant changes in the role of determinants of 
NNM, but some patterns are noteworthy. For example, we cannot observe any 
shift toward a more sensitive response on negative news about private banks 
evoked through the financial turmoil (Column (1)). Perhaps there were that 
many negative reports about the financial sector that single news that were in 
our focus did not carry special weight.  
Column (2) reveals that the negative effects of the equity ratio on NNM-
growth do not seem to be impaired by the financial crisis; Column (3) does not 
show any influence of the crisis for the effects of changes in the service level 
and its interaction with the cost-income-ratio; and in Column (4) we observe 
that there occurred no significant shift in the role of the client structure in the 
time period after the turmoil. 
Strikingly, however, aft client value turns out to be a highly significant 
factor in determining NNM-growth before and up to the crisis. Thus, signaling 
higher past performance historically did allow private banks to increase their 
NNM-growth. It will be interesting to see whether this occurs again in the 
future when markets calm down.  
Finally, Column (6) shows that the ability to offer own managed funds 
becomes an important factor after the financial crisis. For an average private 
bank this implies that after the financial crisis the ability to offer own managed 
funds products increases NNM-growth by around 1.5 percentage points. 
5 Conclusions 
This is one of the first papers to systematically investigate the determinants of 
net money flows into and from private banks. Using a comprehensive sample 
of Swiss private banks, we have obtained several novel insights into the 
drivers of assets under management. First, we document a strong negative 
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Table III 
Heterogeneous Effects Across Banks 
Each column in this table reports a panel regression of yearly net new money of Swiss private banking institutions on bank characteristics from 2003 to 
2010. The dependent variable is NNM_AUM and captures the aggregated net amount of assets under management acquired from new and existing 
clients standardized by the average of AUMt and AUMt-1. MEDIA is a dummy variable that equals one if an institution exhibits negative media coverage 
in the corresponding year. EQUITY RATIO is the ratio of equity to total capital. SERVICE captures the proportion of the number of total employees to 
total AUM. COST-INCOME-RATIO is the Cost-Income-Ratio. COMP-PER-CAPITA captures the wage cost per employee and EMPLOYEE GROWTH 
is the annual rate of change of the number of total employees. CORPORATE CLIENTS, INSTITUTIONAL CLIENTS and INDEPENDENT ASSET 
MANAGERS are dummy variables that equal to one if the bank serves corporate, institutional or independent asset managers, respectively. ASSETS 
captures the private banks total capital. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors, clustered at the 
bank level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MEDIA -0.222** -0.210* -0.275** -0.283** -0.293*** -0.277** -0.221* -0.313*** 
(-2.15) (-1.89) (-2.09) (-2.15) (-2.70) (-2.08) (-1.74) (-2.58) 
MEDIA X LOG ASSETS 0.023* 0.022* 0.029* 0.029* 0.019 0.028* 0.023 0.021 
(1.93) (1.71) (1.91) (1.94) (1.35) (1.86) (1.53) (1.35) 
EQUITY RATIO  0.178 -0.012 -0.232 0.045 -0.096 0.185 -0.266 
 (0.79) (-0.04) (-0.72) (0.16) (-0.36) (0.80) (-1.07) 
EQUITY RATIO X LOG ASSETS  -0.062 -0.040 -0.007 -0.053 -0.029 -0.065* -0.032 
 (-1.61) (-0.96) (-0.14) (-1.22) (-0.66) (-1.76) (-0.77) 
SERVICE   7.952** 9.659*** 8.773** 9.057** 3.386 10.366*** 
  (2.18) (2.77) (2.38) (2.51) (1.11) (2.69) 
SERVICE X LOG ASSETS   -0.889 -1.093** -0.982* -1.034* -0.416 -1.300** 
  (-1.59) (-1.97) (-1.71) (-1.81) (-0.79) (-1.97) 
COST-INCOME-RATIO   -0.068 -0.055 -0.083 -0.085 0.117 -0.066 
  (-0.72) (-0.59) (-0.88) (-0.89) (1.00) (-0.67) 
COST-INCOME-RATIO X LOG ASSETS   -0.008 -0.015 -0.008 -0.008 -0.033* -0.013 
  (-0.56) (-1.00) (-0.56) (-0.52) (-1.93) (-0.81) 
COMP-PER-CAPITA   1.522** 1.673** 1.666** 1.523**  1.778** 
  (2.09) (2.49) (2.26) (2.16)  (2.54) 
COMP-PER-CAPITA X LOG ASSETS   -0.189* -0.213** -0.211** -0.192*  -0.220** 
  (-1.84) (-2.22) (-2.00) (-1.89)  (-2.22) 
EMPLOYEE GROWTH   -0.344** -0.355** -0.344** -0.332**  -0.384*** 
  (-2.33) (-2.39) (-2.25) (-2.22)  (-2.60) 
EMPLOYEE GROWTH X LOG ASSETS   0.048*** 0.049*** 0.047** 0.045**  0.050*** 
  (2.61) (2.72) (2.47) (2.49)  (2.86) 
INSTITUTIONAL CLIENTS    -0.008 0.011 -0.010 -0.018 -0.228* 
   (-0.09) (0.60) (-0.34) (-0.56) (-1.79) 
CORPORATE CLIENTS    -0.239*** -0.003 0.025 0.008 -0.387*** 
   (-2.93) (-0.14) (0.68) (0.17) (-2.63) 
INDEPENDENT ASSET MANAGERS    -0.014 0.011 0.018 -0.026 0.008 
   (-0.15) (0.62) (0.65) (-0.77) (0.07) 
INSTITUTIONAL CLIENTS X LOG ASSETS    0.003    0.020 
   (0.27)    (1.35) 
CORPORATE CLIENTS X LOG ASSETS    0.030***    0.043*** 
   (2.75)    (3.12) 
INDEPENDENT ASSET MANAGERS X LOG ASSETS    0.003    -0.003 
   (0.26)    (-0.22) 
INSTITUTIONAL CLIENTS X MEDIA     0.038   0.043 
    (0.66)   (0.66) 
CORPORATE CLIENTS X MEDIA     -0.007   -0.016 
    (-0.15)   (-0.33) 
INDEPENDENT ASSET MANAGERS X MEDIA     0.088*   0.095* 
    (1.94)   (1.79) 
INSTITUTIONAL CLIENTS X EQUITY RATIO      0.134  0.356 
     (0.87)  (1.48) 
CORPORATE CLIENTS X ERATIO      -0.226  0.117 
     (-1.09)  (0.48) 
INDEPENDENT ASSET MANAGERS X ERATIO      -0.014  0.010 
     (-0.07)  (0.04) 
INSTITUTIONAL CLIENTS X SERVICE       1.051 1.731 
      (0.56) (0.88) 
CORPORATE CLIENTS X SERVICE       -0.419 1.333 
      (-0.21) (0.75) 
INDEPENDENT ASSET MANAGERS X SERVICE       1.860 0.469 
      (0.95) (0.23) 
LOG ASSETS -0.002 -0.001 0.052** 0.053** 0.059** 0.054** 0.031** 0.054** 
(-0.49) (-0.14) (2.03) (2.02) (2.16) (2.00) (2.06) (2.00) 
Constant 0.019 0.042 -0.304* -0.291 -0.343* -0.311* -0.108 -0.259 
(0.56) (0.84) (-1.68) (-1.62) (-1.82) (-1.68) (-1.04) (-1.45) 
        
N  409 408 335 335 335 335 400 335 
Number of Banks 79 79 78 78 78 78 79 78 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.10 0.12 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.23 
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influence of negative media coverage on private bank’s ability to increase the 
asset base. Additionally, and surprisingly, trying to signal security by less 
leverage and acting less aggressive when attracting new funds does not seem 
to pay off; indeed, higher leverage is associated with an increase in the growth 
of assets under management. 
We argued that this finding may pick up heterogeneity in managerial 
preferences that also translate into policies for how NNM is acquired. 
Inorganic growth, that is, solely increasing the number of relationship 
managers generally does not play a role for NNM, while efficiency is 
important. We also provide evidence for size effects in Swiss private banking. 
For example, larger institutions are less affected by negative media 
coverage and can benefit more from external growth. Up to the financial crisis, 
client value created was an important determinant of NNM; the crisis appears 
to have shifted the focus away from performance, at least temporarily. 
Our analysis, while the most comprehensive of its kind, still presents 
some limitations. While an advantage of this study is that we used data that are 
in principle publicly available, even more progress could be made with more 
specific, often highly confidential data. For example, we were only able to 
investigate net new money; ideally, researchers would have access to inflows 
and outflows separately. Also, we do not have data on the source of funds. 
Clearly, it would be exciting to study fund flows from one bank to 
another. Similarly, the domicile of the investor would be extremely useful 
information to have, especially in conjunction with events that occurred in 
some countries. In other words, our study provides a first informative look on 
the macroeconomic landscape of value drivers of private banks, and it 
suggests that a microeconomic investigation, drawing on more detailed data 
would be a promising topic for future research.  
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Table IV 
Heterogeneous Effects Across Time 
This table examines panel regressions of yearly net new money of Swiss private banking institutions on bank characteristics from 2003 to 2010. The 
dependent variable is NNM_AUM and captures the aggregated net amount of assets under management acquired from new and existing clients 
standardized by the average of AUMt and AUMt-1. AFTERCRISIS is a dummy variable that equals one for the years 2009 and 2010. MEDIA is a dummy 
variable that equals one if an institution exhibits negative media coverage in the corresponding year. EQUITY RATIO is the ratio of equity to total 
capital. SERVICE captures the proportion of the number of total employees to total AUM. COST-INCOME-RATIO is the Cost-Income-Ratio including 
depreciations. COMP-PER-CAPITA captures the wage cost per employee and EMPLOYEE GROWTH is the annual rate of change of the number of 
total employees. CORPORATE CLIENTS, INSTITUTIONAL CLIENTS and INDEPENDENT ASSET MANAGERS are dummy variables that equal to 
one if the bank serves corporate, institutional or independent asset managers, respectively. CLIENT VALUE captures the growth of AUM over a one 
year's period less the growth of the asset base through net clients funds in the same period. OWN FUNDS captures the ratio of AUM allocated in own 
funds. COMMISSION INCOME is the proportion of revenues from commissions and fees to total revenues. ASSETS captures the private banks total 
capital. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, clustered at the bank level. ∗, ∗∗, and 
∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AFTERCRISIS -0.034*** -0.055** 0.032 -0.039** 0.041 -0.002 
(-2.88) (-2.44) (0.57) (-2.24) (0.76) (-0.04) 
MEDIA  -0.049** -0.042* -0.046** -0.030 -0.032 
 (-2.28) (-1.92) (-2.10) (-1.24) (-1.35) 
MEDIA X AFTERCRISIS  0.047     
 (1.08)     
EQUITY RATIO  -0.151* -0.139 -0.145 -0.168* -0.168** 
 (-1.87) (-1.63) (-1.57) (-1.80) (-2.02) 
EQUITY RATIO X AFTERCRISIS  0.106     
 (0.84)     
SERVICE   1.534* 1.522** 1.897*  
  (1.81) (1.98) (1.82)  
SERVICE X AFTERCRISIS   -1.426  -1.761  
  (-1.08)  (-1.20)  
COST-INCOME-RATIO   -0.085** -0.111*** -0.076**  
  (-2.00) (-2.99) (-1.97)  
COST-INCOME-RATIO X AFTERCRISIS   -0.031  -0.030  
  (-0.37)  (-0.38)  
CORPORATE CLIENTS    -0.012   
   (-0.69)   
CORPORATE CLIENTS X AFTERCRISIS    0.011   
   (0.34)   
INSTITUTIONAL CLIENTS    0.011   
   (0.65)   
INSTITUTIONAL CLIENTS X AFTERCRISIS    -0.003   
   (-0.13)   
INDEPENDENT ASSET MANAGERS    0.013   
   (0.69)   
INDEPENDENT ASSET MANAGERS X AFTERCRISIS    0.031   
   (1.33)   
CLIENT VALUE     0.134*** 0.065 
    (2.59) (1.64) 
CLIENT VALUE X AFTERCRISIS     -0.140  
    (-1.38)  
OWN FUNDS      -0.017 
     (-0.19) 
OWN FUNDS X AFTERCRISIS      0.300* 
     (1.79) 
COMMISSION INCOME      -0.045 
     (-0.60) 
COMMISSION INCOME X AFTERCRISIS      -0.039 
     (-0.51) 
LOG ASSETS -0.003 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.005 -0.007 
(-0.71) (-1.45) (-1.49) (-1.57) (-0.88) (-1.09) 
Constant 0.059* 0.121** 0.144*** 0.164*** 0.108* 0.127 
(1.91) (2.55) (2.67) (2.79) (1.88) (1.58) 
      
N 409 408 401 401 329 332 
Number of Banks 79 79 79 79 78 78 
R2 0.015 0.033 0.047 0.057 0.073 0.078 
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Appendix 
 
Media Analysis 
 
For each institution in the database we conduct a media search in 
LexisNews Academic International News and Wire database. Articles are 
collected from five national Swiss newspapers and one German business 
newspaper. Each institution’s name is connected with the following search 
terms. In order to account for different spellings or plural/singular occurrences 
of distinct word, we use the following search operators. "!" picks up any 
number of letters after a root word; "*" serves as a placeholder for one letter; 
“w/n” is a proximity connector which is used to establish a relationship 
between terms; the letter “n” can present an arbitrary number. 
 
Search terms 
Amnestie w/10 steuer Kunden! 
nicht w/2 deklariert* Repatr! 
Amtshilf! Schwarzgeld 
angeklag! Scudo! 
anklage Steuerab! 
Bankd! Steuerbe! 
Bankgeheim! Steuerdaten 
Doppelbest! Steuerfl! 
Finanza! Steuerhinter! 
Finanzp! Steuersünd! 
Geldw! Steuerver! 
Gesetz! Strafsteuer 
IRS! unversteuert* 
Kont**dat!  
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Title Type of medium Circulations11 
Tages-Anzeiger Daily newspaper 195‘618 
Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ) Daily newspaper 132‘670 
NZZ am Sonntag Weekly newspaper 130‘133 
Financial Times (Deutschland) Daily newspaper 100’393 
Handelszeitung Weekly newspaper 36’230 
Finanz und Wirtschaft Biweekly newspaper 29‘517 
 
 
 
 
Table Q 
 
Table Q based on Margins nos. 198a and 198b of guidelines of Swiss 
Federal Banking Commission on financial statement reporting 
 
Assets under management 
Type of assets under management Reporting year Previous year 
Assets in own-managed collective investment schemes   
Assets with management mandate   
Other assets under management   
Total assets under management (including double counting)    
Of which double counting12   
Change through net new money (including double countings)   
 
  
                                                 
11
 Information based on published media information downloaded from the newspaper’s website; data were 
recorded on June 2012.   
12
 Double countings incorporates assets in self-managed funds, funds in customers‘ accounts that were already 
classified as assets under management.  
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Employing a comprehensive dataset of executive and board compensation 
and management and board shareholding information of 100 Swiss listed 
companies for the time period 2007-2011, we document significant evidence 
of a pay-for-performance relationship in CEO pay. We show that the CEO 
pay-performance relationship is somewhat weaker in Small-Cap companies 
than in large firms. However, Swiss CEO’s are not solely rewarded for 
individual performance; rather, part of their compensation is related to 
general sector or exchange rate changes, indicating potential deficits in pay 
design. We also describe trends in disclosure of compensation matters.  
JEL-classification: G34. 
Keywords: CEO compensation; pay-for-performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
†This research was supported by the Swiss Finance Institute, the NCCR FINRISK and the Research Priority Project 
Finance and Financial Markets at the University of Zurich. We thank PricewaterhouseCoopers (especially Robert 
Kuipers and Remo Schmid) for providing a part of compensation data and sharing insight into the compensation 
practices at Swiss companies. ‡Reichenecker: University of Zurich, Department of Banking and Finance, email: 
michael.reichenecker@bf.uzh.ch; Wagner: University of Zurich, Harvard University and CEPR. Wagner is an 
Independent Counsel for PricewaterhouseCoopers. email: alexander.wagner@bf.uzh.ch. Mailing address for both 
authors: University of Zurich, Department of Banking and Finance, Plattenstrasse 14, CH-8032 Zurich, Switzerland.  
  
82 
1. Introduction 
This is one of the first papers providing a comprehensive overview of the 
contemporaneous structure and levels of board and executive compensation in 
Switzerland. The study is timely and important – executive compensation is 
one of the most hotly and most publicly discussed topics in economics and 
finance, especially in highly developed economies like Switzerland. 
Managerial pay is also a focal point of regulatory actions, including 
requirements regarding disclosures.1 Surprisingly, very little academic work is 
available on executive compensation in Switzerland.2 Evaluating a hand-
collected sample of compensation data of around 100 of the largest Swiss 
companies for the time period 2007-2011, this paper seeks to fill this gap. We 
provide four key findings.  
First, we begin by providing descriptive evidence of the level and 
development of executive compensation. Notably, CEO pay in the largest 
companies decreases substantially over the time period (with the largest 
decrease after the 2007 crisis), while executive pay in the other companies 
remained largely stable. We document large differences in the composition of 
pay; top executives of large companies receive significantly more equity-
based compensation than their counterparts in small companies. Other, less 
visible pay components (such as pension payments) appear to have become 
more important in recent years, relative to cash bonus payments.  
Second, we analyze the extent to which Swiss CEOs are rewarded for 
performance. To our knowledge, this is the first systematic evaluation of this 
kind in an academic study. We find a surprisingly strong and consistent pay-
performance relationship: higher return on assets, higher return on equity, and 
higher (lagged) total shareholder return are all significantly positively related 
to CEO pay. Accounting variables such as EBITDA or earnings per share 
                                                 
1
 For example, the “Initiative gegen die Abzockerei” demands that shareholders obtain the right of binding say-
on-pay. (See Wagner and Wenk (2012) for an analysis of the market reaction to the initiative.) The Transparency Act 
of 2007 requires firms to disclose detailed compensation data, and the SIX Exchange Regulation has stipulated 
detailed additional disclosure requirements.  
2
 Some work exists that looks at international comparisons of executive pay, including Switzerland (Aggarwal, 
Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011)). However, these studies do not provide detailed accounts of compensation in 
Switzerland.  
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offer lower explanatory power for the variation in CEO pay. Interestingly, the 
quality of corporate governance is not associated with compensation. We also 
assess the quality of the pay setting process and question whether there exist 
incentive schemes that reward the CEO for firm performance that are beyond 
the CEO’s control. Indeed, we find that firm performance driven purely by 
“luck” – such as positive sector performance or favorable developments in 
terms of the exchange rate with countries to whom a firm exports a large 
fraction of its sales – is a highly significant determinant of total pay and in 
particular of the equity-based portion of pay. Seen from an agency theoretic 
perspective – under which observable external components of firm 
performance should be filtered out when assessing a CEO’s performance – 
this suggests potential deficiencies in the pay process for Swiss executives.  
Third, we provide an overview about the structure and the changes of 
wealth levels of Swiss executives. The median CEO of the 100 largest Swiss 
corporations holds about 0.04% of the market value of his company, around 
CHF 1 million, that is, approximately three times his yearly salary. By 
comparison, the median CEO of the 1,500 largest US corporations holds about 
0.72% of the market value of his company, around USD 7.5 million, that is, 
approximately eleven times his yearly salary. There is, however, large 
variation across firms.  
Finally, we turn to the regulatory perspective and assess the quality of 
compliance of compensation disclosures with regulatory requirements. Not 
surprisingly, but reassuringly, we document a trend of improved disclosure in 
the past three years.  
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the sample and the 
data used. Section 3 provides a detailed overview about executive and board 
compensation. Section 4 analyses patterns of pay-performance relationships. 
Section 5 presents an analysis of executive wealth and ownership incentives. 
Finally, Section 6 provides an analysis of compensation disclosure practices in 
Switzerland, and section 7 concludes.  
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2. Data  
2.1. Sample 
Our sample consists of the 100 largest companies listed at the Swiss stock 
exchange. We distinguish between three groups of firms. The first group 
includes the 20 companies of the major blue-chip Swiss Market Index (SMI). 
The second group includes all companies of the SMIM index, capturing the 
next 30 largest and most liquid Mid-Cap stocks. These 50 companies add up to 
around 90 percent of the capitalization of the Swiss equity market. In order to 
get an even more representative sample, we extend our analysis to the 
following 50 companies according to their market capitalization in the year 
2007. In the following, we refer to this third group as Small-Cap companies. 
The full market capitalization of our total sample as of 31.12.2011 is CHF 881 
billion.  
2.2. CEO Pay and Wealth Variables  
We study hand-collected panel data of board and executive committee 
compensation and management’s shareholding data. (For the largest 48 
companies compensation data comes from PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012).)  
We collect data on total annual payments (TOTAL PAY) as well as 
decomposed into fix and variable components. The components of annual 
payments are annual guaranteed fixed cash payments (BASE CASH PAY), a 
discretionary variable cash bonus (VARIABLE CASH) and equity-based 
payments associated with long-term incentive plans (LTIP). For the purpose of 
this study we summarize all reward components paid in equity as LTIP.3 All 
other remaining payment components, such as director fees and emoluments 
for management service or pension contributions are captured as “other 
payments” (OTHER PAY). 
Furthermore, we gather data on the accumulated number of stocks held by 
all board and executive committee members. In order to derive the value of 
                                                 
3
 Some of the payments are part of the base compensation, while others are a form of bonus payment. 
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these equity holdings (VALUE SHAREHOLDINGS) we value each holding 
position with the stock price of the firm at the end of the corresponding year.4  
2.3. Firm Characteristics and Performance Measures 
We consider the size of the firm as one of the most important determinants of 
executive pay. Firm size is captured by total assets (TOTAL ASSETS) and 
defined as the sum of total current assets, long term receivables and 
investments.5 The scope of a firm’s foreign exposure is denoted by the stake of 
international sales to total sales (FOREIGN SALES).  
We control for the risk exposure of the firm. Garen (1994) showed that 
firms with higher levels of risk are more likely to offer executives higher 
compensation levels. We employ a static beta factor (BETA) to capture the 
elasticity of movements in the stock price to movements in the market as a 
whole. BETA is estimated based on a 2½ year stock price history and the 
Swiss Performance Index as the corresponding underlying market.  
Next, our primary firm performance measures are return on equity (ROE) 
and return on assets (ROA). ROE denotes the ratio of operating income 
(EBITDA) to the shareholder’s equity, and ROA captures the ratio of EBITDA 
to the book value of assets. EBITDA is the earnings before interest, taxes, and 
depreciation.  
As an additional measure of firm performance – capturing directly the 
value generated for shareholders – we also incorporate the total shareholder 
return (TOTAL RETURN). Further measures of firm performance are earnings 
per share, growth of sales and the growth of accounting returns. 
All data on firm characteristics are from Thomson Reuters Datastream.  
2.4. Governance Measures 
We include two direct controls for governance: the total number of 
directors (NO OF DIRECTORS) and the equity stake held by the CEO 
                                                 
4
 Data on option holdings are in principle also available. However, disclosure is too limited to allow a reliable 
valuation of these options. 
5
 Market capitalization could also be a suitable measure to capture size. However the market value of a firm 
may be correlated with the total return, one of our measures of firm performance.  
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(EQUITY OWNED). Both controls aim to capture potential power effect that 
enable the CEO to enforce influence on the board. Larger boards tend to be 
associated with worse governance, though the literature is somewhat 
ambiguous on this subject (Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010)). Higher 
managerial shareholdings can indicate better governance, though there is the 
danger of excessive insider influence.  
Additionally we control for the firm’s compliance with regulatory 
disclosure requirements captured by the disclosure score (DISCLOSURE 
SCORE); this score is described in Section 6. 
2.5. Macroeconomic Variables 
The EXPORT PRICE INDEX measures the price level of a fixed set of Swiss 
produced goods for the external market. The statistic is based on the terms of 
trade collected by the Swiss federal statistical office and establishes the 
relationship, for a given product, between the price index of exports and 
imports. We use this information to construct the measure of external “lucky” 
developments for a firm.  
3. The Executive and Board Pay Landscape 
3.1. Level of CEO Pay 
Table I Panel A provides a summary statistics of the most important pay 
variables in real terms. It reveals that an average CEO in our sample earns on 
annual total payments of around CHF 3.3 million, holds 1.4 percent of the 
company’s equity capital which corresponds to CHF 18.10 million of personal 
wealth. However, these variables are highly skewed. The corresponding 
numbers for the median CEO are CHF 2 million, 0.04 percent, and CHF 1.2 
million. Moreover, Figure 1 plots the mean and median levels of real total 
CEO pay over the sample period, split into corresponding stock indices.  
A first striking finding is that mean CEO pay doubles from one index bracket 
to the next. An average CEO of a SMI company earns twice the remuneration 
that the CEO of an average Mid-Cap company earns. And the CEO of a Mid-
Cap companies receives almost twice the pay that a Small-Cap CEO obtains.  
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Table I 
Summary Statistics: CEO annual Pay Variables and Firm Characteristics 
 
This table presents summary statistics of the main variables capturing the CEO pay and firm characteristics. BASE PAY represents the 
total sum of guaranteed annual cash pay. VARIABLE CASH is the total variable cash bonus. LTIP is the total sum of the payments 
granted in long-term-incentive programmes (containing fix and variable equity payments). OTHER PAY captures granted benefits, and 
emoluments for management service as well pension contributions. TOTAL PAY is the sum of total fixed cash and equity pay, variable 
cash and equity pay, and total other granted remuneration. ASSETS captures the sum of total firm assets. FOREIGN SALE is the ratio of 
international sales to the company's domestic sale. BETA is the stock related movements in its price relative to movements in the 
market as a whole. EBITDA represent the earnings of a company before interest expense, income taxes and depreciation. It is calculated
by taking the pretax income and adding back interest expense on debt and depreciation, depletion and amortization and subtracting 
capitalized interest. EBIT represents the earnings of a company before interest expense and income taxes. ROA (return on assets) is the 
ratio of EBITDA divided by the firm's total assets. ROE (return on equity) is the ratio of EBITDA divided by shareholder's equity. 
TOTAL RETURN is the total return of holding the company's equity over the last year and re-investing all dividend payments to
purchase additional units of the equity. EPS captures the earnings per share. NO OF DIRECTORS is the total number of directors in the 
company's board, and NO OF EXECUTIVES represents the total number of executives. EQUITY OWNED is the absolute number of 
shares held by the corresponding CEO divided by the total number of outstanding shares. VALUE SHAREHOLDINGS captures the 
value of the CEO's shareholdings; calculated by valuing the shareholdings by the share price at the end of each corresponding year.
DISCLOSURE SCORE represents the score of the disclosure analysis. SPI RETURN is the annual return of the Swiss Market Index, 
and SECTOR IND RETURN captures the returns of different sector indices. EXPORT PI is a price index that measures the producer 
price level of goods sold for export. All firm return variables have been winsorized at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles.  
 
Panel A: CEO pay and wealth variables Mean p25 p50 p75 min max sd 
BASE CASH PAY (in TCHF)  954.77 451.00 684.00 1,110.44 0.00 7,908.12 972.10 
VARIABLE CASH (in TCHF)  725.01 109.00 364.96 840.00 0.00 6,776.14 1,025.35 
LTIP (in TCHF)  1,260.32 24.00 300.28 1,300.00 0.00 17,900.00 2,485.59 
OTHER PAY (in TCHF) 358.09 82.90 171.00 293.75 0.00 13,485.80 970.99 
TOTAL PAY (in TCHF) 3,318.08 1,076.00 1,993.00 4,073.98 0.00 22,280.00 3,603.75 
EQUITY OWNED (in %) 1.40 0.00 0.04 0.18 0.00 61.78 6.17 
VALUE SHAREHOLDINGS (in TCHF) 18,163.01 62.70 1,158.40 5,032.22 0.00 921,634.60 74,134.55 
        
Panel B: Firm characteristics        
ASSETS (in Mio.) 49.35 1.05 3.15 18.19 0.02 2,269.55 214.63 
FOREIGN SALE (in %) 46.13 17.35 46.02 74.46 0.00 99.76 32.38 
BETA 1.17 0.75 1.25 1.54 0.01 2.16 0.52 
EBITDA (in Mio.) 1.33 0.10 0.31 0.65 -0.14 14.90 3.20 
EBIT (in Mio.) 1.10 0.06 0.23 0.55 -0.17 12.58 2.68 
        
Panel C: Performance measures        
ROA (in %) 6.03 1.20 5.33 10.27 -15.45 23.64 7.64 
ROE (in %) 10.66 6.57 12.01 19.07 -63.68 44.40 18.11 
TOTAL RETURN (in %) -0.85 -27.35 -0.47 21.86 -72.57 97.57 39.52 
EPS (in %) 17.02 1.76 5.57 15.71 0.00 160.60 31.19 
        
Panel D: Governance Measures        
NO OF DIRECTORS 8.82 7.00 8.00 10.00 4.00 20.00 2.90 
NO OF EXECUTIVES 7.72 5.00 7.00 9.92 1.00 29.00 4.18 
DISCLOSURE SCORE (in %) 60.89 47.73 63.64 76.19 11.90 100.00 18.96 
        
Panel E: Market Measures        
SECTOR IND RETURN (in %) -3.93 -20.41 -2.30 21.65 -75.53 46.51 27.70 
EXPORT PI (in BP) 100.87 100.60 101.00 101.80 98.30 102.60 1.46 
SPI RETURN (in %) -3.17 -7.72 -0.05 2.92 -34.05 23.18 18.69 
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Figure 1. Total CEO compensation. This figure depicts the per capita CHF levels of annual total CEO
compensation over the sample period. The mean and median levels are split according to different
company size classes, where SMI, Mid-Cap und Sma-Cap capture Swiss Market Index constituents,
Mid-Cap and Small-Cap firms, respectively. 
This pattern remains constant over the whole sample period. 
Second, consider the development over time. Strikingly, average CEO pay 
in SMI companies decreased by at least 20 percent over the time period under 
consideration; the largest cut emerged between 2007 and 2008, presumably as 
a direct consequence of the subprime crisis. Beside this crisis effect there 
seems to occur no other common pattern in general annual remuneration 
characteristics. Hence, solely CEOs of SMI companies increase their total pay 
in 2009 whereas average CEO pay in the other sectors showed a continued 
downward sloping trend. Finally, Figure 1 demonstrates that SMI CEO 
remuneration is more volatile over time than compensation in the two smaller 
indices.  
3.2. Composition of CEO Pay  
Figure 2 presents the composition of CEO pay, separated into different index 
brackets. Thus, we calculate the stake of each pay component (base cash pay,  
89 
cash incentive pay (bonuses), equity incentive pay (long-term incentive plans 
and options) and other payments) on total annual compensation.  
An inspection of Panel A of Figure 2 reveals a decreasing importance of 
fix cash payments for CEOs of larger firms. Thus, CEOs of SMI firms receive 
about 30 per cent of their total annual reward in the form of fix cash payments; 
by contrast, for CEOs in Small-Cap firms, the stake of base pay even increases 
from 0.35 in 2007 to almost half of total annual pay in 2011.  
Next, Panel B of Figure 2 depicts the share of discretionary annual short-
term cash bonus on total reward. Naturally, as direct consequence of the 
financial crisis, there occurred a large drop in the importance of bonuses in 
2008 and 2009. However, we further observe that the portion of bonus 
payments decreases more for CEOs of SMI companies than it did for CEOs of 
Mid-Cap or Small-Cap firms. Furthermore, especially SMI company CEOs 
record a significant loss in importance of bonuses in the years after the crisis. 
Figure 2. Composition of total CEO Compensation. This figure displays the composition of CEO pay
over the sample period. Each of the pay components are presented separately according to company size,
where SMI, Mid-Cap und Sma-Cap capture Swiss Market Index constituents, Mid-Cap and Small-Cap
firms, respectively. Panel A depicts the sum of total base pay to total pay. Panel B: presents the ratio of
the cash bonus to total pay and Panel C the LTIP (long term incentive payment), base and variable equity
participation payments to total pay. Panel D displays the sum of all other payments, such as consulting
fee or pension contribution payments, to total pay. 
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Thus, the stake of bonuses on total pay decreased for SMI-company CEOs 
from almost one third to around one fifth in 2011.  
3.3. Other Executives 
Figure 3 depicts the mean and median levels of pay of the members of the 
executive board.6 Overall total annual pay of executives does not exhibit large 
fluctuation over time. The mean levels are close to the median levels, implying 
that executive pay does not exhibit extremely high payments. 
Interestingly, the pattern of size-dependent pay levels, previously observed for 
CEOs, also seems to exist for other executives. Although mean and median 
levels of executive pay of Small-Cap and Mid-Cap firms lie closer together, 
the increase in pay in SMI executive pay is striking. Thus, an average 
executive in a SMI firm is rewarded by more than three times the salary that 
an average Small-Cap executive earns. 
Lastly, we observe that average executive pay levels only increase moderately 
over the sample period. This finding is interesting, especially after  having 
seen substantial drops in CEO pay levels as a consequence of the recent 
financial crisis. 
3.4. The Board of Directors 
Figure 4 presents an overview of the mean and median levels of total 
compensation for directors in the companies’ board split according to size 
classes.7 Overall, average total directors’ annual pay increases massively by 
size class. Thus, an average director can almost quadruple his average pay by 
moving from a Small-Cap company to a large SMI company. In other words, 
there are substantial incentives through career concerns for directors of Swiss 
companies. This pattern has remained stable over time. 
  
                                                 
6
 This group of executives captures only these members of the executive board that are not considered as CEO.  
7
 This captures only those members of the board that are not classified as Chairman.  
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Overall, between 2007 and 2011, average total director pay decreased 
modestly for SMI companies by 5 percent and by around 4 percent for Mid- 
Cap companies, respectively. In contrast, on average directors in Small-Cap 
firms lost around 10 per cent of their (already relatively low) annual pay since 
2007. The mean-median-ratio of total director pay remains almost constant 
over time and is 1.02 for Small companies in 2011 and 1.5 for Mid-Cap 
companies in 2007. Extremely high pay levels do not tend to occur in 
directors’ pay. 
Next, Figure 5 presents the mean and median levels of total chairman 
compensation split into index brackets. When interpreting these figures, an 
important caveat has to be considered. A chairman can either solely chair the 
board of directors or he can – in the same function - also have additional 
operational responsibilities as a member or chairman of the executive board.  
  
0
1,000,000
2,000,000
3,000,000
4,000,000
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
mean SMI median SMI
mean Mid-Cap median Mid-Cap
mean Sma-Cap median Sma-Cap
Total Compensation of Executives 
Figure 3. Total compensation of executives. This figure depicts CHF levels of annual executive board
member compensation over the sample period. Executives are those members of the Executive Board
that are not considered as CEOs. The mean and median levels are split according to different company
size classes, where SMI, Mid-Cap und Sma-Cap capture Swiss Market Index constituents, Mid-Cap and
Small-Cap firms, respectively. 
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This implies that this group of directors cannot be identified as strictly as the 
previous subgroups were.8 Nonetheless, some findings are noteworthy. 
It is interesting to observe that SMI company Chairmen’s pay was not 
influenced by the recent financial crisis. Strikingly, average total pay of SMI 
firm chairmen has even increased by around 20 percent between 2007 and 
2011.   
This pattern does not appear to be driven by an outlier; the median annual pay 
levels also increased by more than 50 per cent. This strongly contrasts with the 
significant decrease of total average compensation of chairmen in Mid-Cap 
companies. An average Chairman of a SMI company today earns more than 
4.5 times the pay rewarded in Small-Cap companies. 
  
                                                 
8
 The annual surveys of PricewaterhouseCoopers, for example, attempt to distinguish between operative and 
non-operative Chairmen.  Thus, they arrive at different descriptive statistics than presented here. 
 
 
Figure 4. Total director compensation. This figure depicts the per capita CHF levels of annual 
directors compensation over the sample period. Directors capture the members of the board of directors 
that are not considered as Chairmen. The mean and median levels are split according to different 
company size classes, where SMI, Mid-Cap und Sma-Cap capture Swiss Market Index constituents, 
Mid-Cap and Small-Cap firms, respectively. 
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4. An Analysis of Pay for Performance 
Having found some first potential patterns of CEO pay variation over time in 
the previous section, we now focus on the determinants of CEO pay in the 
cross section. 
Given the fact that the actions of the CEO are difficult to observe by 
shareholders, there arises the risk that the CEO as agent expends too little 
effort on the principal’s behalf. That is, the executive might have an incentive 
to work less than is optimal for shareholders as a group. In order to minimize 
agency-costs, executive compensation is designed to provide incentives that 
induce managers to act in ways to maximize firm and shareholder value.  
But how strong are the actual performance-incentives for Swiss CEOs? 
Subsequently we study whether and how strongly managers are aligned with 
firm performance and to which extent CEO pay depends on factors that are 
beyond the CEO’s control.  
Figure 5. Total chairman compensation. This figure depicts the per capita CHF levels of annual 
Chairmen compensation over the sample period. The mean and median levels are split according to
different company size classes, where SMI, Mid-Cap and Sma-Cap capture Swiss Market Index 
constituents, Mid-Cap and Small-Cap firms, respectively. 
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4.1. Basic Results 
We begin by providing some graphical evidence, simply plotting annual levels 
of total CEO pay against firm performance measures. Figure 6 presents scatter 
plots of CEO total annual remuneration and return on assets (ROA) for the 
overall sample as well as for different firm size brackets. Considering the 
overall sample first, it becomes apparent that total annual CEO pay increases 
slightly with increasing firm performance. An inspection of the three plots for 
the indices additionally suggests that this positive correlation is most 
pronounced for SMI companies.  
Next, Figure 7 displays the analogous scatter plots for total annual CEO 
remuneration and return on equity (ROE). A similar pattern as with ROA 
arises; indeed, the correlation between performance and pay seems to be more 
pronounced and stronger.  
  
Figure 6. Total CEO compensation and return on assets. This figures presents scatter plots of total 
CEO compensation and contemporaneous return on assets (ROA). Panel A displays the plots for the 
overall sample, and Panel B to D depict the corresponding plots for SMI, Mid-Cap and Small-Cap firms, 
respectively. 
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These findings provide a first indication that CEOs’ total annual pay is 
tied to firm performance, at least in large companies. We now investigate this 
relationship more rigorously, using regression analysis. In this analysis, we 
follow Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Murphy (1999). Specifically, we 
estimate:  
ܥܧܱ	ܲܣܻ௜௝௧ ൌ β	ܲܧܴܨܱܴܯܣܰܥܧ௜௧ ൅ ߛ	ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮܵ௜௧ ൅ α୨ ൅ ߜ௧ ൅	ߝ௜௝௧		 	 ሺ1ሻ	
where CEO PAYijt is the measure of total annual CEO compensation, 
which is defined as the annual total pay or components of pay of firm i of 
sector j in year t.  
PERFORMANCE captures company performance and incorporates 
various accounting performance and shareholder return measures. The 
coefficient ߚ captures the strength of the pay for performance relationship.  
CONTROLS are control variables that include firm size and corporate 
governance proxies. Incorporating governance variables is important because 
Figure 7. Total CEO compensation and return on equity. This figures presents scatter plots of total 
CEO compensation and contemporaneous return on equity (ROE). Panel A displays the plots for the 
overall sample, and Panel B to D depict the corresponding plots for SMI, Mid-Cap and Small-Cap firms, 
respectively. 
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it is possible that the pay-setting process between a CEO and the board is not 
at arm’s-length (Bebchuk and Fried (2004)). Additionally, we incorporate a 
static beta factor to capture the (market) risk exposure a company has against 
the overall market movements (Aggarwal and Samwick (1999)).  
As our sample is a cross section of firms of varying sizes and industries, 
there are likely to exist time invariant unobservable factors which may explain 
some part of the variation in pay. We try to address this unobserved 
heterogeneity by incorporating time and sector-specific binary variables. 
Hence, ߙ௝	refers to sector-specific effects of sector j. ߜ௧ represents a set of year 
dummies, capturing possible time trend and macroeconomics shocks that are 
common to all firms.  
Moreover, we take logs of total compensation and the key explanatory 
variables. Thus, the regression estimates may be interpreted as elasticities.  
We note that these regressions do not allow us to strictly identify causal 
effects, as there are possible omitted variables correlated with both 
compensation and the explanatory variables. Therefore, we interpret the 
results are correlations.  
Table II presents the main results of the CEO pay-for-performance panel 
regressions. Overall, the analysis confirms the indications we derived from the 
scatters plots: Total annual compensation of Swiss CEOs is significantly 
positively associated with firm performance.  
Consider first the regressions where performance is measured by 
contemporaneous return on assets, as in specifications (1) to (3). The 
inspection reveals that there is a positive, significant link between ROA and 
total compensation. The economic significance is not very large, however; a 
10% increase in return on assets is associated with a 1.2 per cent increase in 
total pay.  
Next, performance is captured by total return on equity, Columns (4) to 
(6). It becomes apparent that the pay-performance elasticity becomes even 
stronger. Thus, a 10 per cent increase in ROE is rewarded by around 5 per cent 
increase in total pay. Our finding suggest that for an average CEO of an 
average average firm in our sample, an increase of ROE from 10.6% to 11.7%  
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Table II 
Pay for Performance 
This table presents panel regressions of CEO total compensation on performance and control variables. The dependent variable is 
the logarithm of the CEO total compensation defined as the sum of base pay, bonus, the long-term incentive payments and the 
value of other granted remuneration in the given year. CEO pay is reported in CHF. ln(ROA) (return on assets) is the logarithm of 
the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA), divided by the firm's total assets. ln(ROE) is 
the logarithm of the ratio of EBITDA divided by shareholder's equity. ln(TOT_RET) is the logarithm of the total return of holding 
the share of the company over the last year; this assumes that dividends are re-invested to purchase additional units of the equity. 
NO OF DIRECTORS captures the total number of directors in the company's board. EQUITY OWNED is the absolute number of 
shares held by the corresponding CEO divided by the total number of outstanding shares. BETA is a static factor capturing the stock 
related movements in its price relative to movements in the market as a whole. ln(TOTAL ASSETS) is the logarithm of the firm's 
total assets, reported in CHF. Sector Controls are binaries that equal one for each of different industry sectors the corresponding
company is assigned by the Swiss stock exchange. The t-statistics are adjusted for clustering of standard errors by firm. ∗, ∗∗, and 
∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Time and industry dummies are included but not reported.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ln(1+ROA) 0.113* 0.120* 0.113*        
 (1.72) (1.85) (1.71)        
ln(1+ROE)    0.506** 0.496** 0.502**     
    (2.24) (2.14) (2.22)     
ln(1+EBITDA)       0.052 0.058   
       (1.31) (1.41)   
L.ln(TOTAL RETURN)         0.143** 0.136** 
         (2.23) (2.18) 
NO OF DIRECTORS  -0.020   -0.011   -0.029  0.017 
  (-0.78)   (-0.41)   (-1.04)  (0.82) 
EQUITY OWNED   0.006   -0.784  -0.700  -0.507 
   (0.01)   (-1.35)  (-0.94)  (-0.60) 
BETA 0.267* 0.263 0.267* 0.250* 0.246 0.254* 0.222 0.217 0.357** 0.363** 
 (1.69) (1.64) (1.70) (1.68) (1.62) (1.71) (1.41) (1.36) (2.23) (2.26) 
ln(TOTAL ASSETS) 0.266*** 0.288*** 0.266*** 0.246*** 0.257*** 0.241*** 0.269*** 0.293*** 0.392*** 0.368*** 
 (2.88) (2.99) (2.82) (3.16) (3.09) (3.03) (2.86) (2.92) (10.23) (7.77) 
Constant 7.600*** 7.494*** 7.601*** 8.095*** 8.064*** 8.171*** 7.864*** 7.840*** 5.876*** 6.020*** 
 (5.35) (5.31) (5.24) (6.73) (6.71) (6.68) (5.43) (5.37) (9.34) (8.96) 
           
Sample Size 414 414 414 459 459 459 413 413 279 279 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.29 0.56 0.56 
 
implies an increase of total CEO pay by around CHF 165,000.  
Columns (7) and (8) indicate that financial measures, here shown for 
EBITDA, are still positively, but less significantly associated with 
performance. This suggests that they are not perceived as an adequate measure 
of performance or are not used to reward performance. Further  
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untabulated results confirm that this finding also holds for other accounting 
measures (earnings per share, dividend per share) and financial measures 
(level or change in earnings or sales).  
Finally, Columns (9) and (10) provide evidence for a direct alignment of 
shareholders’ interests and CEO pay. A 10% increase in total shareholder 
return in the previous year is associated with a 1.4 per cent increase of total 
CEO pay.  
As for the control variables, naturally, firm size has a large effect on total 
CEO pay. In the regressions measuring company performance by the return on 
asset, the total assets’ elasticity is around 0.25. This implies that a 10% 
increase in total assets will lead to a 2.5% increase in total annual CEO pay. 
Interestingly, concerning the governance variables, we are not able to find any 
significant effect. Thus, neither a larger board nor the proportion of equity 
owned by the CEO seem to determine CEO total annual pay. The 
insignificance of both governance variables indicates that there seems to exist 
no entrenchment in Swiss boards and CEO’s are not able to take significant 
control in the pay-setting process.  
The static beta factor enters positively and significantly in almost all 
specifications. Thus, as expected, total CEO pay increases with the exposure 
of the corresponding company to the general market. We interpret this finding 
as a risk premium – being more exposed to market movements is something a 
risk-averse CEO needs to be compensated for.9  
Table III tabulates year dummies for the overall sample, split for different 
indices and into sectors. Panel A of Table III shows that controlling for the 
various firm-specific variables, there does not seem to exist an overall fix year 
effect influencing annual total CEO pay. Solely the technology company 
sector exhibits a significant downward trend. Additionally, Panel B of Table 
III displays the time dummy coefficients for a regression of total annual CEO 
on time dummies only. Here, the time effects are somewhat more pronounced, 
                                                 
9
 Another channel through which beta may influence pay is through the increased dismissal risk for the CEO. 
Indeed, Peters and Wagner (2012) document that CEOs of firms exposed to more volatile industry conditions are 
more likely to be fired, and are consequently paid a job risk premium. 
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Table III 
Time Dummy Coefficients 
This table presents time dummy coefficients from panel regressions; Panel A displays the time dummy coefficients of model (1) 
inTable 1 and Panel B presents the time dummy coefficients of a panel regression on time dummy coefficients only. The Year 2007 
is the reference year, and Overall captures the entire sample of CEO observations; SMI and MID-CAP consider subsamples 
according to the corresponding Swiss stock exchange index. SMA-CAP comprises companies of smaller market capitalization, i.e.
not being part of either the SMI or MID-CAP index. Column (5) to (11) split the sample into different sectors, where Indi captures 
industrial companies, Fina, Bama, Heca, Cogo, Tech, and CoSE, financials, basic material, health care, consumer goods, technology 
and consumer service sector firms, respectively.  
The t-statistics are adjusted for clustering of standard errors by firm. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Overall SMI MID-CAP SMA-CAP Indu Fina Bama Heca Cogo Tech Cose 
Panel A: Time dummy of corresponding specification (1) in Table 2.  
2008 -0.059 -0.096 -0.130 -0.040 0.032 -0.140 0.475 -0.191 0.044 -0.222* -0.282 
(-0.92) (-0.75) (-1.13) (-0.46) (0.35) (-0.92) (1.57) (-0.90) (0.43) (-1.70) (-0.77) 
2009 -0.049 0.029 -0.244* 0.004 -0.005 0.142 0.414 -0.232 0.017 -1.179** -0.351* 
(-0.58) (0.32) (-1.95) (0.04) (-0.04) (0.84) (0.99) (-1.20) (0.09) (-2.48) (-1.72) 
2010 0.004 0.019 -0.134 0.035 0.157 0.085 0.288 -0.182 0.008 -0.551* -0.242 
(0.05) (0.16) (-0.99) (0.30) (1.46) (0.48) (1.16) (-0.64) (0.04) (-1.69) (-1.18) 
2011 0.008 0.012 0.038 -0.018 0.238* 0.020 0.238 -0.183 0.191 -0.560*** -0.239 
(0.10) (0.08) (0.31) (-0.14) (1.83) (0.10) (0.95) (-0.66) (1.10) (-5.27) (-1.16) 
Sample Size 414 100 111 203 110 129 28 51 35 26 20 
Sector Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.32 0.15 0.38 0.28 0.024 0.38 0.75 0.85 0.67 0.59 0.70 
            
Panel B: Time dummy coefficients of regression of CEO total pay on time dummies only 
2008 -0.091 -0.243 -0.211** -0.017 0.001 -0.192 0.035 -0.242 0.014 -0.149 -0.041 
 (-1.41) (-1.40) (-2.25) (-0.20) (0.01) (-1.12) (0.13) (-1.33) (0.13) (-1.17) (-0.10) 
2009 -0.067 -0.134 -0.299** 0.023 -0.080 0.104 0.005 -0.075 -0.062 -0.782* -0.433 
 (-0.83) (-1.26) (-2.45) (0.20) (-0.71) (0.56) (0.02) (-0.35) (-0.51) (-1.91) (-1.57) 
2010 0.008 -0.096 -0.157 0.072 0.183 0.044 -0.075 -0.230 -0.074 -0.347 0.007 
 (0.10) (-0.73) (-1.29) (0.62) (1.64) (0.22) (-0.33) (-0.83) (-0.45) (-1.35) (0.03) 
2011 -0.020 -0.139 -0.090 0.007 0.203* -0.060 -0.139 -0.302 0.017 -0.183* 0.127 
 (-0.25) (-0.86) (-0.73) (0.06) (1.67) (-0.28) (-0.37) (-1.11) (0.09) (-1.79) (0.50) 
            
Sample Size 477 103 129 245 118 143 30 65 36 32 31 
Sector Controls No No No No No No No No No No No 
R2 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.17 
 
suggesting that the firm-specific variables explain significant variation over 
time that is otherwise captured by the time dummies directly.  
In order to confirm this, we consider the ratio of explained variation in 
different settings by comparing both panels of Table III. Indeed, the major part 
of variation in total CEO pay is captured by firm size and sector index 
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variables. Thus, we conclude that our analysis does not provide evidence for 
the existence of common factors, such as regulatory influences, that determine 
the levels of CEO pay in general.  
Overall, this analysis shows that CEO pay in Swiss companies is 
powerfully determined by the performance of the companies and sectors. By 
contrast, variation in governance measures offers limited power in explaining 
variation in pay. 
4.2. Heterogeneous Effects  
After having found evidence for a connection of pay and performance in the 
previous section, we now evaluate whether there occur size effects in the 
interaction of pay and performance. In Table IV we interact the raw 
performance measures with size variables.  
In Columns (1) to (3) of Table IV we interact performance measures with 
total assets – our primary firm size variable. An inspection of Table IV 
appears to suggest that the previously established pay for performance 
sensitivity does not seem to be determined by size effects. None of the 
performance measures shows any significant interaction with the firm’s asset 
size. 
However, it turns out that there is a non-linear relation between firm size 
and pay-for-performance. Specifically, in Columns (4) to (6) we interact the 
performance measures with a binary indicator variable that equals one for 
Small-Cap companies and that is zero otherwise. An inspection of Column (4) 
reveals a massive decrease in the pay for performance sensitivity for Small-
Cap firms. While a 10 per cent increase in return on assets increases the 
annual pay of CEOs in SMI and Mid-Cap firms on average by around 3 
percent, the pay for performance sensitivity in Small-Cap firms virtually 
vanishes to about 0.02 percent. Similar results, though somewhat less 
significantly, also hold for the other performance measures that had been 
shown to be significant determinants of pay, ROA and ROE.  
Overall, pay for performance appears to be most pronounced in large and 
medium Swiss companies, but is essentially non-existent in small firms.  
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Table IV 
Heterogeneous Effects 
This table presents panel regressions of CEO total compensation on performance and control variables. The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the CEO total compensation defined as the sum of salary, bonus, the long-term incentive 
payments and the value of other granted remuneration in the given year. CEO pay is reported in CHF. ln(1+ROA) (return on 
assets) is the logarithm of the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA), divided by
the firm's total assets. ln(1+ROE) is the logarithm of the ratio of EBITDA divided by shareholder's equity. ln(TOTAL 
RETURN) is the logarithm of the total return of holding the company’s stock over the last year; this assumes that dividends 
are re-invested to purchase additional units of the equity. ln(STOCK RETURN) is the logarithm of the return of the firm's 
stock in the current year. NO OF DIRECTORS captures the total number of directors in the company's board. EQUITY 
OWNED is the percentage of the firm's equity owned by the CEO. BETA is a static factor capturing the stock related 
movements in its price relative to movements in the market as a whole. SMA-CAP is a dummy variable that equals to one for 
companies considered as “small”, i.e. not being part of either the SMI or SMIM index. ln(TOTAL ASSETS) is the logarithm of 
the firm's total assets, reported in CHF. The t-statistics are adjusted for clustering of standard errors by firm. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Time and industry dummies are included but not reported. 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(1+ROA) -0.665   0.294***   
 (-0.85)   (3.37)   
ln(1+ROE)  -0.771   0.910**  
  (-0.55)   (2.51)  
L.ln(TOTAL RETURN)    0.037   0.211*** 
   (0.10)   (2.96) 
ln(1+ROA) * ln(TOTAL ASSETS)  0.053      
 (0.99)      
ln(1+ROE) * ln(TOTAL ASSETS)  0.086     
  (0.91)     
L.ln(TOTAL RETURN) * ln(TOTAL ASSETS)    0.007    
   (0.29)    
SMA-CAP    0.653* 0.119 -0.521*** 
    (1.79) (0.42) (-2.99) 
ln(1+ROA) * SMA-CAP    -0.276**   
    (-2.36)   
ln(1+ROE) * SMA-CAP     -0.653  
     (-1.44)  
L.ln(TOTAL RETURN) * SMA-CAP      -0.101 
      (-1.37) 
ln(TOTAL ASSETS) 0.195 0.260*** 0.370*** 0.301*** -0.010 0.291*** 
 (1.36) (3.03) (7.76) (2.77) (-0.39) (5.62) 
NO OF DIRECTORS -0.019 -0.010 0.017 -0.019 0.292* 0.013 
 (-0.76) (-0.38) (0.84) (-0.79) (1.75) (0.69) 
BETA 0.339* 0.253* 0.366** 0.389** -0.935 0.255* 
 (1.91) (1.67) (2.27) (2.18) (-1.52) (1.76) 
EQUITY OWNED -0.105 -0.769 -0.483 -0.109 0.262*** -0.255 
 (-0.16) (-1.32) (-0.58) (-0.18) (2.79) (-0.31) 
Constant 8.802*** 8.010*** 5.984*** 6.767*** 7.846*** 7.800*** 
 (4.47) (6.41) (8.94) (3.73) (5.11) (9.35) 
       
Sample Size 414 459 279 414 459 279 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.34 0.56 0.31 0.33 0.58 
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4.3. Pay for Luck 
In this section we try to obtain further insights in the contracting relationship 
between the CEO and the board. Specifically, having documented that pay and 
measures of firm performance are related, we now turn to the question of 
which part of firm performance is actually rewarded. Following Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2001), we consider firm performance as being split into a part 
that actually depends on the factual action of the CEO and of another random, 
but observable component that is external to the CEO. 
This random component of performance consists of other factors that are 
beyond the control of the CEO. As the CEO has no control over the 
observable luck components, the shareholder does not profit at all from 
incentivizing the CEO on this component. Hence, an optimal incentive scheme 
should filter for observable luck components.10 
In order to estimate the sensitivity of CEO pay to luck, we apply a two-
stage procedure where luck is the instrument for performance. In the first-
stage we predict performance by regressing the previously found pay-
performance sensitivity measures on variables capturing unobservable luck 
components:  
ܲܧܴܨܱܴܯܣܰܥܧ௜௝௧ 	ൌ 	ܾ	ܨܣܸܱܴܣܤܮܧ௜௧ ൅ ݃	ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ௜ܵ௝௧ ൅ ݀௜ ൅ ݁௜௧	 	ሺ2ሻ	
Where PERFORMANCE is the measure of firm performance of firm i of 
sector j in year t and ܨܣܸܱܴܣܤܮܧ௜௧ captures the measure for luck; the 
predicted value of performance is ܲܧܴܨܱܴܯܣܰܥܧపఫ௧෣ . 
As the Swiss economy is mainly export oriented, we consider the direct 
influence of exchange rate movements as a first measure of luck. We call this 
specification EXCHANGE. Here, we define FAVORABLE as the FOREIGN 
SALES of each firm multiplied by the EXPORT PRICE INDEX. Thus an 
                                                 
10 These predictions hold within the strict confines of traditional agency theory.  Some models do predict that 
even in competitive markets pay should depend on industry and general market factors.  See, for example, Eisfeldt 
and Kuhnen (2010). 
 
103 
increase in FAVORABLE indicates a more prosperous external environment to 
the company and, hence, an increase in performance.  
As a second luck measure we consider the stock return of the domestic 
sector each company belongs to. The underlying assumption is that sector 
affiliation is not determined by the CEO and performance is mainly driven by 
factors that are beyond the control of the CEO. We call this specification 
SECTOR. Here, FAVORABLE is equal to the sector return, which again is 
hypothesized to be positively related to firm performance.  
Then, in the second-stage of our pay for luck regression we incorporate 
the predicted values for firm performance that are solely determined by 
corresponding the luck measure. Then, we estimate the pay-performance 
elasticity regression again: 
ܥܧܱ	ܲܣ ௜ܻ௝௧ ൌ ߚ௅௨௖௞	ܲܧܴܨܱܴܯܣܰܥܧ෣ ௜௝௧ ൅ ߛ	ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ ߜ௧ ൅	ߝ௜௝௧		 ሺ3ሻ	
where ܲܧܴܨܱܴܯܣܰܥ෣ ܧ݆݅ݐ	captures	the	predicted	value	of	 
ܲܧܴܨܱܴܯܣܰܥܧ௜௝௧. Naturally, we omit the sector dummies from this 
analysis because foreign exposure and sector performance are highly 
correlated with these dummies.  
Since in the second-stage changes of pay are solely based on luck, we 
expect that estimated pay-performance coefficient, ߚ௅௨௖௞, should equal to zero.  
The first-stage regressions are contained in Appendix 1. The instrumental 
variables are significantly associated with the endogenous variables. 
Specifically, when the exchange rate environment becomes more favorable in 
the regions a company exports to more, firm performance improves. Similarly, 
when the sector an industry operates in does better, so does the individual 
company. The first-stage F-statistics for the EXCHANGE specification are 
between 9.5 and 15 and by around 5 for specification SECTOR (except in the 
case of ROE, where they are very low). We note that the values for the 
EXCHANGE specification are above the conventionally suggested threshold 
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of 10.11 For the SECTOR specification, by contrast, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that our two-stage regressions are suffering from a weak 
instruments problem, which would bias the second-stage estimates in the same 
(unknown) direction as the OLS estimates are biased. We therefore interpret 
the following findings carefully (but note that in the study of Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003), which employs the same methodology, the F-statistics of 
the excluded instruments are only around 3).  
The second-stage regression for specification EXCHANGE are presented 
in Table V. Overall, the analysis reveals that pay for luck seems to exist in 
Swiss CEO pay. Columns (1) and (2) in Panel A of Table V show high 
significance of both pay-performance coefficient. Thus, CEOs are rewarded 
for an increase in firm performance independent of whether they contributed 
by own commitment. Panel B in Table V further supports our finding and 
displays that CEO’s total pay increases by around 0.5 per cent when return on 
equity increases by 1 per cent. However, an increase in return driving by luck 
is associated with an increase in total pay by around 11 percent.  (We caution 
that the empirical strategy here relies on the notion that the instrumental 
variable is uncorrelated with other unobserved variables.  It is conceivable, for 
example, that CEO skill, which is by nature unobserved, is positively 
correlated with a company’s decisions to be active in foreign markets.  In this 
case, differences in returns and differences in compensation may be driven by 
this unobserved dimension of heterogeneity among firms.)   
Moreover, Table V reveals that especially long-term incentive plans are 
largely determined by pay for luck. We interpret this finding by observing that 
long-term incentive programmes are granted primarily on a discretionary 
basis. This could potentially enable the CEO to influence the arrangement in a 
more favorable manner.12  
                                                 
11
 Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) suggest a threshold of 8.96 in the case of one instrument. This threshold 
applies for the case of iid errors. As we cluster standard errors by groups, we report the Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic. 
Here, the Staiger and Stock (1997) threshold, 10, is in practice considered as a good rule of thumb 
12
 This analysis shows an additional feature of the pay-performance relation.  In general, performance 
measures seem to be solely associated with total pay and LTIP variable components. In contrast, variable cash and 
base pay seem to be determined by other firm-specific characteristics. 
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TABLE V 
PAY FOR LUCK - EXCHANGE 
This table provides results of 2SLS regressions explaining CEO Pay. The dependent variable is the logarithm of CEO pay,
where TOTAL COMP captures annual total compensation, BASE CASH PAY represents the sum of guaranteed cash 
remuneration, VARIABLE CASH is the amount of cash bonus payments, and LTIP is the sum of long-term-incentive 
programme (containing fix and variable equity payments). Specification captures whether the regressions were run in the
general pay-performance setting (General) or as 2SLS-regression (Exchange), where performance was instrumented with
FAVORABLE, a measure of the firm’s foreign exposure. NO OF DIRECTORS captures the total number of directors in the 
company’s board. EQUITY OWNED is the absolute number of shares held by the CEO divided by the total number of
outstanding shares, and BETA is a static factor capturing the stock related movements in its price to movements in the market
as a whole. ln(TOTAL ASSETS) is the logarithm of the firm’s total assets, reported in CHF. The t-statistics are adjusted for 
clustering of standard errors by firm, and ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable ln(TOTAL PAY)  ln(BASE CASH PAY) ln(VARIABLE CASH) ln(LTIP) 
Specification General Exchange General Exchange General Exchange General Exchange 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A:Performance captured by return on assets. 
ln(1+ROA) 0.144** 1.700*** 0.017 2.872 0.456 2.102 1.377*** 4.385** 
 (2.24) (3.50) (0.16) (1.63) (1.11) (1.07) (3.01) (2.26) 
NO OF DIRECTORS -0.017 -0.075 -0.125 -0.154 -0.186 -0.400 0.086 -0.169 
 (-0.67) (-1.28) (-1.19) (-0.67) (-0.85) (-1.24) (0.51) (-0.71) 
EQUITY OWNED -0.362 1.292 0.078 3.965 -3.310 0.310 -15.862*** -13.578*** 
 (-0.72) (0.57) (0.06) (1.00) (-0.51) (0.05) (-4.88) (-2.88) 
BETA 0.206 0.620*** 0.565 1.237** -0.410 -0.177 0.426 1.053 
 (0.96) (2.91) (1.38) (2.02) (-0.55) (-0.22) (0.55) (1.15) 
ln(TOTAL ASSETS) 0.237*** 0.693*** 0.311** 1.079* 0.244 0.886 0.872*** 1.879*** 
 (3.65) (4.36) (2.14) (1.72) (0.89) (1.27) (3.32) (2.94) 
Constant 10.543*** 0.434 8.084*** -9.979 8.361** -3.325 -6.716 -26.993** 
 (10.47) (0.13) (4.12) (-0.82) (2.08) (-0.26) (-1.53) (-2.13) 
         
Sample Size 414 414 414 414 414 414 414 414 
Adjusted R2 0.18  0.030  0.032  0.14  
F-stat of excluded instrument  15.01  15.01  15.01  15.01 
         
Panel B:Performance captured by return on equity.  
ln(1+ROE) 0.491** 11.075*** -0.176 18.277 4.310*** 17.892 2.921* 28.687** 
 (2.17) (2.74) (-0.48) (1.50) (2.73) (1.41) (1.65) (2.01) 
NO OF DIRECTORS -0.006 0.184* -0.115 0.278 -0.081 -0.015 0.210 0.557* 
 (-0.21) (1.84) (-1.26) (1.31) (-0.39) (-0.05) (1.16) (1.88) 
EQUITY OWNED -1.151*** 1.491 -1.232 4.542 -5.703 -2.379 -14.988*** -11.945* 
 (-2.94) (0.66) (-0.72) (1.02) (-1.29) (-0.50) (-3.76) (-1.95) 
BETA 0.177 1.003*** 0.573 1.936** -0.466 0.541 0.036 1.964* 
 (0.84) (3.08) (1.43) (1.98) (-0.62) (0.51) (0.04) (1.84) 
ln(TOTAL ASSETS) 0.189*** -0.105 0.276** -0.297 0.155 -0.120 0.386 -0.286 
 (3.19) (-0.50) (2.39) (-0.69) (0.68) (-0.27) (1.46) (-0.48) 
Constant 11.408*** 11.983*** 8.633*** 10.045** 8.879*** 9.781** 2.410 4.013 
 (13.29) (4.63) (5.73) (2.13) (2.98) (2.44) (0.61) (0.58) 
         
Sample Size 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 
Adjusted R2 0.16  0.028  0.060  0.12  
F-stat of excluded instrument  9.515  9.515  9.515  9.515 
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Table VI presents the second-stage regressions for specification 
SECTOR. Primarily CEOs’ total pay seems to be strongly associated with firm 
performance driven by sector performance. While considering the above-
stated caveats, we observe that Swiss CEO are also exposed to sector-driven 
performance – both on the upside and on the downside – that is beyond their 
control. 
5. Executive and Board Wealth and Ownership 
Equity holdings can provide powerful performance incentives by ensuring that 
the wealth of most CEOs varies strongly with their firm's stock price.  
5.1. Descriptive Statistics  
Over all observations and sample periods CEO’s of Swiss firms hold on 
average 1.4 percent of outstanding share capital. CEOs of SMI companies 
hold a smaller proportion of total equity capital than CEO’s in Mid-Cap and 
Small-Cap companies. Thus, the median CEO equity ownership in SMI 
companies is 0.01 percent, while it corresponds to 0.03 percent and 0.10 
percent in Mid-Cap and Small-Cap firms, respectively. CEO participation in 
Small-Cap firms is more wide-spread and reaches higher total levels than in 
the other indices brackets. The mean share ownership of Small-Cap firms is 
2.5 percent of total market capitalization. 
Next, inspecting the value of CEO equity holdings in Panel B of Table 
VII reveals that the median CEO in our sample holds about CHF 1.16 million 
of his wealth in company’s equity capital. Strikingly, CEOs of SMI companies 
hold on average more than three times the amount of wealth in firm’s equity 
than CEOs of Mid-Cap and Small-Cap companies. Thus, the median CEOs 
holds roughly CHF 2.93 million in equity. Overall, absolute CEO wealth 
increases over time and even surpasses the average growth of the stake held in 
firm’s equity capital.  
Remarkably, we observe a general increase in the stake of equity 
participation rate. The proportion of CEOs that do not hold any shares drops  
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Table VI 
Pay for Luck – SECTOR 
This table provides estimated coefficients from 2SLS regressions on CEO Pay. The dependent variable is the logarithm of
CEO pay, where TOTAL COMP captures annual total compensation, BASE CASH PAY represents the sum of guaranteed cash 
remuneration, VARIABLE CASH is the amount of cash bonus payments, and LTIP is the sum of long-term-incentive 
programme (containing fix and variable equity payments). Specification captures whether the regressions were run in the 
general pay-performance setting (General) or as 2SLS-regression (Sector), where performance was instrumented with 
FAVORABLE, the firm’s domestic sector index return. NO OF DIRECTORS captures the total number of Directors in the 
company’s board. EQUITY OWNED is the absolute number of shares held by the CEO divided by the total number of
outstanding shares, and BETA is a static factor capturing the stock related movements in its price to movements in the market
as a whole. ln(TOTAL ASSETS) is the logarithm of the firm’s total assets, reported in CHF. The t-statistics are adjusted for 
clustering of standard errors by firm, and ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable ln(TOTAL PAY)  ln(BASE CASH PAY) ln(VARIABLE CASH) ln(LTIP) 
Specification General Sector General Sector General Sector General Sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: Performance captured by return on assets. 
ln(1+ROA) 0.144** 0.965** 0.017 0.850 0.456 -0.493 1.377*** 0.713 
 (2.24) (2.04) (0.16) (0.75) (1.11) (-0.22) (3.01) (0.33) 
NO OF DIRECTORS -0.017 -0.026 -0.125 -0.019 -0.186 -0.226 0.086 0.077 
 (-0.67) (-0.48) (-1.19) (-0.10) (-0.85) (-0.73) (0.51) (0.29) 
EQUITY OWNED -0.362 0.578 0.078 1.999 -3.310 -2.214 -15.862*** -17.149*** 
 (-0.72) (0.44) (0.06) (1.08) (-0.51) (-0.33) (-4.88) (-4.74) 
BETA 0.206 0.499*** 0.565 0.904* -0.410 -0.604 0.426 0.449 
 (0.96) (2.88) (1.38) (1.75) (-0.55) (-0.75) (0.55) (0.52) 
ln(TOTAL ASSETS) 0.237*** 0.480*** 0.311** 0.492 0.244 0.133 0.872*** 0.812 
 (3.65) (3.00) (2.14) (1.28) (0.89) (0.20) (3.32) (1.20) 
Constant 10.543*** 4.967 8.084*** 2.500 8.361** 12.690 -6.716 -4.334 
 (10.47) (1.56) (4.12) (0.35) (2.08) (0.93) (-1.53) (-0.32) 
         
Sample Size 414 414 414 414 414 414 414 414 
Adjusted R2 0.18  0.030  0.032  0.14  
F-stat of excluded instrument  4.710  4.710  4.710  4.710 
         
Panel B: Performance captured by return on equity. 
ln(1+ROE) 0.491** 23.831 -0.176 33.086 4.310*** 50.207 2.921* 11.455 
 (2.17) (0.42) (-0.48) (0.37) (2.73) (0.40) (1.65) (0.16) 
NO OF DIRECTORS -0.006 0.356 -0.115 0.478 -0.081 0.420 0.210 0.325 
 (-0.21) (0.43) (-1.26) (0.38) (-0.39) (0.23) (1.16) (0.35) 
EQUITY OWNED -1.151*** 3.937 -1.232 7.382 -5.703 3.818 -14.988*** -15.249 
 (-2.94) (0.35) (-0.72) (0.43) (-1.29) (0.16) (-3.76) (-1.06) 
BETA 0.177 1.788 0.573 2.847 -0.466 2.528 0.036 0.904 
 (0.84) (0.52) (1.43) (0.52) (-0.62) (0.32) (0.04) (0.20) 
ln(TOTAL ASSETS) 0.189*** -0.467 0.276** -0.717 0.155 -1.037 0.386 0.203 
 (3.19) (-0.26) (2.39) (-0.26) (0.68) (-0.27) (1.46) (0.10) 
Constant 11.408*** 13.312 8.633*** 11.588 8.879*** 13.149 2.410 2.218 
 (13.29) (1.43) (5.73) (0.83) (2.98) (0.70) (0.61) (0.26) 
         
Sample Size 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 
Adjusted R2 0.16  0.028  0.060  0.12  
F-stat of excluded instrument  0.161  0.161  0.161  0.161 
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massively – the most pronounced for in SMI and Mid-Cap companies from 
half of CEOs to around one fifth in 2011.13 Panel B of Table VII also displays 
a certain size effect as the increase in CEO equity participation is more distinct 
in SMI and Mid-Cap companies. However, note that equity participation in 
Small-Cap is higher – three out of four CEOs held an equity stake already in 
2007. 
Finally, in Panel C of Table VII we set the absolute level of CEO equity 
wealth in relation to the CEO’s annual fix cash pay. For an average CEO in 
our sample, a ratio of around 1.8 implies that around 2 annual base cash 
payments are held in the company’s equity capital.  
Overall, the shareholding-to-cash multiplier increases massively over time 
as well as in each of the industry brackets. Thus, in 2007 the median SMI-
CEO holds only about one fifth of his annual cash reward in firm’s equity. In 
2011 however, equity holdings increased reaching two times the annual cash 
reward. Interestingly, equity participation increased the most for CEOs of 
Small-Cap firms.  
Lastly, observing a general increase of the mean-median-ratio over all 
brackets and over time, we observe a decreasing tendency of extreme values.  
We conclude that equity participation gained in importance of the sheer 
holding of equity as well as concerning the CEOs’ wealth that is allocated in 
firms equity. 
Next, we evaluate the equity holdings of the members of the executive 
board. An inspection of Table VIII reveals that overall executive equity 
participation is less pronounced. Thus, firm’s executives hold, with an average 
of 0.4 percent, only half of the equity stake than CEOs. 
The observation of the figures for relative ownership of executives in 
Mid-Cap and Small-Cap firms shows, similar patterns of executive equity 
participation as for the group of CEOs. Interestingly, although showing lower 
holdings of equity, the value of the corresponding equity positions is similar to 
                                                 
13
 It is conceivable, though arguably unlikely, that these changes are due to companies not correctly reporting 
data in 2007.  
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the CEO’s equity stake. This implies that the executives hold larger 
fractions in particularly valuable companies, relative to CEOs.  
Finally, the inspection of the shareholdings-to-cash multiplier reveals that 
primarily executives of SMI and Mid-Cap firms increase the amount of wealth 
allocated in firm equity. Thus, the ratio increases from between one tenth and 
fifth to around twice annual salaries and one annual salary for Mid-Cap firms 
respectively. In contrast, executives in Mid-Cap firms even decrease the ratio 
of salary held in equity over the sample period  
Overall, especially CEOs have to hold or hold voluntarily an increasingly 
large amount of their personal wealth in their firms’ equity. This pattern seems 
to occur especially in larger firms, whereas executives in smaller companies 
do not participate as much.  
To conclude this investigation, we note that generally, equity wealth 
holdings are much higher for U.S. executives. Using data from ExecuComp 
for (roughly) the largest 1,500 corporations, we construct Table IX. The 
median CEO of the largest 1,500 U.S. companies owns around 0.72 per cent 
of the firm’s market value. This corresponds to USD 7.5 million and around 
11 time the annual salary. These numbers are significantly higher than those 
for Switzerland.14 
5.2. Wealth Changes 
Table X presents descriptive statistics for the levels of director’s absolute 
equity wealth changes per year. The absolute individual wealth is captured by 
the average shareholding per year, valued with the company’s share price at 
the end of the corresponding year. Average shareholding is considered as the 
average amount of shares held at the end of the previous year and the holding 
in the corresponding year. 
 
                                                 
14
 One caveat regarding the analysis in the section is that we were not able to consider options and other types 
of equity-based compensation. Especially in the U.S. a significant part of the wealth held in the company’s equity are 
options. The value of the options for a median CEO is around 3 percent of the companies market capitalization. 
However, the ratio is subject to heavy fluctuations. Due to inconsistent and qualitative limitations valid interpretations 
are difficult for Switzerland. 
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Table VII 
CEO Wealth and Ownership 
This table presents descriptive statistics of CEO wealth and ownership. Panel A displays the proportion of shareholdings of a CEO, standardized by the total amount of shares outstanding. This proportion is reported in percent. Panel B shows the 
total value of CEO ownership in shares; therefore the total number of shares a CEO holds at the end of each year is valued with the company’s share price at the end of the corresponding year. Panel C displays the ratio of the value of CEO 
shareholdings standardized by the annual fix cash pay; the value of shareholdings of Panel B were divided by yearly fix pay of the CEO. SMI, MID-CAP and SMA-CAP capture the index bracket the company belongs to, where, SMI capture the 
Swiss market index; the Mid-CAP bracket and Small-Cap bracket, respectively. No shld is the proportion of CEOs that does not own any shares in the corresponding company. 
 Overall sample    SMI     MID-CAP     SMA-CAP    
year median p25 p75 mean no shld.  median p25 p75 mean no shld.  median p25 p75 mean no shld. median p25 p75 mean no shld. 
                        
Panel A: CEO relative ownership in company's share capital (in percent)               
                        
2007 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.78 0.36  0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.50  0.00 0.00 0.05 0.43 0.52  0.08 0.00 0.27 1.23 0.24 
2008 0.03 0.00 0.15 1.47 0.20  0.02 0.00 0.05 0.25 0.15  0.02 0.00 0.06 0.25 0.31  0.10 0.02 0.36 2.57 0.16 
2009 0.05 0.01 0.18 1.50 0.19  0.02 0.00 0.04 0.23 0.15  0.04 0.01 0.10 0.32 0.21  0.10 0.01 0.65 2.74 0.19 
2010 0.04 0.01 0.21 1.63 0.18  0.01 0.00 0.03 0.20 0.22  0.03 0.01 0.08 0.21 0.19  0.09 0.02 0.68 3.12 0.15 
2011 0.06 0.01 0.22 1.59 0.18  0.01 0.01 0.03 0.22 0.20  0.06 0.01 0.12 0.23 0.19  0.14 0.03 0.66 2.93 0.17 
Total 0.04 0.00 0.18 1.40 0.22  0.01 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.24  0.03 0.00 0.07 0.28 0.27  0.10 0.02 0.46 2.50 0.18 
                        
Panel B: CEO value of ownership in company's share capital (in Mio. CHF)              
                        
2007 0.71 0.00 4.74 15.70   0.17 0.00 6.11 9.06   0.00 0.00 1.50 26.00   0.90 0.02 5.47 14.00  
2008 0.87 0.07 3.10 15.50   2.99 0.58 11.30 28.70   0.43 0.00 1.32 6.77   0.83 0.05 2.67 15.00  
2009 1.35 0.11 4.73 23.40   3.97 0.77 11.60 28.00   1.13 0.09 4.24 8.05   1.08 0.13 4.21 30.80  
2010 1.84 0.20 6.91 24.90   3.33 0.04 12.30 25.50   1.11 0.39 6.37 7.74   1.27 0.17 6.59 34.10  
2011 1.73 0.16 5.20 11.00   4.20 0.88 13.60 15.00   1.41 0.08 4.12 3.60   1.48 0.14 3.83 13.50  
Total 1.16 0.06 5.03 18.16   2.93 0.17 10.60 21.40   0.86 0.00 3.12 9.72   1.06 0.11 4.41 21.30  
                        
Panel C: Ratio of value shareholdings to yearly fix cash pay                
                        
2007 1.05 0.00 4.37 29.54   0.20 0.00 4.15 4.50   0.00 0.00 2.85 22.24   1.52 0.04 9.97 43.22  
2008 0.97 0.12 4.00 20.43   1.70 0.59 8.45 12.23   0.52 0.00 1.29 4.44   1.30 0.12 6.12 32.86  
2009 1.90 0.23 6.08 33.00   1.98 0.75 7.22 11.56   1.41 0.17 4.24 5.19   2.34 0.27 7.82 61.08  
2010 2.55 0.52 7.84 38.41   2.19 1.34 4.95 15.94   1.22 0.18 7.61 7.57   3.17 0.71 10.98 68.03  
2011 2.19 0.22 6.56 21.33   2.12 1.08 8.80 11.90   1.71 0.18 4.72 6.09   3.00 0.37 7.29 34.17  
Total 1.75 0.13 6.00 28.51   1.96 0.20 6.14 11.33   0.96 0.00 4.00 8.48   2.24 0.19 7.60 47.49  
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Table VIII 
Executives Wealth and Ownership 
This table presents descriptive statistics of executive board members wealth and ownership. Panel A displays the proportion of shareholdings of a executives, standardized by the total amount of shares outstanding. This proportion is reported in 
percent. Panel B shows the total value of executives ownership in shares; therefore the total number of shares an executive holds at the end of each year is valued with the company’s share price at the end of the corresponding year. Panel C 
displays the ratio of the value of executive shareholdings standardized by the annual fix cash pay; the value of shareholdings of Panel B were divided by yearly fix pay of the CEO. SMI, MID-CAP and SMA-CAP capture the index bracket the 
company belongs to, where, SMI capture the Swiss market index; the MID-CAP bracket and Small-Cap bracket, respectively. No shld is the proportion of executives that does not own any shares in the corresponding company. 
 
 Overall sample    SMI     MID-CAP     SMA-CAP    
year median p25 p75 mean no shld.  median p25 p75 mean no shld.  median p25 p75 mean no shld. median p25 p75 mean no shld. 
                        
Panel A: Executive relative ownership in company's share capital (in percent)               
                        
2007 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.50 0.38  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.54  0.00 0.00 0.08 0.38 0.49  0.12 0.01 0.47 1.01 0.16 
2008 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.32 0.28  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.43  0.02 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.26  0.11 0.04 0.29 0.75 0.15 
2009 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.63 0.27  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.55 0.35  0.05 0.00 0.15 0.11 0.30  0.15 0.04 0.42 1.12 0.14 
2010 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.38 0.28  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.53 0.34  0.03 0.00 0.12 0.09 0.34  0.17 0.02 0.31 0.43 0.15 
2011 0.02 0.00 0.16 0.18 0.19  0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.21  0.08 0.02 0.19 0.14 0.13  0.13 0.02 0.38 0.37 0.19 
Total 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.41 0.28  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.24 0.38  0.03 0.00 0.12 0.15 0.31  0.13 0.02 0.38 0.74 0.16 
                        
Panel B: Executive value of ownership in company's share capital (in Mio. CHF)              
                        
2007 0.65 0.00 3.26 19.70   0.00 0.00 1.84 10.70   0.02 0.00 3.26 34.00   1.40 0.05 6.52 20.30  
2008 0.67 0.00 3.03 6.37   0.60 0.00 5.82 6.70   0.54 0.00 1.11 2.13   0.87 0.12 2.85 8.48  
2009 1.48 0.00 5.51 94.10   1.57 0.00 6.95 223.00   0.94 0.00 3.53 3.30   1.51 0.22 5.51 10.90  
2010 1.52 0.00 5.52 138.00   2.04 0.00 7.57 341.00   1.19 0.00 4.83 3.47   1.52 0.24 5.28 6.04  
2011 1.58 0.16 6.54 6.83   1.88 0.10 7.78 10.20   2.09 0.57 5.80 3.81   1.01 0.05 4.83 4.90  
Total 1.09 0.00 4.83 55.20   1.07 0.00 6.33 125.00   0.78 0.00 3.45 8.75   1.33 0.12 4.55 10.20  
                        
Panel C: Ratio of value shareholdings to yearly fix cash pay                
                        
2007 0.85 0.00 3.04 37.16   0.16 0.00 2.26 3.70   0.11 0.00 2.45 8.42   1.26 0.40 4.69 87.43  
2008 0.58 0.00 2.54 12.05   0.79 0.00 3.26 3.19   0.35 0.01 1.60 1.00   0.73 0.11 2.76 27.65  
2009 1.06 0.02 3.45 140.49   1.60 0.00 4.96 333.75   0.71 0.02 2.61 2.02   0.90 0.31 9.65 17.31  
2010 1.32 0.20 5.01 434.16   2.48 0.20 5.28 1165.32   0.70 0.00 4.54 2.82   1.17 0.33 6.42 13.64  
2011 1.17 0.19 3.74 7.18   1.92 0.32 5.45 5.23   1.08 0.29 2.98 2.50   0.95 0.16 2.68 11.41  
Total 0.92 0.03 3.63 130.01   1.33 0.00 4.37 301.83   0.65 0.00 2.53 3.22   0.95 0.24 3.65 30.87  
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Table IX 
U.S. Wealth and Ownership 
  
This table presents descriptive statistics of U.S. CEO and executive wealth and ownership of S&P1500 firms. Panel A displays the proportion of 
individual shareholdings standardized by the total amount of shares outstanding. This proportion is reported in percent. Panel B shows the total 
value of individual executive ownership in shares; the total number of shares a individual holds at the end of each year is valued with the company’s 
share price at the end of the corresponding year. Panel C displays the ratio of the value of individual shareholdings standardized by the annual fix 
cash pay; therefore the value of shareholdings of Panel B were divided by yearly fix pay of the CEO. No shld is the proportion of individuals that 
does not own any shares in the corresponding company. 
 
 CEO      Board & Other Executives 
 median p25 p75 mean no shld.  median p25 p75 mean no shld. 
 
Panel A: Relative ownership in company's share capital (in percent) 
 
2000 1.47 0.49 5.91 5.18 0.04  2.29 0.70 9.07 6.84 0.04 
2001 1.35 0.45 4.80 4.68 0.10  1.95 0.60 7.69 6.12 0.10 
2002 1.10 0.37 4.07 4.34 0.12  1.60 0.49 6.59 5.80 0.12 
2003 1.05 0.35 3.50 3.86 0.12  1.47 0.48 5.62 5.40 0.12 
2004 1.03 0.34 3.28 4.03 0.09  1.33 0.46 5.37 5.56 0.09 
2005 1.01 0.34 3.16 3.77 0.02  1.33 0.45 5.20 5.09 0.02 
2006 1.04 0.34 3.21 3.97 0.01  1.37 0.45 5.30 5.58 0.01 
2007 0.93 0.32 3.33 4.01 0.02  1.14 0.32 4.34 5.26 0.02 
2008 0.97 0.36 3.10 3.93 0.01  1.10 0.27 3.79 5.17 0.01 
2009 0.36 0.12 1.13 2.00 0.01  0.83 0.30 2.43 3.22 0.01 
2010 0.33 0.11 1.03 1.75 0.01  0.78 0.30 2.08 2.93 0.01 
2011 0.33 0.11 1.03 1.60 0.01  0.80 0.29 2.09 2.74 0.01 
Total 0.72 0.22 2.43 3.29 0.04  1.15 0.38 4.18 4.73 0.04 
 
Panel B: Value of ownership on company's share capital (in Mio. USD) 
            
2000 10.39 2.33 54.48 200.96   24.07 6.42 94.06 306.46  
2001 9.45 2.03 45.30 176.96   21.36 5.40 92.15 260.29  
2002 6.93 1.40 30.57 157.14   14.71 3.72 61.14 210.26  
2003 8.96 2.21 43.04 160.95   17.84 5.51 74.41 217.40  
2004 10.02 2.42 43.34 169.92   20.51 5.89 82.62 260.90  
2005 10.73 2.61 41.06 154.01   21.93 6.48 84.62 260.18  
2006 11.70 3.05 43.07 176.15   25.45 8.17 93.65 278.60  
2007 8.39 2.29 34.99 634.30   20.57 5.88 75.77 708.82  
2008 5.26 1.38 17.87 251.69   12.84 3.93 39.49 297.53  
2009 6.02 2.05 18.19 65.90   13.75 5.11 37.57 112.63  
2010 7.12 2.62 20.14 83.58   16.32 6.51 42.60 127.41  
2011 7.15 2.74 19.73 66.83   16.86 6.81 41.24 109.01  
Total 7.70 2.23 29.09 185.65   17.85 5.72 60.01 252.45  
 
Panel C: Ratio of value shareholdings to yearly fix cash pay 
            
2000 19.31 4.52 108.14 683.57   56.62 15.91 224.03 943.54  
2001 17.07 3.97 78.50 681.41   51.27 14.26 191.00 856.75  
2002 11.52 2.63 54.71 574.61   32.91 9.38 125.92 668.69  
2003 14.64 4.08 70.40 659.19   43.05 13.53 157.67 765.74  
2004 16.04 4.44 68.79 671.62   43.84 14.50 159.06 1,133.09  
2005 15.79 4.48 61.22 663.42   47.20 14.93 167.98 817.06  
2006 17.03 4.96 65.19 614.12   53.39 18.35 169.37 774.86  
2007 12.03 3.73 51.82 3,388.47   43.08 14.19 135.95 3,435.37  
2008 7.38 2.20 25.95 1,917.38   25.04 8.84 75.19 1,967.18  
2009 7.93 2.97 22.08 211.99   26.62 10.73 63.74 274.03  
2010 8.94 3.71 23.52 188.73   29.66 13.35 68.26 245.58  
2011 8.98 3.70 22.41 185.95   29.26 13.49 63.54 239.36  
Total 11.24 3.56 41.96 851.30   35.33 12.94 112.49 973.69  
113 
In 2008, at least three out of four CEOs, chairmen and other board 
members suffered net wealth reductions resulting from plunging share prices. 
In 2009, we observed the mirror image, that is at least 75% of the persons 
surveyed benefited from rising share prices. In 2010 however, an intermediate 
result occurred.  The median CHF wealth change due to ownership was 
around zero or slightly positive for all three groups. 
The difficult market environment in 2011 led to broad losses throughout, 
and so the gains the median CEO, chairman and director had made in 2009 
and 2010 essentially evaporated in 2011. The wealth changes of the middle 
half of CEOs, chairmen, and other board members are in a relatively narrow 
range around the median. 50% of all CEOs, that is between lower and upper 
quartile, experienced wealth changes in the amount of CHF -900,000 to CHF 
+100,000. For chairmen, this range is from CHF -730,000 to CHF +90,000 for 
2010. For other board members, this range amounts to CHF -230,000 to CHF -
10,000 for 2011 compared to CHF -50,000 to CHF +110,000 for 2010.  
While in 2010, the distribution of wealth changes was relatively 
symmetric – with the average wealth change approximating the median – in 
2011, this distribution was again highly skewed (as had been the case in 2008 
and 2009). For example, in 2011, the average CEO lost CHF 3,8 million while 
the median lost “only” CHF 400,000. This applies similarly for chairmen and 
other board members.   
The percentage wealth change, defined as the wealth change of a 
disclosed person expressed as a percentage of the wealth he holds in shares of 
his company, can be substantial: In SMI and Mid-Cap companies, the median 
percentage wealth change of CEOs in 2011 was -14.6%. For other board 
members, this number was -13.6%, for chairmen it was -12.7%. In Small-Cap 
firms, these numbers were -20.2%, -16.4%, and -24.2%, respectively. 
Overall, these results suggest that in a market environment as volatile as 
the one we have witnessed over the past years, Swiss executives and board 
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Table X 
Wealth Changes 
 
members are exposed to significant wealth risk through their equity holdings, 
even though the absolute holdings are relatively small compared to their 
counterparts in U.S. firms. Given that stock price developments are to a 
significant extent driven by general market developments, this again suggests 
a substantial element of exposure to exogenous factors. While economic 
theory suggests that some degree of such exposure can be useful – for 
example, for retention purposes – boards should think carefully about whether 
the particular setting in their company is appropriate given the characteristics 
of their industry and the contributions of the executives.   
 
6. Disclosure of Compensation 
6.1. Introduction to Disclosure 
The disclosure of statements about corporate governance of Swiss listed 
companies is required by law based on the Swiss Code of Obligations. That 
code mainly concerns the disclosure of levels of compensation. In the recent 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the levels of director’s absolute equity wealth changes per year. The absolute individual wealth is 
captured by the average shareholding per year, valued with the company’s share price at the end of the corresponding year; average shareholding is 
the average amount of shares held at the end of the previous year and the holding in the corresponding year.  
The absolute wealth changes are reported in Mio. CHF.  
 
 SMI and Mid-cap companies    Small-Cap companies 
 max p25 p75 min median  max p25 p75 min median 
 
Panel A: Absolute wealth changes of CEOs (in Mio. CHF) 
 
2008 42.827 -0.285 -1.884 -218.788 -0.828  0.319 -0.056 -4.834 -79.747 -0.323 
2009 10.315 0.985 0.059 -35.268 0.482  495.006 0.781 0.004 -5.728 0.069 
2010 11.620 0.979 -0.008 -21.115 0.231  41.940 0.913 0.018 -184.497 0.118 
2011 8.274 -0.105 -0.897 -99.275 -0.399  0.110 -0.001 -1.520 -690.150 -0.207 
 
Panel B:  Absolute wealth changes of Chairmen (in Mio. CHF) 
            
2008 6.342 -0.308 -33.518 -2,745.093 -2.740  0.155 -0.080 -1.828 -291.441 -0.237 
2009 2,173.719 3.095 0.013 -30.078 0.246  210.701 0.293 0.001 -0.517 0.068 
2010 1,899.800 0.407 -0.110 -32.085 0.079  177.387 0.710 0.002 -12.641 0.099 
2011 4.411 -0.091 -0.726 -9.318 -0.327  0.220 -0.004 -0.636 -51.169 -0.060 
 
Panel C: Absolute wealth changes of other members of the board of Directors (in Mio. CHF) 
            
2008 4.732 -0.059 -0.667 -3,014.274 -0.209  0.106 -0.007 -0.261 -401.006 -0.040 
2009 1,442.614 0.236 0.007 -318.185 0.054  210.701 0.059 0.000 -2.765 0.010 
2010 293.772 0.106 -0.048 -586.749 0.008  191.854 0.078 0.000 -17.850 0.015 
2011 44.447 -0.010 -0.235 -1,567.438 -0.068  1.955 0.000 -0.159 -66.106 -0.021 
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years several new requirements became effective that particularly address the 
disclosure of statements about the process and about other substantive issues 
in management compensation.  
In particular, the SIX Exchange Regulation is responsible for the 
enforcement of issuer regulation in accordance with the SIX Swiss Exchange 
stock exchange law. In its Directive on Information15 relating to Corporate 
Governance it requires issuers to disclose important information on their board 
and executives.16 With its circular 8/2010, the SIX has amplified the relevancy 
of corporate governance disclosures by emphasizing that in its 2010 review of 
annual reports it would pay particular attention to whether the rules are being 
adhered to. 
However, compliance to disclosure requirements is not a simple matter 
when it comes to compensation disclosure and listed companies need to be 
aware of several different standards in deciding what needs to be disclosed. 
Additionally, the Directive Corporate Governance is itself not particularly 
detailed, and there are several additional relevant documents that our 
assessment also incorporates. First, the Commentary to the Directive provides 
a number of more detailed points. Second, on November 24, 2010, the SIX 
provided some additional guidance on particular aspects of disclosure. Third, 
additional information can be read out of the published decisions of the SIX 
sanctions commission. 
6.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Having recognized the inexistence of any clear regulatory requirements for 
corporate governance disclosure, we employ a rating system that aims at 
capturing the rules that companies currently need to comply with as far as the 
SIX Exchange Regulation is concerned. This rating system was first presented 
in PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011), summarized in a scorecard for disclosure 
                                                 
15
 Note that the Directive Corporate Governance also covers other aspects of disclosure not related to 
compensation.  
16
 Companies do also have the right to obtain certain information; however this has to be justified 
substantially.  
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in annual reports comprising 24 criteria.17 The description of the system 
follows PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011).  
The general guiding principle that companies need to follow is that the 
principles and elements of compensation (the design and determining 
mechanisms, as well as details of any shareholding program and how it works) 
must be explained to investors in terms that are as comprehensible as possible.  
Onto this general principle follow several more specific requirements, 
which we hence chosen to summarize under three headings.  
Topic A (Requirements regards the process of how pay is set) covers 
requirements regarding the process of how pay is set. The key points of the 
process used to determine compensation and participation in the shareholding 
program must be described. This includes, but is not limited to, issues such as 
competencies of various bodies, who have a vote in a relevant meeting, 
whether external advisors are consulted, and whether part of the compensation 
is given on a discretionary basis.  
Topic B (Requirements regarding the substance of the compensation 
system) related to requirements regarding the substance of the compensation 
system. Companies have to describe which goals are taken into account when 
structuring compensation and share-ownership programs, and how strongly 
individual goals and other components are taken into account. Non-GAAP 
measures need to be explained. Moreover, companies are required to disclose 
whether benchmarks or salary comparisons have been used; if so, the 
benchmarks and salary comparisons selected must be disclosed and the choice 
of benchmarks and reference salaries must be explained as transparently as 
possible. Furthermore, the composition of pay needs to be detailed in various 
ways, using easy-to-understand quantitative analysis, and share and option 
planed need to be explained exactly.  
                                                 
17
 The scorecard is PricewaterhouseCoopers’ reading of the SIX Exchange Regulation’s rules. It is not an 
official rating and was developed without any involvement of SIX Exchange Regulation.  
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Topic C (Requirements regarding the evaluation of payments and other 
requirements) explanation of in-kind payments, special payments, especially 
those made upon leaving the company, and related topics.   
On each of the 24 criteria, companies were rated with a grade of 0, 1, or 2. 
First determined whether a given criterion is addressed at all in a report. If it 
was addressed, a score of 2 was given if an issuer fully and understandably 
covered the issue or used the “explain” clause, that is the issuer did not 
disclose the issue, but explained why it did so. A score of one was given if the 
criterion was partially addressed, and a score of 0 was given if the issuer used 
too general explanation or incomprehensible prose. If a criterion was not 
mentioned at all, we assigned a score of 0 due to the apparent violation of 
disclosure requirements.  
However, for some criteria it was possible that they did not apply to a 
given company (for example, when no “special rules” exist for some 
managers, they cannot be disclosed), and in this case we did not take this 
criterion into account for calculation of the total number of reachable points 
for this company. The total compliance score for a company was then 
calculated as the ratio of the sum of the total number of points achieved to the 
total number of reachable points. 
Figure 8 presents an overview of the compliance scores for SMI and Mid-
Cap firms from 2009 to 2011. In order to capture overall patterns, we sort the 
scores by year in ascending order. Overall, we observe a general increase in 
disclosure quality. As the median score increases constantly, we interpret this 
as evidence for a general establishment of minimum disclosure standards. 
Thus, in 2009 firms had to reach a score of at least 50% to be in the upper 
half of the sample distribution. The minimum threshold level between the 
upper and lower half of the distribution increased constantly over time. 
Thus, in 2011, the disclosure score of at least 75% was required to be in 
the upper bracket. 
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Next, Figure 10 displays the disclosure score ranked on the score reached 
in 2009. We find that only 5 out of 50 firms worsened their disclosure over 
time. The remainder of firms improved its disclosure quality constantly. 
Especially the group of companies that exhibited the lowest compliance in 
2009 revealed the largest improvements. Naturally, annual improvements 
decrease the higher the initially achieved score was. 
6.3. Regression Results 
As a final step in our analysis, we now briefly consider the potential 
correlation of disclosure quality with general pay levels. Two hypotheses 
appear plausible. On the one hand, disclosure of more detailed and private 
information about the pay-setting process, such as insight into the substance 
and calculations, may imply that average pay diminishes as discretionary parts  
become public and have to be justified to shareholders. On the other hand, it 
could be that better disclosure enables firms to substantiate complex and 
discretionary components of total executive pay.  
 
Figure 8: SIX Disclosure Score. This figure presents the developments of the disclosure score for SMI
and Mid-Cap companies from 2009 to 2011. 
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Table X shows that the DISCLOSURE SCORE is not highly significantly 
associated with pay levels. If at all, firms with better disclosure tend to pay 
more (even controlling for size, performance, and other factors). 
  
7. Conclusions 
This is one of the first comprehensive investigations of executive pay practices 
in Swiss companies. Both mandatory and voluntary disclosure of 
compensation have improved significantly over time.  We document that in 
the time period for which detailed compensation data are available, there have 
been few strong trends in compensation. We do observe a general increase in 
the stake of equity participation that is most pronounced for larger companies. 
Furthermore, concomitantly with increasing equity participation, accumulated 
CEO equity wealth increases as well – binding executives even more to the 
general firm’s success. The level of equity participation is, however, is still far 
below that of other countries, the U.S. for example.  Drawing on a  
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Figure 9. SIX Disclosure Score. This figure presents the developments of disclosure score for SMI and
Mid-Cap companies from 2009 to 2011; the ranking is based on the disclosure score reached in 2009. 
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Figure X 
Compensation and Disclosure 
This table presents panel regressions of CEO total compensation on disclosure scores, performance and control variables . The 
dependent variable is the logarithm of the CEO total compensation defined as the sum of base pay, bonus, the long-term incentive 
payments and the value of other granted remuneration in the given year. CEO pay is reported in CHF. DISCLOSURE SCORE
represents the score of the disclosure analysis. ln(ROA) (return on assets) is the logarithm of the ratio of earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA), divided by the firm's total assets. ln(ROE) is the logarithm of the ratio of EBITDA 
divided by shareholder's equity. ln(TOT_RET) is the logarithm of the total return of holding the share of the company over the last 
year; this assumes that dividends are re-invested to purchase additional units of the equity. NO OF DIRECTORS captures the total 
number of directors in the company's board. EQUITY OWNED is the absolute number of shares held by the corresponding CEO 
divided by the total number of outstanding shares. BETA is a static factor capturing the stock related movements in its price relative 
to movements in the market as a whole. ln(TOTAL ASSETS) is the logarithm of the firm's total assets, reported in CHF. Sector 
Controls are binaries that equal one for each of different industry sectors the corresponding company is assigned by the Swiss stock 
exchange. The t-statistics are adjusted for clustering of standard errors by firm. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. Time and industry dummies are included but not reported. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
DISCLOSURE SCORE 0.698 0.724 0.740 0.602 0.698 0.675 0.792 0.937* 0.732 0.949 
 (1.40) (1.43) (1.44) (1.16) (1.37) (1.27) (1.52) (1.76) (1.36) (1.63) 
ln(1+ROA) 0.234* 0.206* 0.240**        
 (1.91) (1.96) (1.97)        
ln(1+ROE)    0.338 0.202 0.397     
    (0.42) (0.34) (0.52)     
ln(1+EBITDA)       0.098 0.070   
       (1.15) (1.19)   
L.ln(TOTAL RETURN)         0.218*** 0.201** 
         (2.68) (2.50) 
NO OF DIRECTORS  0.024   0.068**   0.056*  0.049 
  (0.92)   (1.97)   (1.90)  (1.46) 
EQUITY OWNED   9.211   15.433  16.583  14.390 
   (0.65)   (0.79)  (0.87)  (1.15) 
BETA 0.266 0.236 0.276 0.155 0.104 0.172 0.150 0.118 0.379 0.383 
 (0.62) (0.56) (0.64) (0.37) (0.26) (0.41) (0.34) (0.27) (0.67) (0.69) 
ln(TOTAL ASSETS) 0.174 0.151 0.175 0.167 0.095 0.168 0.087 0.031 0.378*** 0.327*** 
 (0.93) (0.80) (0.93) (0.93) (0.52) (0.93) (0.45) (0.15) (3.76) (3.48) 
Constant 11.017*** 11.224*** 10.928*** 11.994*** 12.444*** 11.880*** 13.011*** 13.248*** 8.453*** 8.569*** 
 (3.72) (3.82) (3.66) (4.25) (4.39) (4.18) (4.24) (4.22) (3.72) (3.90) 
           
Sample Size 133 133 133 142 142 142 128 128 106 106 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.48 0.52 
 
comprehensive dataset of the extent to which companies comply with 
transparency requirements, we also document massive increases of disclosure 
quality for the largest 50 companies, probably prompted by several actions the 
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regulator has taken against noncompliant companies.  Perhaps the most 
notable result of our study is that Swiss CEOs do experience pay for 
performance in general. We highlighted two facets of this relationship. First, 
pay for performance is stronger in larger companies. Second, Swiss CEOs 
appear to be exposed to external developments; performance driven purely by 
luck (bad luck) translates into higher (lower) pay.  While the data suggest a 
general insignificance of governance influences, implying that there does not 
seem to exist a close entrenchment of Swiss CEOs, a natural question to ask is 
whether in better-governed firms there is less pay-for-luck.  As more data 
become available, it will be possible to address this question.  
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Supplementary Appendix 
Table A.1 
Overview of covered sectors 
Sector 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Basic Materials 7 7 6 6 4 30 
Consumer Goods 6 7 8 8 6 35 
Consumer Services 6 6 6 6 5 29 
Financials 28 29 29 28 28 142 
Health Care 12 13 13 12 12 62 
Industrials 24 23 24 23 23 117 
Oil & Gas 1 1 1 2 2 7 
Technology 6 6 6 6 6 30 
Telecommunications 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Utilities 1 2 1 1 2 7 
Total 92 95 95 93 89  
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Table A.2 
First-stage regression of Pay for Luck Analysis 
This table presents estimated coefficients of the first-stage regression on the2SLS regression setting in Table V and Table VI. Two 
specifications are displayed: EXCHANGE and SECTOR. In specification EXCHANGE  performance instrumented with the share 
of foreign sales multiplied by the Swiss franc nominal effective exchange rate. In specification EXCHANGE
performance was instrumented with corresponding sector index return. NO OF DIRECTORS captures the total number 
of Directors in the company’s board. EQUITY OWNED is the absolute number of shares held by the CEO divided by 
the total number of outstanding shares, and BETA is a static factor capturing the stock related movements in its price to
movements in the market as a whole. ln(TOTAL ASSETS) is the logarithm of the firm’s total assets, reported in CHF. 
The t-statistics are adjusted for clustering of standard errors by firm, and ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
 
Specification Exchange FAVORABLE = ln(1+FOREIGNEXPOSURE) 
Sector 
FAVORABLE = ln(1+SECTOR IND RETURN)
Dependent Variable ROA ROE ROA ROE 
     
FAVORABLE 0.199*** 0.032*** 0.766*** 0.024 
 (7.38) (4.19) (3.38) (0.40) 
NO OF DIRECTORS 0.048*** -0.016*** 0.065*** -0.014*** 
 (2.93) (-3.69) (3.84) (-3.06) 
EQUITY OWNED -1.293** -0.224 -0.791 -0.188 
 (-2.04) (-1.42) (-1.19) (-1.16) 
BETA -0.461*** -0.108*** -0.165** -0.061*** 
 (-5.90) (-4.94) (-2.35) (-3.20) 
ln(TOTAL ASSETS) -0.260*** 0.032*** -0.278*** 0.029*** 
 (-10.69) (5.10) (-10.91) (4.45) 
Constant 5.576*** -0.188** 5.970*** -0.111 
 (16.83) (-2.14) (17.41) (-1.25) 
     
Observations 414 459 414 459 
R-squared 0.376 0.127 0.311 0.093 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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